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Background: The 2014-2016 Ebola Virus Disease outbreak in West Africa highlighted the 
danger of emerging infectious diseases in areas with weak health systems. In Liberia, the 
outbreak resulted in over ten thousand cases and five thousand deaths. Existing evidence 
on the spread of Ebola is based on smaller scale outbreaks, and there is a knowledge 
gap in understanding the drivers of the epidemic in this new setting. This work 
investigates the epidemiological parameters of the EVD outbreak in Liberia, characterizes 
the role of community event-based surveillance in outbreak control, and investigates the 
determinants of performance of community health workers in those programs. 
Methods: Paper 1 uses surveillance data generated during the EVD epidemic in 2014 
and 2015 to link data generated by case investigations, treatment units, and epidemic 
control measures. We report changes over time in reproduction numbers, coverage of 
control measures, case fatality ratios, and the odds ratios of selected demographic, risks, 
and exposures. Paper 2 uses data from a community surveillance pilot project and the 
disease reports in 2016 to examine the design and implementation of a Community 
Event-Based Surveillance (CEBS) program, its sensitivity and positive predictive value, and 
evaluate domains of sustainability. Paper 3 evaluates the performance of community 
health workers in CEBS, examined through estimating odds rations for indicators of 
reporting, trigger recall, information sources, and process knowledge. 
Results: We identified 10,280 cases (Attack Rate: 5.3 per 1,000) and 5,049 Ebola-related 
deaths (Case Fatality Ratio: 48.4%). The estimated basic reproduction number (R0=1.72) 
was one of the lowest estimates for EVD outbreaks. We show that the coverage of 
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contact tracing was low, covering a maximum of 21% of cases, and Ebola Treatment Unit 
(ETU) usage rose through the epidemic. There was a large increase in coverage of 
interventions following a reorganization of outbreak coordination in August, coinciding 
with a shift towards inclusive community outbreak control strategies. In Paper 2, we 
report that the CEBS pilot project in Liberia captured an average of 157 alerts and 37 
suspect cases per week of the 12 reportable epidemic-prone conditions. The majority 
(95%) of alerts met the case definition. CHWs were most able to recall endemic 
conditions. We also identify and summarize four major designs of CEBS programs and 
suggest the Liberia CEBS structure as an active response program was unsustainable due 
to challenges in political support, organizational capacity, and financial sustainability. In 
Paper 3, we show that reporting at least one trigger was negatively related to the 
walking time of more than one hour from the health facility (OR=0.30, 95%CI 0.17-0.52). 
CHWs who were satisfied with their incentive were more likely to recall triggers (OR= 
2.05, 95%CI 1.39-3.04), recall program protocol (OR=1.65, 95%CI 1.645-2.40) and have 
more information sources (OR=1.7, 95%CI 1.16-2.50).  
Conclusion: There was substantial subnational variation in Ebola transmission and 
epidemiological parameters over space and time. Community engagement improves 
coverage of control activities during outbreaks, reduces risks and exposures to limit 
transmission. Community surveillance programs have the potential to improve timeliness 
of outbreak detection if countries with limited resources carefully define program goals 
and structure, proactively solve transportation and reporting barriers, and monitor CHW 
performance in relation to supervision and incentives.  
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Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose a significant threat to international health 
and economy.1,2 Overall, infectious diseases account for 15% of deaths globally. The 
most affected are marginalized and disadvantaged populations. Infectious disease in 
low-income countries accounts for one-third of the disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) 
burden.3 EIDs are emerging or resurging diseases which “have newly appeared in a 
population or have existed but are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic range.”1 
They are among the most pernicious public health threats, known colloquially as 
pestilence or plague, and can present acute threats such as SARS, or entrenched 
outbreaks which develop into an endemic burden, such as AIDS. The incessant rise of 
EIDs is ascribed to changes in socioeconomic and ecological factors, including climate 
change and infrastructure development.2,4–6 Jones et al. (2008) use population density 
and growth as proxies for the anthropogenic factors, and predict that the highest risk 
geographies for new EIDs are concentrated in lower-latitude low-income countries.2  
Health systems in these regions are ill-equipped to respond to large scale 
outbreaks.2,7 The 2014-2016 West African Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak 
demonstrates the  danger EIDs pose to unprepared health systems. EVD outbreaks have 
historically been contained to smaller outbreaks in Central Africa.8 The West African 
outbreak resulted in a reported 11,308 deaths and 28,610 cases in seven countries.9 The 
health systems in the three most heavily affected countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea, were quickly overcome by the number of cases, and outbreak control measures 
were limited by insufficient numbers of trained staff, unprepared leadership in the early 
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days, community stigma, inadequate communication infrastructure.10 The outbreak cost 
the three affected countries an estimated $53.2 billion in lost GDP (2014 USD), with $18.8 
billion of these losses related to economic and social burden of non-Ebola deaths 
resulting from lack of basic health services and vaccination campaigns during the 
epidemic.11 The extent of the outbreak and the overwhelming response needed to stop 
transmission was a call to action: disease surveillance in fragile countries must be 
modernized and become more responsive to changing health threats. 
1.1 STUDY CONTEXT 
Liberia, the setting for this dissertation, was especially vulnerable to health shocks. In 
2003, the country emerged after two decades from one of the bloodiest contemporary 
conflicts in the continent. The extended unrest resulted in a large Liberian diaspora and 
refugee population. An estimated 86% of the population are displaced.12 Post-conflict 
efforts prioritized the provision of basic health service packages for the population.13,14 
These rebuilding efforts have flooded the health sector with financing; external donors in 
2012 accounted for nearly 47% of the total health expenditure, with 35% coming from 
out-of-pocket spending.12,15  
Contemporary Liberia remains among the poorest countries in the world, ranking 
162 of 169 by GDP per capita, with a total GDP of 1.95 billion dollars in 2013.16 
Sustenance farming accounts for the majority of the labor force. The economy is largely 
agricultural, relying on exports of natural resources including rubber, diamonds, and 
palm oil. Liberia ranks 6th of 53 on the Ibrahim Governance Index for African Countries, 
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90th of 183 on the Corruptions Perceptions Index in 2011, and is classified by UNDP as a 
“Least Developed Country” with low human development, the lowest of 4 categories.17  
The disease surveillance system in Liberia was unequipped to deal with a national 
emergency. No leadership structures existed to quickly respond to the rising crisis. The 
ability to create actionable information was limited; the surveillance system relied on 
passive, health facility-based reporting, and the country lacked trained field 
epidemiologists. Relationships with health providers and the community were already 
strained. The government often delayed payroll, and during the epidemic was unable to 
sustain hazard pay for health workers and contact tracers. Much of the public initially 
believed the outbreak was a manufactured crisis to silence the government’s criticism. 
The relationship with the community was further threatened by controversial mandatory 
cremation and quarantine policies. The EVD epidemic further weakened the health 
system through nosocomial infections which resulted in the deaths of over 300 health 
workers.18  
As the nature of the crisis became clear, a dedicated technical body was created to 
handle the crisis and further mobilize and coordinate international aid. Capacity was 
rapidly developed in all aspects of the disease surveillance and response structure, 
including a shift towards more context appropriate control meaures. As the epidemic 
waned, the focus of the incident coordination body shifted towards creating a responsive 
disease surveillance system, able to quickly identify and respond to potential health 
threats. This dissertation work was embedded in a larger project, From Ebola Response To 
Sustainable Public Health Systems In Liberia which supported that process. Led by Dr. 
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David Peters, the purpose of the project was to support Liberia’s Ministry of Health and 
National Public Health Institute to develop and implement its vision for health 
information systems, with a focus on disease surveillance. This task was accomplished by 
tackling four pillars; strengthen coordination, build capacity, develop infrastructure for 
actionable information, and promote systematic evaluation.  My role in the project was 
as the primary onsite technical assistance and de facto country director, providing 
support to the health information units in the Ministry of Health and the infectious 
disease units in the National Public Health Institute of Liberia.  
1.2 SCOPE 
During the EVD outbreak, community health workers played several important 
roles including contact tracing, health promotion and door to door case finding.19 In this 
dissertation, we investigate the performance of disease surveillance during the EVD 
outbreak in Liberia, and how performance in the future can be improved by 
implementation of a community surveillance program. To frame our discussion of 
disease surveillance performance in context of community surveillance, we adapt the 
community health worker frameworks proposed by Gopalan et al. (2012) and Franco et 
al. (2002), and a health program sustainability framework proposed by Schell et al. (2013) 
in Figure 1-1.20–22 In this framework, the nine domains of sustainability proposed by 
Schell et al. (2013) are categorized into contextual and input factors which encompass 
additional elements unique to community surveillance programs. Factors of the 
sustainability framework are further described in paper 2, and performance indicators are 








In paper 1, we examine strength of the disease surveillance and effectiveness of 
control measures to halt transmission and reduce mortality during the outbreak (Impact 
and Goal boxes of Figure 1-1) by presenting a detailed overview of the epidemiological 
phenomena, risk factors, case fatality, and control measures. We created a 
comprehensive database by linking records from eleven databases, including surveillance 
data, laboratory data, treatment records, and control measures. The data were 
geolocated and deduplicated, allowing for a more accurate investigation of the coverage 
of outbreak control measures, and analysis in changes in transmission and case fatality 
over time than previously possible. The results of this paper aim to inform the 
characteristics of the outbreak in Liberia and identify the control measures and 
interventions which may prevent similar health threats the future. 
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Papers 2 and 3 of this dissertation stem from my involvement and subsequent 
leadership in the Technical Workgroup (TWG) for Community Event-Based Surveillance 
(CEBS), under the auspices of the National Disease Surveillance Strategy. CEBS is a 
program which enlists the community in disease surveillance by training community 
health workers to identify potential disease, and report/refer community members to the 
health facility. CEBS programs in Liberia were put in place during the tail-end outbreak to 
improve community engagement and maximize the sensitivity of the surveillance 
system.23,24 The most extensive program was implemented by the International 
Organization for Migration in the eight counties with international borders, responding 
to concerns of re-infection from Sierra Leone and Guinea from the “high mobility of 
populations and cross-border movement of infected travelers.”25–29 With the epidemic 
waning in 2015, the IOM CEBS project shifted towards an integrated approach, adopting 
the disease triggers proposed by the TWG for surveillance of IDSR conditions. This 
program served as a pilot for the national CEBS program. Paper 2 compares the results 
of the CEBS program against the disease reports in the national surveillance database to 
examine the performance of the pilot in sensitivity and specificity of the disease triggers 
(Sustainability and impact box of Figure 1-1). We also conducted a desk review of 
documents and in-depth interviews to ascertain whether such a program would be 
sustainable in Liberia. 
The relationship between input and contextual factors on CSW performance is 
the topic of Paper 3 (CSW performance and input factor boxes of Figure 1-1). We 
investigate the determinants of performance of community health workers to report 
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cases, recall triggers, gather information sources and recall the reporting process. The 
Liberia CEBS pilot was ambitious in design. The program targets epidemic-prone 
diseases, which require reporting within a 24-48-hour period. The real-time nature of the 
CEBS program is unique and presents challenges in an environment with little in the way 
of transport infrastructure. The paper identifies approaches, designs, and reforms which 
may impact the performance of community health workers in a surveillance program. 
This dissertation is intended to elucidate how the EVD outbreak in Liberia evolved 
and the describe the role of community interventions put in place to prevent the next 
outbreak. As other resource-limited countries consider institutionalizing community 
surveillance programs as part of routine disease surveillance, I hope they may learn from 







2 2015-2016 EBOLAVIRUS EPIDEMIC IN LIBERIA: AN 
EPIDEMIC POST-MORTEM 
Tashrik Ahmed1 […] 
1 Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
Background: Reports of Ebola in West Africa surfaced in January 2014. The resulting 
epidemic was worse than anticipated in both the duration and extent by public health 
officials. We aimed to document and describe the key epidemiological features of the 
epidemic in Liberia, including the risk factors and the impact of interventions. 
Methods: The Liberia Ministry of Health and partners collected information on EVD 
cases, and contact tracing, dead body management, and treatment control measures for 
reporting to the Incident Management System. A comprehensive database was 
constructed by matching records in each of the eleven compiled databases through a 
customized deterministic matching algorithm. We conducted descriptive analyses over 
time and location of the epidemiological characteristics (caseload, reproduction 
numbers, case fatality rate, and transmission delays), surveillance system performance 
(timeliness, cases reported after death, case definition diagnostics), and coverage of 
control measures (case participation in contact tracing, dead body management, and 
ETU usage). We also report the relative risk of becoming a case by exposure and 
background characteristics, including international travel, funeral attendance, health care 
workers, age, and sex.  
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Results: Symptom onset for the first known confirmed case of EVD in Liberia was on 
March 13th, 2014. Between March 1st, 2014 and December 31st, 2015, a total of 10,222 
cases (Attack Rate (AR): 2 per 1,000) were identified in the linked database, with 5,049 
subsequently confirmed by laboratory testing and 5,121 Ebola-related deaths (CFR = 
48.4%). We find substantial variation in both metrics over time and location. AR was 5.3 
in communities which reported at least one case. CFR varied from 7% and 74% between 
ETUs, with clear trends by age and phases of the epidemic. 51,791 individuals were 
tracked in Liberia for possible exposure to Ebola, including 20,522 contacts. We estimate 
the basic reproduction number to be 1.78. This is among the lowest estimates for an EVD 
outbreak, compared past outbreaks which have reported reproduction numbers between 
1.4 and 4.7 in past outbreaks. The instantaneous reproduction number varied over time 
dependent on control measures and penetration into urban areas. The initial sustained 
drop in reproduction number coincided with the creation of the Incident Management 
System and revised community engagement strategy. Funeral exposure ((RR: 1.27 
[95%CI: 1.21-1.34]), males (0.93 [0.90-0.96]), residence in rural areas (1.32 [1.28-1.35]), 
health worker status (1.09 [1.04-1.15]), and international travel (1.16 [1.09-1.22]) were 
identified as statistically significant risk factors. We show a large increase in timeliness in 
reporting after the initial crisis recognition phase, and an increase in coverage of contact 
tracing, ETU admissions, and safe and dignified burials among cases. Dead body tracing 
reported the highest coverage, covering 2 in 3 case fatalities, whereas contact tracing 
reached only 16% of reported cases. 
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Conclusions: We show the 2014-2016 West African EVD outbreak in Liberia was 
distinctive in context and extent of transmission, but not in the epidemiological 
parameters. We hypothesize the lower basic reproduction number was influenced by 
urban transmission, which lowered the reliance on superspreading events to sustain 
person-to-person spread. The spread to major urban centers, national capitals, and high 
mobility populations likely drove the high duration and case load. The previous largest 
outbreak occurred in a provincial city in DRC, where Ebola is endemic. There was 
substantial variation in epidemiological characteristics (such as CFR) over time, space, 
and by risk factors, and summary measures may not adequately describe epidemic 
dynamics. We find further evidence to support funeral exposures as a primary driver of 
transmission. The overall evidence is suggestive that improved coordination mechanisms 




In early 2014, Gueckèdou district in south-eastern Guinea confirmed active transmission 
of Zaire Ebola virus (EBOV/Ebola) and an outbreak of EBOV disease (EVD) cases. Over the 
next two years, the ensuing outbreak affected seven countries and infected over 30,000 
people.9 Public health officials did not anticipate the duration or extent of the outbreak 
and delayed mobilization of resources during the early response. Eventually 
acknowledging that the outbreak presented a major public health threat, the World 
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Health Organization (WHO) declared its third Public Health Event of International 
Concern (PHEIC) since the ratification of the International Health Regulations in 2005.  
EVD is not entirely uncommon in the continent. Past outbreaks were 
concentrated in Central Africa in smaller, successfully controlled outbreaks which did not 
pose a serious regional threat. However, the extent of transmission in urban areas and 
resulting geographic spread in the 2014-2016 West African epidemic was 
unprecedented.30  
The outbreak in Liberia constituted a complex humanitarian emergency; an acute 
public health threat layered over ongoing instability. The country was still recovering 
from two decades of civil war. The health system was fragile, and public trust in the 
quality of health service delivery and government at large was tenuous at best. At the 
time of the outbreak, the health system was focused on the delivery of basic health 
services. Public health structures to respond to national health threats were nonexistent, 
and donors supported much of the sector.13,14 External funds account for nearly 47% of 
the total health expenditure in 2012.12,15,31 Despite these challenges, country officials in 
partnership with aid organizations were able to eliminate EVD from Liberia and leverage 
the outbreak to create long-lasting capacity within the health system. 
In this chapter, we present a post-mortem of epidemiological features of the 
completed outbreak in Liberia using the surveillance data collected between 2014 and 
2015. These data were used for real time response during the outbreak, and in retrospect 
provide insight into EVD disease dynamics, the efficiency of control strategies, and 
recommendations for long term resilience. 
12 
 
2.2.1 Timeline of Events 
The putative index case, an 18-month old Guinean boy from the remote village of 
Meliandou, was presumed to be infected in December of 2013 from exposure to infected 
bats (Figure 2-1).32 The Meliandou health post sent the first medical alert of a cluster of 
unknown disease to district health officials at the end of January 2014. The resulting 
investigation by national and international officials speculated cholera as the causative 
agent due to the clinical similarity. By February 1st the infection spread to the capital, 
Conakry, by an extended family member of the index case. No infection prevention 
precautions were taken against the yet unidentified disease at the hospital where the 
man died, resulting in exposure and infection of patients and health workers. Over the 
next months, the infection spread to neighboring prefectures and districts, traveling 
along trunk routes. On March 13th, Guinea alerted WHO to the unidentified disease, 
launching an investigation by national health officials which identified epidemiological 
links between seemingly disparate clusters. The Institut Pasteur confirmed the causative 
agent was a filovirus, and the next day narrowed to Zaire Ebolavirus, the deadliest of 
Ebola’s common strains. By March 23rd, the Guinean government and WHO publicly 
announced an outbreak of EVD with 49 cases reported.  
Liberia reported the first confirmed case at the end of March. This first reported 
case died, and the sister traveled while symptomatic to Margibi County with her two-
year-old child to her home at the Firestone Rubber Plantation.33 By March 30th, Liberia 
reported eight cases from Lofa, Margibi, and Nimba counties. Facing an increase in 
caseloads and cross-country transmission, Medicins Sans Frontiérs (MSF) warned the 
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outbreak was unprecedented in both location and magnitude. WHO dismissed the 
warning as alarmist and maintained the outbreak could be controlled with existing 
resources, with WHO playing its normative advisory role.  
Figure 2-1. Timeline of the West African EVD outbreak in three most affected countries 
 
Country case counts and events based on reporting by WHO Sitreps, archived by CDC9 
Through April and May, caseloads in Liberia remained steady and relatively low. The 
infection reached the capital Monrovia on June 17th. The capital city was incapable of 
managing the deluge of infections. Within the next week, MSF urged the need for a 
massive international response, a warning again ignored by WHO until two months 
later.34,35 In the meantime, management of control activities was left to the rather weak 
national disease surveillance system, WHO and CDC epidemiologists, and NGOs with a 
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pre-existing presence in the country. MSF set up EVD Treatment Units in Foya county to 
aid in rapid isolation and treatment of suspected cases while providing basic infection 
prevention and control measures to minimize nosocomial transmission to health 
workers. Samaritan’s Purse also set up ETUs but withdrew after staff became infected.  
As the caseload rose, the danger of a propagated and uncontrolled outbreak in West 
Africa became clear. The United States Centers for Disease Control activated its 
Emergency Operations Center on July 9th to coordinate its field response. The Liberian 
government struggled to handle the rising emergency and created a national task team 
at the end of July, closed all borders and schools, and quarantined infected 
communities.24 August saw an accelerating caseload. Liberia declared a national 
emergency on August 8th, followed two days later by the United Nation’s PHEIC 
declaration. The World Bank pledged 200 million USD to support outbreak control, the 
US activated its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART), and a range of NGOs 
assisted the national government in dead body management, water and sanitation, 
infection prevention and control, case management, and disease surveillance.  
The epidemic overwhelmed the health system, prompting the Ministry of Health 
to erect a parallel incident management system (IMS) to streamline decision-making.36,37 
While initially headed by the Chief Medical Officer, the organization of the IMS was 
shifted towards a self-contained and streamlined structure headed by an Incident 
Manager. Delegating epidemic coordination to the IMS also allowed the Ministry of 
Health to focus on the crumbling health sector.38 The IMS focused on four pillars of 
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response; 1) early detection, isolation, and treatment; 2) safe transport of patients; 3) safe 
burial; and 4) infection prevention and control.24  
Before the outbreak health workers had been protesting the government about 
lack of pay and missed payments. Rumors abounded that a desperate administration 
manufactured the current crisis. Trust was further strained when a cremation policy was 
announced in early August, a contentious proposition for Muslim and tribal 
communities. Families of EVD cases were also dismayed with the destruction of property 
following sanitization of infected household items and intermittent food supplies during 
the quarantine.39  Tensions spilled over at Westpoint, a dense slum in downtown 
Monrovia, when protesters broke the IPC barrier of the local health facility, posing a 
considerable exposure risk. The military was brought in to enforce a quarantine, and 
during a protest, one person died in a standoff with authorities on August 18th. 
Distrust of health officials and sustained depletion of already weak health systems 
through nosocomial transmission made it difficult for countries to extend disease 
surveillance and control measures into more remote regions.40 With MSF leading the 
charge since early spring; a complex pluralism of bilateral, multilateral, NGOs and 
national organizations had flowed into Liberia attempting to stem the rising tide of EVD 
cases.41–43 Under the guidance of IMS, disease control interventions supported by these 
organizations and public sector health workers were standardized under the umbrella of 
the national government. In response to the riot, the IMS pursued a central and culturally 
appropriate community engagement strategy. County health teams and NGOs had 
transitioned away from the cremation policy towards providing culturally competent 
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dead body management through the Safe and Dignified Burial program. Contact tracing 
was active in most areas of the country and were able to link to rapid response teams 
when cases were identified. Investments were made into hospitals and ETUs to bolster 
infection prevention and control standards. Capacity building within the county and 
national disease surveillance staff focused on developing analytical and epidemiological 
skillsets. Laboratory infrastructure and staff competency also surged, with regional 
laboratories being built around the country. Logistical clusters supported sample 
transport from health facilities to laboratories, health worker transport from communities 
to rural health centers, and ambulance transport for patients from communities and 
between referrals. The Ministry of Health developed guidelines for health promotion 
which outlined a culturally appropriate and consistent messaging strategy.  
Incidence peaked in September, with more than 750 cases reported per week. 
Growing disease burden, episodes of international transmission, and rising pressure to 
address the epidemic galvanized further international support. On September 16th, the 
US committed a military presence to support building EVD treatment units in addition to 
growing the existing CDC and USAID assistance. In mid-September, the United Nations 
Mission for EVD Emergency Response (UNMEER) was established by the United Nations 
Secretariat.  
By October, the situation began to stabilize with cases decreasing week by week; 
though prolonged high incidence in Sierra Leone and the possibility of hidden 
transmission chains were a constant threat. By November 10th, the first of the US-funded 
ETU’s opened in Bomi County. As the epidemic wore on, a pattern of mini-epidemics 
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emerged, hampering regional isolation efforts. EVD cases flared up in a community, 
quickly spread, before dying out. Half of the new cases were localized in remote, rural 
areas.24 To contain these rural and peri-urban epidemics, IMS put into place the RITE 
strategy, Rapid Isolation, and Treatment of Ebola. RITE empowered counties to form 
rapid response teams to respond quickly to hotspots.24 In December, a new transmission 
chain was discovered in St Paul River Bridge, a peri-urban community on the outskirts of 
Monrovia. Overcoming stigmatization in the community, inadequate HCF triage, lack of 
recognition of cases, and incomplete identification and follow-up, public health officials 
were able to respond and eliminate the chain quickly.44  
ETU usage at this time had fallen, and by mid-January plans for existing buildings 
were downsized. By the end of February, the US military withdrew after completing the 
new ETUs, and at the end of March 2015, the PHEIC was lifted. In May, Liberia announced 
that all known lines of transmission were extinguished and no case had been identified 
for the past 42 days. The declaration started 90 days of WHO protocol for heightened 
surveillance, including community-based surveillance and postmortem testing for all 
reported deaths.45 Warning that flare-ups were likely as latent transmission chains came 
to light and persistent infection was still possible, WHO announced what would be the 
first of four Ebola-free declarations on May 9th, 2015.46 Flare-ups occurred over the next 
year, from importation from an outbreak in N’zerèkorè district of Guinea47, latent 
infections, and discovery of new transmission chains.45 UNMEER began its drawdown on 
August 30th, and the national emergency was lifted on November 13th, 2015. The final 
EVD free declaration was made in June of 2016. 
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After the first outbreak free declaration, attention and investments shifted 
towards building a resilient health system.48 Part of this strategy was reintroduction and 
implementation of an Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) program, a 
surveillance framework used in various countries in Africa devised by AFRO region office 
of WHO.49,50   
2.2.2 Overview of Control Measures 
With the lack of licensed pharmaceuticals or vaccines, outbreak control relied on 
nonpharmaceutical interventions.   
Case Management and Treatment 
Health facilities in Liberia lacked isolation capacity to treat EVD cases without 
risking exposure to health care workers and other patients. In addition to clinical care, 
ETUs were constructed to provide rapid isolation and treatment to EVD cases while 
minimizing nosocomial transmission. ETUs also acted as a logistics backbone for sample 
transport, dead body management through the morgues, disposal of biowaste, and 
training health workers in infection control. Each ETU generally included a “green zone” 
free of EVD contamination, and “red/hot zone” for EVD cases and health workers with full 
personal protective equipment (PPE). Cases were admitted from community walk-ins, 
referrals from case investigation and contact tracing teams, and triage at health facilities.  
Without any pharmaceutical cure, ETUs relied on basic supportive care. Patients were 
provided with oral and parenteral volume replacement, analgesics, electrolytes, and 
vitamin supplements. The treatment protocol was not standardized, and some NGOs did 
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not provide intravenous rehydration in mildly symptomatic cases to reduce the risk of 
exposure.24  
Dead Body Management 
Tribal traditions and religious rites surrounding funerals created a high risk of 
exposure during the burial of Ebola-infected individuals.51 In some tribes, family 
members and caretakers sleep in the same room as the body until burial, and during the 
funeral give a final embrace. In Muslim tradition, dead bodies are washed and wrapped 
in white cloth before burial within 24 hours of death. Initially, Liberian authorities 
mandated cremation for dead bodies with suspected EVD infection to reduce 
transmission risk, with significant community resistance. Dead body management 
programs, termed “Safe and Dignified Burial” were started to address burial in a 
culturally sensitive manner. 54 dead body management teams were active in all fifteen 
counties by September 2014. The teams worked with communities to disinfect the body, 
and demonstrated the use of personal protective equipment to family members who 
wanted to be engaged in the burial. A large cemetery was created in the Disco Hill 
community in Margibi for Ebola-infected individuals.24,52 All unexplained deaths, and 
later all deaths, were swabbed and positive rapid tests were followed by confirmatory 
testing. 
Contact Tracing 
Contact tracing aims to identify all possible individuals with exposures to a case, 
stratify exposure by transmission likelihood, and monitor for signs of disease onset to 
provide timely treatment and minimize further secondary cases.  Contact tracing 
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activities were active across all counties as a fundamental part of case investigation. Six 
types of exposure were defined, (1) sleeping or eating in the same household; (2) direct 
physical contact with the body; (3) touching bodily fluids; (4) manipulating clothes or  
other objects; (5) breastfeeding; and (6) attending a funeral of a deceased case. Case 
investigation teams solicited a list of names which the case encountered during the 
transmissible period. Contact tracing teams visited each contact twice a day for 21 days 
and monitored for signs and symptoms of EVD infection. Each contact tracer was 
assigned up to 20 contacts.39 During the follow-up period, contacts with a high-risk 
exposure (such as direct contact with bodily fluids) were requested to maintain a 
voluntary quarantine within their house.53 Food and water were provided during this 
period, and psychosocial teams made periodic visits. Written documentation was 
provided to employers and schools to excuse the absence and again to provide 
confirmation of completion of the quarantine without signs or symptoms. To prevent 
stigmatization of contacts following quarantine a graduation ceremony was held to mark 
the occasion of discharge.39  
Health Promotion, social mobilization, and psychosocial support 
Communication and mobilization took a rare front seat; this was the first outbreak to 
have a dedicated health promotion logistical cluster. The health promotion cluster 
developed a core package of promotion materials, translated to local dialects. Health 
promotion during the early weeks of the outbreak targeted EVD denial and skepticism. 
As cases began to recover, messaging shifted towards underscoring the potential for 
survival with treatment, preventative measures, and the importance of Ebola elimination. 
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Messaging was disseminated through the newspaper, radio and TV addresses, 
community health talks, comedians and drama troupes. The most effective dissemination 
was door to door, due to the strong tradition of oral communication. The concerted 
push on social mobilization and health promotion included training local leaders and 
community health volunteers on behavior change strategies, radio campaigns, and 
reporting hotlines. 
 Community health workers, religious leaders, traditional healers, chieftains, school 
teachers, and other key stakeholders in the community were trained by NGOs as 
frontline mobilizers.24 These mobilizers were also taught basic surveillance, and could 
report cases. In communities with recent infection, “ring interpersonal communication” 
activities focused psychosocial support and prevention awareness on helping interrupt 
transmission chains.54 Direct support was also provided to families of EVD cases, 
survivors, and EVD negative contacts. Large scale meetings were held with community 
leaders to drive support for outbreak response.  
Health system capacity, coordination, and leadership 
Health system responses were aimed at improving the capacity of the health 
system to respond to the rising emergency. Chief among these was establishing the 
Incident Management System to coordinate surveillance and response between the 
Liberian Ministry of Health and partners, mobilize and direct resources, and 
communicate with the public with a singular voice. Responses included updated 
laboratory infrastructure, logistical support for referrals and sample transport, and 
developing an informatics backbone.55  
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In addition to structural changes, capacity building of staff was targeted. 
Epidemiologists working with international organizations were embedded in national, 
county, and district health teams, and worked with Liberian staff to increase the capacity 
of epidemiologists. Laboratory staff were trained in EVD assays and algorithms, and 
international data management teams supplemented Liberian resources. Teams worked 
together to devise systems and procedures for daily and weekly outbreak reporting.  
2.3 METHODS 
We performed a retrospective descriptive analysis of case records, ETU discharge papers, 
contact tracing, and dead body management databases provided by the Liberian 
Ministry of Health. 
2.3.1 Disease Investigation 
Case Investigation 
Passive and active surveillance activities were conducted by the district, county, 
and national surveillance officers with support from aid organizations. Passive 
surveillance included reports from health facilities, treatment centers, funeral homes, and 
through community hotlines. Active surveillance was ongoing through contact tracing, 
case and key informant interviews, burial teams, and frontline workers. 
For suspect cases, data on demographics, residence, symptoms, and exposures were 
collected from the case and key informant interviews on standardized investigation 
forms. Samples were taken from cases when possible and sent for diagnosis to the 
nearest laboratory equipped for EVD rapid and confirmatory testing. There were several 
regional labs in Liberia equipped for testing, with the reference laboratory, Liberia 
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Institute of Biomedical Research (LIBR). For negative samples, a repeat sample was taken 
after 48 hours.  
Case information and laboratory results were used for epidemiological classification 
of cases. Epidemiological classification designates the likelihood an individual is infected 
with EVD based on laboratory results, signs and symptoms, and epidemiological history. 
Case classification was based on WHO guidance and assigned at the start of a case 
investigation as either suspect or probable and updated when the case is closed as 
confirmed or not a case. Classifications were updated periodically in large batches to 
account for laboratory results and epidemiological information available after case 
closure. During the height of the epidemic, the health system was stretched beyond 
capacity, and many cases were not classified to these final categories. 
Table 2-1. Expanded case definition for EVD 
Suspect case Individuals with a sudden onset of high fever and reported 
contact with an EVD case or a sick or dead animal 
OR 
Individuals with a sudden onset of high fever and at least 
three Ebola-associated symptoms (nausea/vomiting, diarrhea, 
fatigue, loss of appetite, abdominal pain, headache, breathing 
difficulty, swallowing difficulty, hiccups) 
OR 
Individuals with unexplained bleeding 
OR 
Individuals with sudden and unexplained death. 
Probable case Suspect case diagnosed with EVD by a clinician 
OR 
A deceased suspect case epidemiologically linked to a 
confirmed case. 
Confirmed case A suspected or probable case with a positive laboratory result 
for EVD virus antigen by reverse transcriptase PCR (RT-PCR) 




A suspected or probable case with a positive laboratory result 
for EVD virus antigen by detection of anti-Ebola IgM 
antibodies. 
 
Not a Case Suspected or probable case with no specific antibodies, RNA, 
or detectable antigens on laboratory testing (RT-PCR or anti-
IgM antibodies) 
 
The outbreak data also include individuals with a identified exposure but without a case 
record. Classifications for these observations can be: 
• Contacts, identified by soliciting names of all individuals who came in contact 
with a case. Contacts were subsequently followed by contact tracing teams. 
Contacts may have become symptomatic, but a case investigation or admission 
into treatment must have occurred to be considered a case. 
• Sources, Ebola-infected individuals a case encountered and potentially were the 
transmission source. Sources establish an epidemiological link, but EVD infection 
cannot be confirmed in the source case unless a case investigation was 
completed. 
Individuals without an epidemiological linkage or a case investigation are assigned an 
unknown classification. Many unknown classifications in the database are a result of the 
Safe and Dignified Burial program, indicating burials which took place before a sample 
could be tested. We report the sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and 
negative predictive value diagnostics for the suspect case definition, signs, and 
symptoms. 
2.3.2 Data Sources 
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The data collected during the epidemic are rich but inconsistent quality. Case 
investigations, laboratory results, treatment records, and outbreak control measures were 
collected in fragmented databases, and unique identifiers were not universally 
implemented. Limited IT infrastructure led to the bulk of data to be collected initially on 
standardized paper forms and entered into electronic databases. The bulk of cases were 
entered into the Viral Hemorrhagic Fever module of EpiInfo, an epidemiological 
surveillance tool maintained by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The 
module had been designed for the smaller outbreaks seen in Central Africa, and the 
detailed level of information and lack of in-country experience with the platform resulted 
in data managers and analysts working overtime to produce the daily analyses required 
to respond to the outbreak.24 In mid-December 2014, the case investigation data was 
migrated to the DHIS2 platform’s line list module. While not intended to serve real-time 
data transactions, there was an extensive local capacity to operate the platform, and the 
caseload had decreased to a manageable trickle. The DHIS database served as a final 
record rather than a living dataset, with most of the analysis in the last leg of the 
epidemic done using Microsoft Excel. 
In 2015, a task team of health information specialists attempted to digitize all 
outbreak data, including ETU records and laboratory results, for final storage in the 
master DHIS2 dataset. The team conducted chart abstractions at each EVD Treatment 
Unit to identify cases with a treatment record but without a corresponding case 
investigation. Data from laboratories were added to cases and used in reclassifying the 
final epidemiological status of the individual. Record keeping at the laboratory was 
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especially problematic, with numerous occurrences of orphaned lab samples which 
arrived without proper identification, and could not be connected to any case. 
Laboratory data were collected in Excel sheets, with minimal standardization between 
laboratories.  
Data generated by outbreak control interventions were managed by county 
health officials, transmitted to the national level in aggregate.24 We collected contact 
tracing paper forms into a Microsoft Access Database. The Environmental Health unit 
administered dead body management databases within the Ministry of Health in 
separate Excel sheets.  
Key variables from all datasets were extracted and collated to form the 
comprehensive outbreak record reported in this paper. We expect the final dataset to 
contain gaps due to underreporting and record loss. The data from cases and 
interventions in Montserrado County are the most complete as NGOs supported the 
Montserrado county team, and gathering the hard copies of forms was logistically easier. 
Records with either an unknown county of the report or without a patient name were 
dropped.  
The dataset reported in this paper excludes cases reported in 2016, specifically 
the confirmed cases generated by the last cluster. The index case for this cluster is the 
wife of an case who died in Guinea. The woman traveled to Monrovia before dying 
herself. It is assumed that this cluster was not associated with the primary transmission 
chain which was eliminated in September of 2015. Data for this cluster was managed 
separately and not included with the data from the epidemic. 
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Identifying duplicate cases 
In the merged database, duplicates were identified by a deterministic matching 
process which evaluated potential case pairs against a series of keys. Each key was 
manually constructed, containing a combination of onset time, gender, patient name, the 
address of onset, date of death, patient age, and unique IDs. Keys were also created 
which took into consideration name rarity, date transpositions, and reversed first/last 
names. The set of variables included in each key were determined iteratively - results of 
each key match were reviewed and keys which created false matches were removed or 
reformulated. The list of keys is given in Annex See Annex Table 7-1. Any pair of records 
which matched exactly on all the data elements within at least one key were considered a 
match. The results of the deduplication between databases as shown in Table 2-2. By 
including contacts and sources as separate observations in the deduplication process, we 





Table 2-2. Record matches between EVD case, treatment, and intervention datasets 
 
Cells show the percentage of records in the database which are also in the 
comparison database ([# cases which are both databases]/[total cases in column 
database]). Colors denote the percentage – green is a high match percentage and red 
is a low match percentage. 
On occasion, datasets were forked from the central databases and maintained externally. 
For instance, the national survivor dataset was maintained from a snapshot of the ETU 
dataset, and cases were added when survivors came forward to claim benefits. Another 
example is the dataset of health workers who died from EVD, maintained based on a 
snapshot of the DHIS2 dataset. These forked databases resulted a high match 
percentage between the Survivor and EPI Info databases, and the ETU survivors and ETU 
admissions.  
Data Cleaning and Reclassification 
Data were reviewed for common errors and completeness. The location for each 
case is summarized by the county, district, and village of residence. We used the Liberia 











































































































































6.7% 5.6% 1.4% 6.4% 2.4% 1.7% 22.9% 6.8% 8.1%
6.2% 11.0% 2.0% 11.2% 1.9% 10.4% 41.4% 34.6% 3.1%
6.0% 12.9% 3.6% 6.1% 4.4% 11.7% 24.3% 10.8% 10.7%
4.8% 7.3% 11.5% 10.4% 1.8% 5.4% 7.1% 10.2% 9.6%
20.5% 39.6% 18.2% 9.9% 3.6% 15.9% 44.3% 50.6% 58.6%
2.2% 1.9% 3.7% 0.5% 1.0% 4.0% 4.3% 1.8% 1.3%
0.7% 4.9% 4.7% 0.7% 2.1% 1.9% 2.9% 4.1% 3.4%
1.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.1% 0.6% 0.2% 0.3% 1.5% 0.1%
11.1% 62.0% 16.4% 4.9% 25.8% 3.2% 15.6% 58.6% 83.1%
5.7% 2.4% 7.0% 2.0% 12.8% 1.0% 5.5% 1.4% 35.8%
Cases in Database
Unique 1,121 408 1,067 4,575 3,041 764 490 8 412 83
Total 1,621 1,483 1,739 5,519 5,220 1,479 703 70 2,659 1,144
Records in Database
Unique 4,377 2,211 1,102 5,025 6,660 765 19,693 8 1,006 83
Total 8,109 6,599 2,375 5,593 13,485 1,596 20,522 72 4,849 1,471
Total Cases in final database 10,280
Total records in final database 51,479
Databases
Case Linelist (DHIS)
Safe and Dignified Burials
Contact tracing source cases
Case Linelist (EPI Info)
ETU Admissions (Survivors)









clean location to the village level. The 2008 populations were updated to reflect 
population growth up to 2016, using IMF, World Bank, and LISGIS country-wide growth 
estimates. Village names are often repeated or phonetically similar; all matches were 
manually reviewed, but misclassification is possible. Records which could not be matched 
to a village were assigned to the closest village to their latitude/longitude coordinates, 
when available. Municipalities were defined as any village within 20 miles from city 
center, and urban areas were defined as communities with a population larger than 3000 
persons, consistent with the definition in the 2018 census.  
The date of symptom onset is used for calculations of incidence rates and 
reproduction numbers. Dates of onset before 2014 and after 2016 were set to missing, as 
none of the datasets used in this analysis could plausibly contain dates in that range. In 
situations where the date of symptom onset is unknown, such as when the case is 
identified after death, the date of onset is estimated using the date of report minus the 
average report delay, date of contact minus the estimated serial interval, or the date of 
death minus the average time from onset to death. 
Patient names and locations were cleaned using strict Levenshtein distance criteria, 
which standardizes strings which differed by less than 10% based on character deletions, 
substitutions, and insertions.56 Patient gender, essential for identifying duplicates, was 
not included in some datasets. Missing gender was automatically assigned based on the 
first name if at least 80% or more of individuals with that first name in the dataset were 
of male or female gender. The time course of the epidemic was divided along epidemic 
weeks into four phases based on the observed epidemic trends of cases within Liberia. 
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We describe data across epidemic phases as defined by Nyenswah, Engineer, and Peters 
(2018).57  
• Phase 1; crisis recognition; refers to the early organization of response, capturing 
the initial spread of EVD from the start of 2014 to May 21st, based on a post-hoc 
assessment which covers the ramp up in cases and terminates before the start of 
the largest transmission peak. Though the crisis recognition phase can justifiably 
be extended to early August when the national emergency and PHEIC 
declarations were issued, our more conservative definition focuses on the initial 
organization of emergency response partners, the ramp up in case identification 
activities, and early coordination structures. 
• Phase 2 is the emergency phase; which covers the acceleration in incidence and 
the peak of the outbreak, from mid-August to mid-November 2014 
(epidemiological weeks 34-46) and terminates in early September on the 
estimated date the instantaneous reproduction number fell below 1.  
• Phase 3; is the declining epidemic and stretches from early September to the end 
of 2014. At this point, disease control strategies were standardized. 
• Phase 4 is the long tail; covers the sporadic clusters throughout 2015.  
2.3.3 Data Analysis 
The serial interval is defined as the time between the date of onset of the primary 
case and date of onset of a secondary case. We calculated the serial interval from contact 
tracing data between confirmed cases and their confirmed contacts. Case pairs were 
excluded if the date of onset was estimated. The incubation period was measured 
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among contacts, as the time between reported exposure and the onset of symptoms. 
Duration until community death was measured among all cases as the time between the 
date of symptom onset to the date of death for cases without a record of admission to 
an ETU or health facility. The admission delay is defined as the time between symptom 
onset and admission into an ETU among cases with an ETU admission. The 
convalescence time is measured as the time from admission to discharge, and time to 
death measured as the length of time from admission to death in an ETU. All timescales 
are summarized by mean, standard deviation, median, IQR, and range, and compared to 
estimates from previous outbreaks when available. 
The changes in transmission during an epidemic can be caused by contact 
patterns, control measures, change in infectiousness of a causative agent, or a decline in 
susceptible populations. Infectiousness of disease is commonly summarized by the basic 
reproduction number (R0), which denotes the average number of secondary cases in a 
completely susceptible population. We calculate R0 between April 1
st and July 30th, 
before the reorganization of control measures by IMS and border closings and 
community quarantines, using the exponential growth model provided by the R0 R 
package.58 We also calculate the instantaneous reproduction number (Rt), which 
estimates the average number of secondary cases at a given point during the epidemic. 
When Rt falls below 1, the epidemic is unsustainable and will eventually extinguish. We 
estimated Rt using the methods proposed by Cori et al. (2013), using the EpiEstim R 
package.59 The method relies on the calculation of the serial interval, discussed above. 
We mapped Rt over one year, from the beginning of April 2014 to the end of April 2015. 
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The delay in the start window allows for a more precise estimate, and the ending window 
was chosen as the last transmission chain connected to the broader outbreak (first 
detected on March 28th, 2015). The transmission for the flare-ups due to importation or 
unknown transmission are not indicative of a change in transmissibility. This analysis 
assumes the serial interval and reporting rates did not change significantly during the 
outbreak. The latter assumption is tested by correcting for underreporting rates. 
Instantaneous reproduction numbers for selected counties, district, and village are 
reported in the Appendix. 
Case Fatality 
Approximately 17% of cases had a missing vital status after matching to survivor 
and dead body databases. Over 80% of these cases with missing vital status were 
generated early in the epidemic or during the peak of the infection, where case 
investigation mechanisms were either not entirely in place or strained. In many cases, 
fatality was recorded at time of report, and there was no follow-up information available 
on the outcome. A common practice when using case line lists is to exclude both these 
records and cases found after the time of death to avoid biasing case fatality estimates. 
We believe any bias will be minimal in the comprehensive dataset as we can match to 
both dead body management and survivor records. Deaths are more likely to be 
captured by the surveillance system. We report case fatality using this standard method 
and recoding the cases with missing outcome information as alive. Case fatality was 
calculated over a 2-month window, with confidence intervals estimated by a normal 




We define coverage as the proportion of cases (or case fatalities) which received 
the control measure. Coverage of contact tracing and ETUs was calculated among all 
cases, and coverage of Safe and Dignified Burial was measured for case fatalities. 
Participation in contact tracing was defined as being either a case or prior contact. 
Participation in dead body management was defined as appearing in the dead body 
management database, having a record for admission into an ETU, or an indication that 
an NGO or county burial team conducted the burial. ETU coverage was based on 
admission into a named ETU; hospitals, health facilities, and community care centers are 
not included in this measure. The percentage of cases which indicated participation was 
calculated in a 60-day window, with confidence intervals estimated by a logit 
transformed normal assuming a t-distribution.  
Data for planned beds were taken from news articles, situation reports, IMS 
notes, and announcements by the government of Liberia, NGOs, and UN agencies. 
Actual and stretch capacity was based on regular updates made at meetings IMS and 
summaries reported by the US military, literature, and UNDP. Actual and case usage was 
determined based on admission and discharge dates in our database. For records with 
ETU admission dates but without death or discharge dates, we randomly assign a 
duration value from a Poisson distribution constructed from the mean convalescence 
time. The duration of ETU stay was imputed for 51.7% of records in this manner. 
Theoretical usage was calculated with the assumption that all cases used an ETU, and the 
dates of usage imputed from a Poisson distribution based on the date of onset, average 
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admission delay, and average duration in an ETU among cases which had an ETU 
admission. All estimates are calculated across a moving average of one-week window.  
Exposures 
We assessed the relative risk of infection (becoming a suspect, probable, or 
confirmed case) among four exposures reliably recorded in surveillance data; (1) health 
workers, (2) visits to sick persons in the hospital, (3) international travel, and (4) funeral 
attendance. Risks were measured among individuals with a known exposure status. 
Exposure to animals and breast feeding was not available for most cases.  Unadjusted 
relative risk of background characteristics and exposures were estimated by logistic 
regression.  
Observations during Phase 4 were removed from this analysis. Contact tracing was 
highly sensitive during this phase; contacts with even a slight risk of indirect exposure 
were solicited, and tracing was more likely to be initiated for suspect cases which were 
later classified as not a case. Surveillance data did not contain information on 
vaccination, and we were not able to remove vaccinated persons from the exposed 
population. Most vaccinations would have occurred in Phase 4 in the PREVAIL trail which 
started in February of 2015.60 We assume the effect of vaccinations in Phases 1, 2, and 3 
is extremely limited. 
2.4 RESULTS 
Symptom onset for the first confirmed case of EVD in Liberia was on March 13th, 2014. 
Between March 1st, 2014 and December 31st, 2015, a total of 10,280 cases were 
identified, with 5,049 subsequently confirmed by laboratory testing and 5,121 Ebola-
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related deaths (Table 2-3). 51,791 individuals were tracked in Liberia for possible 
exposure to Ebola, including 20,522 contacts. Official estimates from CDC and WHO 
situational reports estimate 10,678 cases, with 3,163 confirmed and 4,810 deaths.  
Table 2-3. Case Classification by Background Characteristics and Exposure Risks 
 
CI = 95% Confidence Interval 
Suspect cases reported in Phase 4 are excluded from the analysis. Results from the 
formal reclassification exercise were not available for this dataset. 
 
Background
Characteristic Confirmed Probable Suspect Not a Case Case All Records
Age in years
0-9 532          294          204          2,942       1,030       3,972       
10-19 698          379          244          2,202       1,321       3,523       
20-29 1,112       516          402          3,530       2,030       5,560       
30-39 1,116       518          469          3,464       2,103       5,567       
40-49 801          418          417          2,664       1,636       4,300       
50-59 397          220          196          1,842       813          2,655       
60+ 267          195          249          2,803       711          3,514       
Gender -              -              
Female 2,428       1,310       1,008       16,520     4,746       21,266     
Male 2,682       1,375       1,459       22,866     5,516       28,382     
County -              -              
Bomi 119          70            92            707          281          988          
Bong 181          72            153          997          406          1,403       
Gbarpolu 21            8              10            449          39            488          
Grand Bassa 75            98            61            1,126       234          1,360       
Grand Cape Mount 107          81            100          554          288          842          
Grand Gedeh 7              2              8              353          17            370          
Grand Kru 25            18            16            387          59            446          
Lofa 426          318          145          1,639       889          2,528       
Margibi 420          508          411          3,067       1,339       4,406       
Maryland 3              -              11            279          14            293          
Montserrado 3,570       1,360       1,400       30,523     6,330       36,853     
Nimba 112          134          57            411          303          714          
River Cess 8              5              5              82            18            100          
River Gee 9              7              5              346          21            367          
Sinoe 27            4              11            246          42            288          
Urban/Rural -              -              
Urban 3,889       1,645       1,571       30,576     7,105       37,681     
Rural 1,210       1,029       914          10,552     3,153       13,705     
Phase -              -              
Crisis Recognition 1,031       572          560          3,010       2,163       5,173       
Emergency 3,684       2,009       1,653       17,548     7,346       24,894     
Declining Epidemic 366          93            272          10,897     731          11,628     
Long Tail 29            11            -              9,711       40            9,751       
Health Care Worker -              -              
No 2,606       1,711       2,148       8,165       6,465       14,630     
Yes 250          120          90            243          460          703          
Travel History -              -              
No 1,038       950          1,273       7,049       3,261       10,310     
Yes 156          125          134          242          415          657          
Hospital Visit -              -              
No 1,002       965          1,212       5,756       3,179       8,935       
Yes 131          49            128          1,517       308          1,825       
Funeral Attendance -              -              
No 1,187       990          1,483       27,181     3,660       30,841     
Yes 242          226          81            504          549          1,053       
ETU Admission -              -              
No 1,852       1,673       2,182       35,424     5,707       41,131     
Yes 3,215       1,002       260          5,124       4,477       9,601       




Table 2-4. Case Fatality Rate by Background Characteristics and Exposure Risks 
 
CI = 95% Confidence Interval 
CFR = Case Fatality Rate; measured among only probable and confirmed cases 
(#deaths/#cases), assuming records with missing values are alive 
Phase 4 was excluded from the analysis. Results from the formal reclassification exercise 




0-9 968       45.5 42.5 48.6
10-19 1,248    36.4 33.8 39.0
20-29 1,934    45.6 43.4 47.7
30-39 1,992    49.7 47.6 51.8
40-49 1,549    53.5 51.1 55.9
50-59 766       56.9 53.5 60.4
60+ 678       61.2 57.6 64.8
Gender
Female 4,412    47.1 45.7 48.5
Male 5,169    49.7 48.4 51.0
County
Bomi 281       47.7 41.8 53.5
Bong 393       36.5 31.8 41.1
Gbarpolu 37         43.6 27.8 59.4
Grand Bassa 210       37.6 31.4 43.8
Grand Cape Mount 289       44.1 38.4 49.8
Grand Gedeh 17         29.4 7.1 51.7
Grand Kru 62         66.1 53.9 78.3
Lofa 872       57.1 53.9 60.4
Margibi 1,316    47.1 44.4 49.8
Maryland 14         64.3 38.2 90.3
Montserrado 5,698    49.6 48.3 50.8
Nimba 303       25.4 20.5 30.3
River Cess 27         77.8 58.0 97.5
River Gee 20         66.7 46.0 87.3
Sinoe 42         66.7 52.2 81.1
Urban/Rural
Urban 5,893    49.2 48.0 50.3
Rural 3,664    46.5 44.8 48.3
Phase
Crisis Recognition 2,041    65.3 63.3 67.3
Emergency 6,864    44.5 43.4 45.7
Declining Epidemic 675       37.8 34.2 41.3
Health Care Worker
No 6,347    50.1 48.9 51.3
Yes 443       59.8 55.3 64.3
Travel History
No 3,590    43.7 42.0 45.4
Yes 427       55.7 50.9 60.4
Unknown 5,564    
Hospital Visit
No 3,624    44.3 42.5 46.0
Yes 308       46.1 40.5 51.7
Funeral Attendance
No 3,624    43.1 41.5 44.7
Yes 308       58.3 54.2 62.4
ETU Admission
No 5,422    0.50 0.49 0.51
Yes 4,159    0.47 0.45 0.48





The demographic breakdown of case classification is presented in Figure 2-3. The 
overall attack rate for Liberia is estimated to be 2 cases per 1,000 persons when the  
entire population is considered susceptible. When considering only cases in the 
community (removing those who self-identified as a health worker) and the exposed 
populations in the villages and communities with at least one reported case, we estimate 
the attack rate to be 5.31 per 1,000. The overall case fatality rate is estimated to be 
48.4%, with significant variation over time (Table 2-4). The estimate is among the lowest 
reported for an EVD epidemic (Table 2-7). One-fifth of cases took place during the crisis 
recognition phase. This phase during the early epidemic also reported the highest case 
fatality rate at 65.3%. The emergency response phase accounted for 70% of all cases, 
with 45% of cases occurring during the decline of the epidemic and less than 1% of cases 
occur during the phase of the long tail in 2015.  
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Table 2-5. Risk of Infection by Background Characteristics and Exposure Risks 
 
*RR; Unadjusted relative risk indicating the risk of infection among people with the 
specified exposure, compared to the risk of infection for all other exposures 
CI = 95% Confidence Interval 
Phase 4 was excluded from the analysis. Results from the formal reclassification exercise 
were not available for this dataset, and the case definition changed to include all deaths. 
Background
Characteristic n RR p
Age in years
0-9 2,032       0.91 ( 0.86 , 0.96) <0.001
10-19 2,226       1.07 ( 1.02 , 1.12) 0.007
20-29 3,632       1.01 ( 0.97 , 1.06) 0.520
30-39 3,794       REF
40-49 2,913       1.01 ( 0.97 , 1.06) 0.585
50-59 1,627       0.90 ( 0.84 , 0.95) <0.001
60+ 1,845       0.70 ( 0.65 , 0.75) <0.001
Unknown 1,384       0.61 ( 0.57 , 0.67) <0.001
Gender
Female 8,574       REF
Male 10,817     0.93 ( 0.90 , 0.96) <0.001
County
Bomi 546          1.06 ( 0.98 , 1.15) 0.168
Bong 851          0.95 ( 0.88 , 1.03) 0.194
Gbarpolu 77            0.99 ( 0.78 , 1.25) 0.934
Grand Bassa 491          0.88 ( 0.79 , 0.98) 0.017
Grand Cape Mount 638          0.93 ( 0.86 , 1.02) 0.122
Grand Gedeh 52            0.67 ( 0.46 , 1.00) 0.047
Grand Kru 118          1.08 ( 0.91 , 1.29) 0.367
Lofa 2,018       0.89 ( 0.84 , 0.94) <0.001
Margibi 2,084       1.30 ( 1.25 , 1.35) <0.001
Maryland 30            0.96 ( 0.66 , 1.41) 0.841
Montserrado 11,741     REF
Nimba 600          1.04 ( 0.96 , 1.13) 0.338
River Cess 62            0.90 ( 0.68 , 1.19) 0.455
River Gee 64            0.64 ( 0.45 , 0.93) 0.018
Sinoe 81            1.07 ( 0.87 , 1.32) 0.538
Urban/Rural
Urban 13,172     REF
Rural 6,221       1.32 ( 1.28 , 1.35) <0.001
Unknown 60            0.89 ( 0.66 , 1.22) 0.480
Phase
Crisis Recognition 3,650       0.88 ( 0.86 , 0.91) <0.001
Emergency 10,853     REF
Declining Epidemic 4,950       0.22 ( 0.20 , 0.23) <0.001
Health Care Worker
No 9,466       REF
Yes 606          1.09 ( 1.04 , 1.15) 0.001
Unknown 9,381       0.44 ( 0.43 , 0.46) <0.001
Travel History
No 5,801       REF
Yes 597          1.16 ( 1.09 , 1.22) <0.001
Unknown 13,055     0.69 ( 0.67 , 0.71) <0.001
Hospital Visit
No 5,417       REF
Yes 879          0.52 ( 0.48 , 0.57) <0.001
Unknown 13,157     0.64 ( 0.62 , 0.66) <0.001
Funeral Attendance
No 6,299       REF
Yes 723          1.27 ( 1.21 , 1.34) <0.001





Figure 2-2. Estimated Case Fatality Rate by Age, Liberia, 2014-2016 
 
Smoothed using locally weighted Lowess smoother, for confirmed and probably cases 
with a date of onset during Phase 1 or Phase 2 
Among cases who reported their age, the attack rate was highest among ages 
40-49, followed by ages 50-59. Case fatality rate generally rose with age, highest among 
the 60+ group at 60.3%, and lowest in the 10-19 age group at 38.8% (Figure 2-2). 
Children under the age of ten were also more likely to die due to EVD. 56.6% of cases 
were between the ages of 15 and 44. The risk of infection after non-specific exposure 
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Table 2-6. Variability in ETU case fatality rate, 2015-2016 
 
*Only for confirmed and probable cases and ETUs with at least 10 cases 
Case fatality rate in each phase is only presented if at least 5 cases presented at the 
ETU. ETU names withheld for privacy. 
 
Case fatality was highly variable between ETUs and phase of the epidemic, as shown in 
Table 2-6. . Case fatalities in ETUs were highest in Phase 1, and lowest during the 
declining epidemic in Phase 3. Variability between ETUs in case fatalities was highest in 
Phase 2, ranging between 15.2% and 87%. Only one ETU operated at scale during Phase 
4. 




ETU Site N Mean SE N Mean SE N Mean SE N Mean SE N Mean SE
ETU 1 -           -        -        -           -        -        18        55.6    12.1    -           -        -        20        55.0    11.4    
ETU 2 322     63.0    2.7      2,225  49.7    1.1      141     42.6    4.2      12        50.0    15.1    2,700  50.9    1.0      
ETU 3 -           -        -        33        15.2    6.3      -           -        -        -           -        -        35        17.1    6.5      
ETU 4 145     49.0    4.2      76        53.9    5.8      -           -        -        -           -        -        221     50.7    3.4      
ETU 5 -           -        -        659     28.5    1.8      91        33.0    5.0      -           -        -        752     29.3    1.7      
ETU 6 -           -        -        5          40.0    24.5    36        2.8      2.8      -           -        -        41        7.3      4.1      
ETU 7 181     61.9    3.6      156     57.1    4.0      -           -        -        -           -        -        337     59.6    2.7      
ETU 8 -           -        -        -           -        -        13        38.5    14.0    -           -        -        18        38.9    11.8    
ETU 9 -           -        -        23        87.0    7.2      50        66.0    6.8      -           -        -        74        73.0    5.2      
ETU 10 -           -        -        15        26.7    11.8    21        38.1    10.9    -           -        -        41        34.1    7.5      
ETU 11 -           -        -        180     41.1    3.7      23        17.4    8.1      -           -        -        206     37.9    3.4      
ETU 12 -           -        -        -           -        -        19        63.2    11.4    -           -        -        23        56.5    10.6    
Total 660     59.2    1.9      3,378  45.3    0.9      412     39.6    2.4      18        55.6    51.1    4,468  46.8    0.7      
TotalPhase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
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We identified 460 health workers who were EVD cases, 250 confirmed. Health 
workers had a higher case fatality rate by nearly 10 percentage points compared to non-
health workers and were more likely to become infected than individuals with other 
exposures (RR=1.09; 1.04-1.15). Reports of exposed health workers were highest during 
the first week of August, accounting for 17% of cases with known health worker status 
(Figure 2-3). Individuals who reported recent international travel also had higher risk of 
being a case (RR=1.16; 1.09-1.22). Individuals who reported recently visiting a hospital 
had lower risk of becoming a case (RR =0.52; 0.48-0.57).  
Individuals with a recent funeral attendance had higher risk of becoming a case 
(RR=1.27; 1.21-1.34). 13% of cases reported attending a funeral prior to the onset of 
their clinical symptoms. The proportion of cases who reported attending a funeral prior 
to onset of clinical symptoms reached 40% in May, stabilizing around 20% in August and 
falling through September to a low of about 10%. 
All fifteen counties reported cases throughout the outbreak, though the burden 
was much less in the eastern region of the country. The overall attack rate was highest in 
Margibi County (n=1337, AR=5.10 cases per 1,000 population), followed by Montserrado 
County n=6229, AR=4.47 cases per 1,000 population). Montserrado accounted for over 
half of all cases, with the largest concentration in the peri-urban areas surrounding 
Monrovia (Table 2-3). Lofa County, where the outbreak started, accounted for 8% of the 
final caseload. Lofa County also reported the second highest case fatality rate at 70.3%, 
second only to River Gee, where most cases were detected through dead body 
management protocols. Most EVD cases resided in urban areas (69.3%). There was no 
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difference in case fatality rate between urban and rural areas. Individuals with exposure 
in rural areas had a 32% higher likelihood of becoming a case compared to urban areas 
(RR =1.32; 1.28-1.35). 
Figure 2-4. EVD Case Density Map, Liberia, 2015-2016 
 
Ebola case clusters refer to a village or town with at least one case 
The epidemic map in Figure 2-4 illustrates the case density. The heatmap shows a 
concentration of cases at the Guinea/ Sierra Leone border in Foya district of northwest 
Lofa where the outbreak first started. The infection nearly immediately reached in Bomi 
and Margibi, with the first reported confirmed case in Montserrado in July. It was 
persistent in Montserrado until the end of the epidemic. The outbreak took hold in the 
capital Monrovia (shown in the inset), in densely populated communities of New Kru 
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Town and Gardnersville. Cases were concentrated in downtown Montserrado, especially 
the Waterside, New Kru town, and Gardnersville communities. Areas of high case density 
follow general population patterns (Appendix for reference map), spreading across the 
immediate coastline around Monrovia. Cases were in the comparatively densely 
populated corridor between Montserrado and Nimba, following the recently constructed 
highway. 
Figure 2-5. Time Series of key EVD indicators, Liberia, 2015-2016 
 
A: Epidemiological curve of suspect, probable and confirmed cases reported per week. 
B: Instantaneous reproduction number over a 30 day window 




Figure 2-5 shows the epidemic curve, instantaneous reproduction number, and 
case fatality rate for Liberia during the EVD epidemic. We estimate the basic 
reproduction number, R0, as 1.72 (95% CI=1.66,1.78). The crisis recognition phase was 
characterized by a low caseload and large changes in reproduction number as cases 
reached susceptible urban populations. The initial spike near the end of the phase 
coincides with an increase in cases in Lofa and the initial introduction of EVD in 
Montserrado. Case fatality during this phase was high, as access to supportive treatment 
options was limited and case finding often focused on dead bodies. Average reporting 
delays early on in this phase stretched upwards of two months, as investigations 
uncovered epidemiological links which were unknown.  
The emergency response phase started with a spike in the reproduction number, 
overlapping incident cases in Bomi, Bong, Margibi, and Montserrado countries. 
Caseloads rose exponentially throughout this phase, peaking at 877 cases reported 
during the first week of September. Case fatality consistently fell during this time, from a 
peak of about 80% to a low of 40% by mid-September. 
The declining epidemic phase started with the instantaneous reproduction 
number falling below one. CFR reached a low of 41% in mid-October before rising 
through November. The average delay between the date of onset and report of the case 





Figure 2-6. Surveillance system performance indicators, Liberia, 2015-2016 
 
Figure 2-6 shows the performance of the surveillance system in terms of the 
delay from symptom onset to report, and the proportion of cases reported on or after 
date of death. A long delay or high proportion of cases reported on or after death 
indicate a failure of the surveillance system to identify cases in a timely manner to allow 
for prevention of further human to human transmission. Throughout the long tail in 
2015, the focus shifted towards identification and elimination of the final few 
transmission chains and on general resilience proactive control measures. There were 
substantial delays in reporting during this time. The average delay between the onset of 
symptoms and case reporting was 5.31 days (Poisson 95% CI 5.24-5.39). About one in 
three (29.3%) cases were identified after the time of death. This proportion was highest 
in Phase 1, peaking at 60% and falling through Phase 2, to 10% in November of 2014. 
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About one in three case fatalities were reported after death. This subset 
represents a missed opportunity to prevent exposure through isolation and quarantine. 
We hypothesize that unreported case fatalities were relatively rare for three reasons, (1) 
deaths are high impact events which are more likely to be identified by the surveillance 
system (2) dead body teams achieved a high coverage rate, and (3) case finding teams 
actively searched for sudden deaths due to unknown causes. This assumption is likely 
more robust in the later stages of the outbreak, when community engagement measures 
and surveillance structures were in place. However, by adopting the assumption that 
death reporting is near complete and cases identified at death would not have been 
reported if they had not died, we can interpolate the late reporting among death statistic 
into a conservative ballpark estimate of underreporting among convalescent cases. Using 
these rates of underreporting to adjust the number of convalescent cases, while 
maintaining the assumption that case fatalities had were not underreported, we arrive at 
a conservative estimate of 16% underreporting overall, or an additional 1646 cases. 
Underreporting varies with the proportion of case fatalities reported after death, highest 





Table 2-7. Key Epidemiological Parameters for EVD, 2015-2016 
  
 
Figure 2-7. Illustration of Delays Between EVD Generations 
 
Table 2-7 describes and Figure 2-7 illustrates the estimates of natural history 
across two generations of EVD infection. The range for each estimate is expected to be 
larger than past outbreaks, as the extent of the outbreak resulted in data entry or 
investigation errors which could not be reconciled. The mean for each of these estimates 
is within the range of previous estimates for EVD outbreaks. The mean serial interval is 
estimated to be 12.9±7.6 days. This roughly corresponds to previous estimates during 
this and past outbreaks. A study of Koinadugu District in Sierra Leone estimated the 
serial interval to be 11.1±5.2 days.61 The average delay between symptom onset and 
admission into an ETU was 5.1 ±4 days. This excludes cases which were denied entry into 
Key Epidemiological Parameters N Estimate SD Median




Generation Time (days) 56 13 8 13 0 , 34 10, 16 5.8 , 25
Incubation Period (days) 374 10 7 10 1 , 34 5, 13 1 , 21
Delay from onset to community death (days)2218 10 9 7 0 , 30 6, 10 0 , 34
Admission delay (days) 3881 5 4 4 0 , 174 4, 5 0 , 19
Delay from admission to death (days) 1846 4 4 3 0 , 62 4.6 0 , 20
Delay from admission to discharge (days) 3217 8 7 5 0 , 57 17 0 , 56
Basic Reproduction Number (R0) 910 1.72 [1.66 , 1.79] 1.4, 4.7 1.9 , 5.7





an ETU due to lack of bed overflow. Once in the ETU, there was an average of 3.8±3.6 
days until death, or 7.6±6.9 days until convalescence and discharge. For cases which 
were not admitted into an ETU, convalescence was not measured. The average duration 




Figure 2-8. Diagnostic power of known exposures, signs, and symptoms, 2015-2016 
 
 
Green circles depict criteria which fall above change, and orange circles denote which fall 
below chance. Larger circles are the criteria which were part of the suspect case definition. 
Data are taken from Phase 2 and 3. Phase 1 is excluded to account for poor training among 
investigation staff which may lead to misclassification, and Phase 4 is excluded as the suspect 
case definition was changed to include all deaths. 
N SD N SD N SD N SD
Entire Definition 4843 0.74 0.01 2681 0.22 0.01 13984 0.45 0.00 10098 0.61 0.00
Clinical definition 4032 0.75 0.01 2150 0.40 0.01 13929 0.47 0.00 11495 0.61 0.00
Fever 4032 0.86 0.01 2150 0.28 0.01 14625 0.48 0.00 10799 0.62 0.00
Nausea or vomiting 3972 0.64 0.01 2119 0.56 0.01 13165 0.46 0.00 12350 0.59 0.00
Diarrhea 3971 0.62 0.01 2123 0.60 0.01 13000 0.46 0.00 12512 0.59 0.00
Fatigue 4730 0.74 0.01 2263 0.32 0.01 13863 0.46 0.00 10750 0.63 0.00
Loss appetite 3939 0.76 0.01 2125 0.38 0.01 14051 0.47 0.00 11491 0.60 0.00
Abdominal Pain 3867 0.53 0.01 2101 0.55 0.01 12833 0.45 0.00 12805 0.57 0.00
Headache 3910 0.55 0.01 2103 0.51 0.01 12967 0.45 0.00 12626 0.57 0.00
Breathing Difficulty 3804 0.24 0.01 2082 0.66 0.01 11555 0.40 0.00 14165 0.53 0.00
Swallowing Difficulty 4699 0.24 0.01 2218 0.79 0.01 10457 0.38 0.00 14232 0.55 0.00
Hiccups 3721 0.10 0.01 2047 0.88 0.01 10675 0.39 0.00 15163 0.53 0.00
General pain 4783 0.55 0.01 2406 0.45 0.01 12546 0.43 0.00 11871 0.59 0.00
Epidemiological Link 1743 0.82 0.01 841 0.57 0.02 15004 0.48 0.00 14018 0.56 0.00
Known contact 7540 0.21 0.00 8263 0.95 0.00 2045 0.78 0.01 13758 0.57 0.00
Health care worker 5121 0.05 0.00 2862 0.96 0.00 8212 0.33 0.01 15411 0.53 0.00
Funeral attendance 3160 0.12 0.01 2526 0.94 0.00 10632 0.45 0.00 15288 0.53 0.00
Travel 2918 0.10 0.01 1967 0.93 0.01 11338 0.43 0.00 15383 0.53 0.00
Visited hospital 2773 0.08 0.01 1955 0.72 0.01 11842 0.42 0.00 15036 0.51 0.00
Visited traditional healter 1664 0.03 0.00 199 0.97 0.01 14001 0.42 0.00 15742 0.52 0.00
Animal contact 1864 0.01 0.00 210 1.00 0.00 13744 0.41 0.00 15788 0.52 0.00
Encountered body fluids 378 0.67 0.02 838 0.61 0.02 15165 0.49 0.00 15225 0.52 0.00
Physical contact 346 0.21 0.02 782 0.90 0.01 14829 0.49 0.00 15649 0.52 0.00
Indirect objects 22 0.14 0.07 50 0.76 0.06 15746 0.48 0.00 15788 0.52 0.00
Same households 22 0.23 0.09 50 0.64 0.07 15754 0.48 0.00 15780 0.52 0.00
Bleeding definition 4671 0.05 0.00 2169 0.93 0.01 9370 0.33 0.00 15396 0.53 0.00









Four in ten (40.0%) individuals had data for all elements of the suspect case 
definition. For cases with unknown cause of death, sensitivity was 15%, and specificity 
88%. For the expanded suspect case definition (Table 2-1), 45% of cases and 55% of non-
cases met the criteria. The sensitivity was 74%, and specificity was 22%, falling below the 
random guess benchmark (slanted line) on the ROC diagram in Figure 2-8. This indicates 
the overall power of the suspect case definition similar to the efficiency of a random 
guess. 
Figure 2-9 illustrates the coverage of contact tracing, ETU, and burial 
interventions among eligible cases. Contact tracing coverage peaked in December 2014, 
as the last transmission chains of the main epidemic were being tracked. Though contact 
tracing generated many contacts and was a crucial element of tracking transmission 
chains in elimination effort, only a small proportion of cases had initiated contact tracing. 
Coverage of contact tracing was 8.6% among all cases and 11% among cases in 
Montserrado County. A poor match rate between sources and cases due to the lack of 
information collected on the sources may depress the numbers from the true estimate. 
Under the assumption that all 1947 reported sources were cases, the maximum possible 
coverage of contact tracing in Montserrado is 31.3%.  




*15-day moving average 
Approximately 2 in 3 cases (66%) were buried following proper infection 
prevention standard. Dead body management peaked in early October at 94% of cases. 
We estimated that 43.0% of cases had an ETU admission. At the peak in November 
three-in-four cases were admitted into ETUs. There was a coverage peak in April, driven 
by the ETU management by MSF and Samaritan’s Purse. ETU building spiked in 
November, with 7 ETUs built around the country, more than doubling the existing 
number. The building continued through January, as the US military completed their 
planned facilities, with two facilities built in December, and six builds in January. Though 
there were many ETUs built in November 2014, however, usage fell through the month 
as cases left, and new cases being identified were often reported at the time of death 
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Figure 2-10. ETU Capacity and Bed Usage 
 
We estimate planned ETU construction would have made available 2,775 beds during the 
epidemic. Demand for ETU beds outpaced supply during the emergency response and 
start of the declining epidemic phases. Most construction occurred after bed usage 
began to fall in early October 2014. Due to the reduction in usage, many of the planned 
ETUs were canceled or scaled down in staffing and equipment to support less than a 
tenth of the original patient population, with the ability to stretch capacity. 
Peak usage was on October 10th, 2014, at 574 beds in use, corresponding to the 
peak observed in case coverage in Figure 3-5. Bed capacity peaked at 695 on December 
29th, 2014, with a peak stretch capacity of 1629 on February 5th, 2015, coinciding with the 
end of the mission for the US military’s Operation United Assistance.  
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Bed availability and ETU construction was assessed nationally. Gaps in capacity may 
have existed for longer periods in high burden areas such as the capital city of 
Montserrado. In Montserrado, ETU usage exceeded capacity at the start of October and 
maintained stretch capacity levels for the entire month before falling. (not shown). 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
The outbreak in Liberia was part of the longest and largest known EVD outbreak 
to date. Case reclassification and deduplication of the surveillance dataset resulted in a 
lower case estimate than presented in the official situation reports.9 We estimate 
between March 1st, 2014 and December 31st, 2015, infection with EVD had been 
confirmed in 5110 individuals in Liberia, with a total of 10,280 suspect, probable, and 
confirmed cases. A substantial portion of transmission may have gone undetected and 
the actual burden of disease is likely higher. Reports of asymptomatic and minimally 
symptomatic patients during the outbreak which may have not met the standard case 
definition, and poor trust in the health system may have repressed identification in some 
communities.62,63 Further, some cases may have been misclassified as non-cases due to 
poor case-finding and use of non-standard case definitions; for instance, there were 
reports of investigators and contact tracers using lack of fever as a de facto exclusion 
criteria.44 Our conservative estimate of underreporting suggests an actual case burden of 
11,934 cases, a 16% underreporting rate. This estimate is lower than a reported district 
specific underreporting in Sierra Leone between 33% and 68% in October 2014, falling to 
18% in March 2015, but corresponds well to an estimated 24% underreporting in 
Montserrado during Phase 2 (compared to 26% during the same period using our 
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method).64–66 This method of ballparking underreporting using readily available 
surveillance data may be useful in similar settings and high mortality outbreaks, but may 
perform worse in outbreaks in rural areas where entire transmission chains in some 
communities may remain undetected. Further exploration of reporting rates and their 
effect on the spatiotemporal dynamics of Ebola during this epidemic are warranted. 
The match rate is much lower than expected between some databases. For 
instance, the low match percentage between source cases and the DHIS line list suggests 
sources were not reliably identified and reported. The low match rate between ETU 
records and the DHIS line list suggests poor communication between ETUs and case 
investigation teams. These issues may have prevented accurate estimation of cases in 
real time during the epidemic, or could be a byproduct of data quality and lack of 
personally identifiable information in some datasets. 
Ideally, cases would be soon after symptom onset through contact tracing or 
other means of identification. The median report delay was four days after the date of 
onset, with 75% reported within one week. The report delay was similar to the admission 
delay, and many cases were identified only when they presented to the ETU rather than 
by active case finding. The reduction in delay after Phase 1 is a testament to both the 
improvements in the organization of leadership and strengthening of surveillance 
structures during emergency response.  
Contact tracing was initiated for 8.7% of cases and proactively identified 378 
cases. This proportion may be higher when accounting for a low match rate between 
contact tracing and case data, and difficulties in collection and digitization the paper 
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records.67 However, the maximum hypothetical coverage is 23%, assuming all individuals 
with initiated contact tracing activities were EVD cases. Lack of resources is likely not a 
driver of this low rate. As an example, the St Paul River cluster was one of the last known 
clusters assumed to have originated through indigenous transmission, and had ample 
human, technical, and financial resources to trace contacts. However, one-third of cases 
in the cluster were never tracked through contact tracing.44 Community avoidance is 
likely a larger contributory cause, the mandatory cremation and property destruction 
reportedly caused cases and contacts to avoid participation in investigations.68 Overall, 
the proportion of cases with initiated contact tracing rose over time, reflecting the 
reliance on contact tracing as a tool to interrupt transmission chains late in the outbreak. 
Contact tracing remains an integral disease control measure to prospectively identify 
cases (epidemiological linkage was the best performing classifier of EVD cases) and 
prevent secondary transmission (in the St. Paul cluster, all cases in the final generation 
were tracked as contacts and isolated).  However, further work is needed to improve 
documentation, community engagement and compliance, and coverage of these 
activities.  
A difficulty in discriminating between cases and non-cases may have added to 
the performance deficits in the surveillance system. We estimate the sensitivity of the 
WHO expanded suspect case definition performed slightly inferior to a random guess. 
The definition did perform at a similar level to the outbreak in Guinea (sensitivity 68%, 
specificity, 49.7%) and better than the simplified case definition published in 1999, 
(sensitivity 58%, false negatives >30%).69,70 The change towards an expanded case 
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definition was in response to the poor availability in epidemiological and clinical 
information for many cases, and the late presentation of highly specific hemorrhagic 
symptoms. Of components of the suspect case definition, evidence of an epidemiological 
linkage and fever was the best performing classifier. Despite the concern that using early 
clinical signs would result in the misclassification of cholera and malaria as Ebola; fever, 
diarrhea, and nausea/vomiting were the best performing symptom classifiers, and the 
overall clinical definition performed better than chance. Symptom data were collected at 
the time of report for most cases, and such classifiers may change in performance 
dependent on the reporting delay and clinical course. We expect this is the cause of the 
relatively poor performance of the hemorrhagic symptoms of the case definition, as 
cases were reported before the onset of full hemorrhagic signs such as hematemesis. 
Overall, though the expanded case definition is advantageous for the paucity of 
information availability during an active outbreak and severely reduces the false negative 
rate, improvements are still needed. There is a moral imperative to minimize false 
positives. Case teams will often refer suspect patients directly to ETUs (or the patient may 
self-refer) where there may be a chance of transmission to false positives. Improvements 
to the suspect case definition do not necessarily require a redefinition. Instead, 
surveillance teams can emphasize collection of the classifiers with the most predictive 
power to increase the information available for the discrimination, and preferentially use 
the epidemiological linkage component when data for multiple components are 
available. This definition is also only useful when an outbreak has already been 
confirmed. Both in this outbreak and previous outbreaks, initial identification of Ebola 
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was delayed by misclassification as Cholera, or bloody diarrhea mistaken for Shigellosis.71 
Field diagnostics and laboratory support will be integral in early identification, and 
confirmatory testing to continue to refine case and clinical definitions. 
Availability of epidemiological parameters estimates from previous Ebola Zaire 
outbreaks is limited. We reproduce a selection of these parameters from a 
comprehensive review by Kerkhove et. al. (2015) in the supplement in Table 7-2.72 Our 
estimates for serial interval, incubation period, R0, and range of values for Rt were within 
the range of these previous estimates, though the R0 is the second lowest reported to 
date (the first being an outmoded modelled estimate of R0 for outbreaks in Congo and 
Uganda) and case fatality was much lower than previously reported. The admission delay 
was also similar to previous outbreaks, and the delay between hospitalization and death 
or discharge were slightly lower.73 The delay between symptom onset and death was 
roughly three days higher in Liberia, though previous studies did not constrain this 
estimate to only cases which did not visit an ETU. The apparent similarity in 
epidemiological parameters and clinical time course between this outbreak and past 
outbreaks of EVD indicates that the severity of the West African outbreak was not due to 
a fundamental change in disease transmissibility, virulence, or access to treatment. The 
remaining differentiation is then context. The outbreak in West Africa reached urban 
centers, vastly increasing the exposed population, and eventually resulting in a caseload 
which was unmanageable by the existing disease surveillance and control structures.  
 Our estimate of the basic reproduction number was slightly higher than previous 
estimates of 2014-2016 West Africa outbreaks, and on the lower end of estimates for 
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EVD in previous outbreaks.73–75 The reproduction number is a function of the effective 
contact rate, and not a biological constant. The effective contact rate will change based 
on social determinants, political and structural context, population structures, and 
seasonality. Past outbreaks were much smaller, and may have contained a higher 
proportion of superspreading (high transmission) events. Though case clustering has 
been demonstrated during this epidemic, it is possible the spread to urban areas in this 
outbreak reduced the reliance on superspreading to sustain the infection in the 
population, and lowered the overall number of secondary cases.64 This effect may be 
masked even when stratifying the basic reproduction number by population density, due 
to high mixing between urban and rural areas. Further investigation into the extent and 
impact on transmission of superspreading effects is warranted. 
We show a variation in the instantaneous reproduction number, which may be 
indicative of the outbreak reaching new populations or high transmission funeral events. 
Our estimate of when the reproduction number first crossed below 1 is mid-September. 
Correcting for underreporting based on the proportion of cases reported after death did 
not significantly change the instantaneous reproduction number over time, though there 
may be spatial patterns which we did not investigate. We detected a brief resurgent 
period in late January, as hidden transmission chains were discovered in Bong and 
Montserrado. The overall decline in the instantaneous reproduction number correlates 
with the reorganization of response and leadership following the creation of the IMS. 
However, we cannot draw a clear consensus on the marginal impact of control measures. 
59 
 
Early response measures emphasized the importance of EVD treatment centers, 
spurred by estimates of 70% ETU coverage needed to halt the epidemic.76 While ETUs 
may have helped control the outbreak, the reproduction number and caseload were 
both declining before the major ETU buildup and well before this coverage threshold 
was reached, suggesting the epidemic was already within control. Most additional 
treatment bed capacity was built outside Montserrado. By the last week of August, 
Montserrado had a capacity of 423 beds. The ETU presence was still likely pivotal in 
managing dead bodies and reducing funeral and community exposures. ETUs managed 
about 30% of dead bodies, and 43% of all cases recorded an ETU admission.  
Case fatality changed significantly over time. We hypothesize the high case 
fatality in phase 1 is due in part to preferential reporting of deaths and lack of treatment 
access and knowledge.  There was a minimal 3% reduction in case fatality for cases in the 
ETU, and significant heterogeneities in case fatality between ETUs.  The small magnitude 
CFR reduction may be driven by the overcapacity and under-resourced nature of ETUs 
during the peak of the epidemic. ETUs in urban areas with high caseload exceeded 
stretch capacity, and there were reports of patients treated on the floors between beds.77 
Some ETUs offered only oral rather than parenteral rehydration partially due to fears of 
health worker exposure.78 ETU morgues stowed dead bodies from the community, which 
may have been falsely included in ETU admission registers. There is also the possibility 
that patients delayed seeking treatment until late in clinical course where supportive 
treatment had limited effect. For instance, the initial admissions at ELWA were critically 
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ill, and had been waiting outside the ETU for care.52 However, treatment delays were not 
found to be significant in a multi-country study of the outbreak.79   
Overall, case fatality during the outbreak was much lower than previous EVD 
outbreaks.80 This finding persists even when excluding suspect cases and records missing 
outcome information (instead of assuming they are alive), which would increase CFR to 
58.4 [57.2-59.6]. The decrease in case fatality may be due to improved case finding of 
convalescent cases, different underlying risk of death in the infected Liberian population, 
or a general increase in knowledge of supportive care. It is also possible that deaths 
occurred after the conclusion of the case investigation but were never reported. It may 
be possible to improve outcomes further by accounting for heterogeneities in case 
fatality rate by age; such as prioritizing parenteral rehydration among children under 10 
years and adults over 60 years of age as recommended in supportive treatment 
guidelines.78 
 Interpretation of risks of infection is complicated by selection and reporting 
biases. Risk information may have been preferentially collected for cases with at least 
one known risk at time of report. Further, recall of point exposures such as funeral 
attendance within a suitable timeframe may be limited. For exposures such as 
international travel, the increase in risk of infection may be tied to other causes, such as a 
higher occurrence of fever among travelers, rather than an increase in EVD transmission. 
Despite these limitations, cases with a funeral exposure had a 27% higher risk of 
becoming an EVD case compared to those with other exposure types, providing further 
evidence for funeral attendance as a primary driver of transmission. This heterogeneity in 
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risk of infection provides suggestive evidence for potential superspreading events 
discussed in other papers.81 The proportion of cases with funeral exposure decreased 
through Phase 2 and 3, before increasing again. We could not say for certain if these 
exposures included unsafe handling of the body or exposure to bodily fluids. It is likely 
the reduction in the proportion of cases with a funeral exposure was fueled by the 
cremation directive, whereas the subsequent increase in funeral exposure corresponded 
with the policy shift towards safe and dignified burials.  
 We were not able to directly measure the impact of community engagement and 
behavior change using surveillance data. The increase in coverage of control measures 
can be, at least in part, attributed to tackling hesitancy and mistrust in the community. 
This implies in addition to a direct decrease in exposure, community engagement and 
increasing trust can have a multiplicative effect in adherence and participation in other 
control measures.82 Community health workers can act as bellwethers to future emerging 
diseases. Long term resiliency to future health emergencies will depend on communities 
and the health system to be well prepared and in lockstep; including a joint discourse on 
health priorities, engagement through programs such as community event-based 
surveillance, and open and transparent communication. 
2.5.1 Limitations 
Surveillance data have several natural limitations. Data may be incomplete, and 
there is evidence of under-reporting which were not able to directly estimate. During the 
data retrieval, some county surveillance officers and ETU operators reported destroying 
forms due to fears of contamination.67 Under-reporting of specific variables of interest 
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increased during the peak of the outbreak when the health system were strained to 
respond and document the rising incident cases. Under-reporting is likely to be 
prevalent in rural areas, where the logistical barriers in reporting a case to the national, 
access to health facilities are limited, and stigma from the outbreak may have suppressed 
the identification of transmission chains. 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The 2015-2016 EVD outbreak in Liberia had a similar epidemiological parameter and 
delays as previously reported outbreaks. We propose the exceptional nature of the 
outbreak was not driven by a fundamental change in transmission patterns, but a 
combination of the outbreak reaching dense population centers, and health systems 
which struggled to rapidly identify transmission chains and implement sophisticated 
non-pharmaceutical control measures. Community engagement, resulting changes in 
approach to dead body management, and a reorganization of response leadership 
coincided with a reduction in transmissibility, whereas additional ETU treatment capacity 
arrived after the reproduction number fell below zero. We find further suggestive 
evidence that funeral exposure was a primary driver of transmission, with 27% greater 
risk of infection compared to all other exposures. Case fatality was among the lowest of 
past EVD outbreaks, and we did not observe a significant impact of ETUs. There was a 
large variability in case fatality between ETUs, which may be due to differences in 
treatment as well as role in outbreak response. The outbreak posed a major challenge to 
the weak disease surveillance system in Liberia, however challenges are not unique to 
EVD. Emerging respiratory diseases with higher rates of transmission pose an even 
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graver risk, and steps must be taken to improve the overall resiliency of the health 
system to future emerging disease.  
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3 IMPLEMENTATION AND SUSTAINABILITY OF A 




Background: Following the 2014-2016 West African EVD outbreak, the Ministry of 
Health in Liberia and the International Organization for Migration implemented a 
Community Event-Based Surveillance (CEBS) program in 8 counties and 2972 
communities to aid in early detection of priority diseases and conditions. CEBS is a 
specialized referral activity involving the collection of information on events of public 
health concern in the community and by the community. Community surveillance 
workers were trained to refer community members based on twelve syndromic 
community case definitions. In this analysis, we review the implementation of CEBS and 
evaluate the sustainability of its activities as Liberia transitions from emergency response 
to routine disease surveillance.  
Methods: We conduct a retrospective review by comparing disease reports in 2016 from 
the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) surveillance system to reports 
of triggers from the community to calculate coverage and positive predictive value of 
each community case definition. We also conduct a document review based on in-depth 
interviews, observations from technical group meetings, key informant interviews, and an 
interviewer administered survey to describe the program implementation, community 
surveillance workers (CSWs), and characterize the sustainability of the program in Liberia. 
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Results: Between February 2016 and October of 2016, the program detected 3746 alerts 
resulting in 885 suspect cases. Approximately 31.5% of non-EVD cases in the national 
surveillance system in the program areas originated from CEBS reports. Over 95% of 
reported alerts met the community trigger definition, and 885 ultimately met the case 
definition of an epidemic-prone disease and were reported to the district level for further 
investigation. The positive predictive value was highest for reports of neonatal, maternal, 
and unexplained death, and lowest for rare diseases (VHF, meningitis, and AFP). Recall of 
triggers was highest for acute watery diarrhea, and the most popular source of 
information was house to house visits and general word of mouth. Transportation 
between the community and health facility was reported as a major barrier at all levels. 
Across the domains of sustainability, we find mixed evidence for the domains of 
partnerships and program adaptation, and severe limitations in the domains of 
organizational capacity and funding stability. As designed, the program accounts for 
19.4% of government expenditure on health. We estimate cost reductions and 
integration with existing community initiatives would reduce this to 2.9% of government 
expenditure on health. Coupled with a transition towards a more community-driven or 
routine program these cost reductions may result in a more sustainable model. 
Conclusions: We classify the structure and goals of the CEBS pilot in Liberia align most 
closely with an active response design and suggest it is unsustainable in its current form 
due to challenges in organization capacity and financial sustainability. Transportation 
barriers and poor recall of rare conditions limit the use of the program for early 
detection of epidemics in remote communities. However, a substantial proportion of 
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reports in program areas originated through CEBS, and the program was effective in 
extending the range of the surveillance system to remote areas and in engaging the 
community in reporting epidemic-prone disease. We suggest that if community 
surveillance programs in Liberia and other resource-limited settings are to succeed, 
program goals should closely align to available capacity, barriers to reporting be 
proactively addressed, and selection of diseases to monitor be carefully considered in 
relation to context.  
 
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
In 1995, the International Health Regulations (IHR) were updated, coming into 
force in 2007 as a legally binding agreement with 196 state signatories aimed at 
preventing the international spread of disease. IHR  intended to mobilize improvement 
in the detection of emerging infectious disease (EID) by promoting local and global 
disease surveillance and response capacity.83–85 In the African region, Integrated Disease 
Surveillance and Response (IDSR) provides a framework for low-income countries to 
build real-time surveillance, supplementing existing aggregated facility-based reporting 
which are less sensitive and responsive to disease trends.86  
Through the implementation of IDSR, the region is building a core capacity in 
syndromic surveillance by through community-event based surveillance (CEBS) programs 
to provide early warning of cases of public health importance, mobilize response, and 
reduce morbidity and mortality within the population.87  A 2019 WHO panel defined 
community-based surveillance as “the systematic detection and reporting of events of 
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public health significance within a community by community members”.88 CEBS is 
defined in Liberia as the “organized and rapid collection of information from community 
events which are a potential risk to public health.”89,90 CEBS shortens the delay in disease 
detection by extending the surveillance apparatus into communities by training 
community members on simplified syndromic triggers.90  
We focus here on the implementation and sustainability of the Liberian CEBS 
program, a community-level disease reporting activity which provides early warning and 
response to health events. For this assessment, we define sustainability as “after a 
defined period, the program…continues to be delivered…and may evolve or adapt while 
continuing to produce benefits for individuals/systems” as proposed by Moore et al. 
(2017).91 The objective of this paper is to discuss factors which influence sustainability 
and propose a typology for community surveillance programs, based on lessons learned 
during the design and implementation of a community event-based surveillance 
program based in Liberia following the 2014-2016 West African EVD outbreak. 
3.2.1 Overview of Community Disease Surveillance 
CEBS programs are abstract and poorly defined, resulting in a large variety of 
formulations and little consensus on best practices.92 Traditionally, CEBS activities are 
leveraged for diseases targeted for elimination or eradication (e.g., avian influenza, polio, 
and guinea worm) intending to increase sensitivity an coverage of disease detection in 
remote regions.93–101 Activities for these often siloed, narrowly targeted, and vertical 
programs, range from reliance on passive detection to blanket coverage through costly 
household surveys. The introduction of IDSR encouraged a shift from vertical to 
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integrated disease surveillance. Programs integrating multiple epidemic-prone diseases 
into a single reporting platform have piloted in regions of India, Ghana, Cambodia, and 
Ethiopia.102–105 These are distinct from the more common community information 
systems which do not collect detailed event information, but instead aggregate counts of 
disease over a period of time. Aggregate reporting can hide individual and community 
level variation and lack the information needed to initiate case investigation or assess the 
severity of disease. Less formal programs have involved volunteers participating in 
monthly community discussions on health problems in Latin America, or identifying 
mosquito larval vectors in Tanzania.106,107  
CEBS also provides advantages over traditional facility-level surveillance methods, 
apart from increasing the coverage and sensitivity of disease surveillance. The program 
improves linkage to care especially in geographies where travel time to the nearest 
health facility can be measured in days. This is especially useful with diseases with clear 
prodromes and unmet need. The use of pre-diagnostic syndromic triggers creates rich 
datasets capable of producing risk maps and identifying patterns of unknown causes of 
disease and death. For communities, it provides a platform to participate in disease 
surveillance and realize rights affirmed in the Alma Atta declaration.108 Engagement of 
communities facilitates risk communication through continuous dialogue, provides a 
democratic voice to surveillance system governance, and more efficient collaboration 
during epidemic response.109,110 Training communities in disease surveillance may lead to 
genuine empowerment.111,112  
69 
 
The data generated from CEBS programs can be used for risk analysis of 
population disease burden and hotspots, in addition to immediately actionable 
responses to identified cases. These programs can generate a large amount of 
information, which can be challenging to synthesize. Often, the limited data analysis 
resources in low income countries may be dedicated to routine analysis of traditional 
disease surveillance sources. CEBS data may overlap with pre-existing routine 
information systems such as Liberia’s Community Based Information System (CBIS). The 
aggregate indicators in the routine system are less responsive to emerging threats and 
do not provide real-time information. The two can be complementary, however, as 
routine information systems can provide a more comprehensive view of community 
health, provide baselines, and monitor long term trends. 
3.2.2 Concepts of Sustainability Applied to Community Disease Surveillance 
CEBS programs are difficult to sustain, evidenced by evaluations of IDSR which  
consistently cite community engagement as a major weakness.113–115 Community 
programs tend to conclude with their funding periods; host countries struggle to 
continue the activities.116 Short funding horizons exacerbate the situation, requiring 
developing countries to achieve sustainability of complex programs in rapid 
timeframes.117 
The range of motivations for community participation in surveillance leads to 
similarly diverse definitions of program sustainability. Past programs have featured 
defined time horizons and targets of elimination, or are judiciously limited to 
geographies where community surveillance be most impactful.93 As with many 
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community interventions, CEBS requires a significant initial investment. Human, financial, 
and organizational capacity are needed to manage and translate the large amounts of 
data.116 The loss of this investment, and the disillusionment and disengagement of the 
community when the benefits are removed, are a strong motivator for sustaining the 
benefits.116 
There are various frameworks which explore programmatic sustainability for 
different levels of operation, contexts, actors, and timeframes.118,119 The most 
comprehensive was proposed by Shediac-Rizkallah and Bone (1998) which consists of 
three indicators of sustainability;  
(1) continued health benefits for individuals,  
(2) institutionalization or routinization of program activities, and  
(3) continuing development of community’s capacity to deliver the program – 
applicable when the program is delivered through community structures.116  
The determinants which influence sustainability were proposed as  
(1) factors in the broader community environment,  
(2) project design and implementation factors, and  
(3) factors in the organizational settings.116  
This concept was further extended in the Dynamic Sustainability Framework (DSF) 
which emphasizes change over time in both the intervention and setting.120 
Consequently, sustainability is not explored at a designated point during the program 
life cycle, but a process which is concurrent with program implementation.121  
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Focusing on communicable disease surveillance programs, Shigayeva and Coker 
(2015) propose five precursors to sustainability: leadership, capacity, 
flexibility/adaptability, interactions, and performance.122 The concept of ‘interactions’ 
describes the adaptation of the intervention to its setting as a range of 
institutionalization which occurs within each of the building blocks of the health system. 
The natural setting for community disease surveillance as an enormous impact on the 
sustainability of the program, as different cultural norms, burdens of disease, and health 
systems modify the effectiveness and sustainability of activities. Iwelunmor et al. (2015) 
propose combining the DSF with frameworks on cultural models to better explain the 
idiosyncrasies of sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa.123  
Analogous to sustainability, the concept of “scaling up” is particularly significant 
for CEBS programs. Due to the large initial investment, many community disease 
surveillance programs begin narrowly defined in disease focus, geographic footprint, 
operational scale, or timeframe. Subramanian et al. (2011) propose factors for success 
scaling from existing frameworks similar to those identified above but also argues this 
sort of reductionist approach is biased towards supply-side factors, and ongoing 
‘learning by doing’ approaches are more likely to result in sustainable programs than 
prescribed blueprints.124  
Paina and Peters (2012) propose viewing scaling and sustainability through the 
lens of a complex adaptive system, which takes into account the feedback loops, time 
dependencies, unintended effects, path dependencies, and networks characteristics of 
programs.125 This viewpoint complements the more simplistic models by advocating a 
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deeper understanding of the pathways of change, taking into account the peculiarities of 
the setting. An example of an application of this viewpoint is the Develop-Distort 
Dilemma, which can help detect and avoid unintended effects, such as alienating 
traditional health providers who may be resistant to the loss of business through 
referrals to the health facility.126  
Schell et al. (2013) propose a framework of sustainability which incorporates 
these frameworks through conceptual mapping and expert input into nine broad 
domains: funding stability, political support, partnerships, organizational capacity, 
program adaptation, program evaluation, communications, public health impacts, and 
strategic planning (Figure 3-1).22 We use this framework to explore the sustainability of 
CEBS programs in Liberia. 




3.2.3 Liberian Context 
During the 2014-2016 West African EVD outbreak, 11,308 people died of the 
28,610 reported EVD cases.127 The surveillance system suffered from insufficient numbers 
of trained staff, community stigma, limited communication infrastructure, and an 
‘overwhelming number of affected persons”.10 Lessons from the outbreak highlighted the 
importance of community engagement and the characteristics of superspreading which 
drove transmission.23,24 CEBS programs in Liberia were put in place during the tail-end 
outbreak, to respond to what a WHO Emergency Committee termed “the high mobility 
of populations and cross-border movement of infected travelers.”25–29 Reintroduction of 
the disease from ongoing transmissions chains in Sierra Leone occurred in 2016 from 
Guinea highlighted the need for increasing the sensitivity of the surveillance system in 
the porous border countries.128  
In Liberia, the CEBS programs were managed jointly between international 
organizations and the Ministry of Health, supported by county and district health staff on 
the ground. Initially, there were a multitude of different forms, triggers, and reporting 
structures in used. As the epidemic waned in 2015, attention moved towards developing 
central MOH guidelines to standardize CEBS processes throughout the country, develop 
a long-term strategy, and identify opportunities to increase program coverage.48 During 
this time, the CEBS was recognized as an integral component of both the community 
health policy as well as the IDSR strategy and integrated into the routine work of the 
MoH.129,130 As operations were normalized and new resources established formally 
incorporated into the MoH, partners led by the MoH in a technical working group 
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converged on a set of guidelines, forms, and process to standardize CEBS activities in the 
country.131  
As part of the health system transition from emergency to routine functions, the 
CEBS program is adapting its format to achieve scale. This adaptation phase is an crucial 
step in identifying a sustainable path towards integrating CEBS as a permanent core 
function of all community surveillance workers in the country, and the lessons learned 
can inform similar referral programs in low-income settings.116,119,132  
3.3 METHODS 
There were multiple international organizations supporting and coordinating CEBS 
activities during the outbreak; we focus on the largest, supported by the International 
Organization for Migration. The program operated in the eight counties of Liberia with 
international land borders, Sierra Leone to the west, Guinea to the north, and Ivory Coast 
to the east (Figure 3-2). CEBS activities were nested in a more extensive border 
management project funded by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and 
implemented by the International Organization for MIgration. These counties were 
chosen to bolster the case detection near the porous land border, as the epidemic in 
Sierra Leone and Guinea continued. County officials mapped 2848 communities in 43 
districts, covering an estimated 2,065,690 persons between April and September of 2016, 
accounting for approximately 36.5% of the population of the country. 
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Figure 3-2. CEBS Coverage 
 
Community event-based surveillance programs were implemented in communities 
(black dots) in the eight border counties and covering only half of Bong County (dark 
shaded) from February to October 2016. 
3.3.1 Program Operations 
Trigger Definitions 
Though the CEBS program in Liberia was a direct response to the ongoing Ebola 
epidemic, it was designed as an extension of the Integrated Disease Surveillance and 
Response program relaunched in 2016. In this manner, rather than a vertical program 
focused on Ebola, it was integrated into the surveillance system and focused on all 
priority diseases. A technical group devised community trigger definitions which 
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described prodromes or syndromes of the 14 priority diseases and conditions marked for 
immediate reporting by the Liberian IDSR Technical Guidelines131: 
• Acute Flaccid Paralysis: Any person with weakness in the legs and arms or not able to walk 
• Measles: Any person with hot skin and spot-spot and/or red eyes 
• Rabies: Any person who is bitten by a dog or any other animal 
• Acute Bloody Diarrhea: Any person passing bloody pu-pu or slimy (slippery pu-pu with 
stomach pain 
• Meningitis: Any person with hot skin and stiff neck 
• Viral Hemorrhagic Fever: Any person who has fever and two and two or more other 
symptoms (headaches, vomiting, runny stomach, weak in the body, yellow eyes), or who 
died after serious sickness with fever and bleeding 
• Acute Watery Diarrhea: Running stomach. Any person passing three or more watery pu-
pu within one day 
• Neonatal Tetanus: Baby who is normal at birth, then after two days is not able to suck 
and starts jerking 
• Neonatal death: Baby who dies at birth or within 28 days after birth   
• Maternal death: Women who dies with big belly or within 42 days after baby is born or 
when the belly move 
• Unexplained cluster of disease: Unknown health problems group together; any health 
problem that you don’t know about that is happening to many many people or animals in 
the same community 
• Unexplained cluster of death: Any death in human or group of animals that you don’t 
know why it happened 
CSWs and Program Staff 
One community surveillance worker (CSW) was enrolled for every 100 households 
(approximately 350-500 persons), for a total of 2972 community surveillance workers in 
the program area. CSWs were nominated by Community Health Committees (CHC) with 
guidance from the catchment health facility and County Health Team. Selection criteria 
for CSWs included; (1) must be a permanent resident of the community, (2) between 18 
and 50 years of age, trustworthy and interested, (3) be able to read, write, add, subtract, 
and multiply and complete an English literacy test.133 All enrolled CSWs were provided a 
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nominal $30 incentive and provided rain gear and essential supplies to aid in travel 
during the rainy season. 
CSWs were supervised by health facility clinicians, either the officer-in-charge or 
designate. In early 2016, a series of week-long trainings were held for CSWs, clinicians, 
and district/county surveillance officers on the trigger definitions, reporting structure, 
supervision, and response. CSWs were trained to identify and communicate with key 
informants and rumor sources (businesses, markets, schools, pharmacies, traditional 
healers) within the community to detect suspect alerts. 
Reporting   
Upon detecting a rumor or making a household visit, the CSWs directly observed 
the patient and matched against the community trigger definition. If the definition was 
met, the CSW filled out the CEBS Alert Form and gave it to the patient to take with them 
to the health facility. 
After the patient arrives at the health facility, the clinician verifies the patient 
matches a community case definition, and further evaluates the case against the 
corresponding IDSR case definition. If the patient returns to the community for 
outpatient services, the clinician fills the bottom half of the referral form with follow-up 
instructions for the CSW. 
If the patient does match an IDSR case definition, they become a suspect case, 
and the health facility fills out the IDSR Case Alert Form. The case is managed through 
the real-time disease surveillance reporting chain, making its way to the laboratories and 
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the national level. The desired notification time for an IDSR priority case is 24-48 hours 
(Figure 3-3). 
Figure 3-3. Simplified Reporting Flow and Common Losses in CEBS 
 
 
Supervision and Coordination 
Supervision and coordination structures were instituted at each subnational level. 
CSWs are directly supervised by a clinician at the health facility. The Community Health 
Services Supervisor (CHSS), a permanent cadre developed to focus on community 
outreach and supervision of community surveillance workers is currently being recruited. 
Temporarily, twelve local NGOs were recruited to supplement health facilities resources 
and provide weekly mentorship of CSWs. Field officers validated alerts against the 
community case definition and verified data quality of the information.  
Health facilities are supervised by the District Surveillance Officer (DSO), a 
surveillance professional trained in Frontline Epidemiology Training Program (FETP). 
DSOs are responsible for reporting to the counties, coordinating with the district health 
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team (DHT), and investigating and escalating suspect cases of the epidemic-prone 
disease.  
The CSW is an active member of the Community Health Committee and gives 
routine updates or ‘health talks’ at large. CSWs also gather routinely at the health facility 
as part of the Health Facility Development Committee. A CEBS implementation team was 
formed in each county, where county, district, health facility, and community 
representatives meet monthly to guide the implementation and adapt to the ongoing 
development of the surveillance system post-Ebola. At the national level, a community 
event-based surveillance technical working group was formed to standardize reporting 
structures and coordinate aid between partners operating CEBS programs in other areas 
of the country. 
3.3.2 Evaluation 
The evaluation of the CEBS program consisted of a desk review of program 
documents, in-depth interviews with program managers, observations from direct 
participation in technical working groups, an interviewer-administered survey. 
 
Desk Review 
A Brief Glossary of Diagnostic Terminology applied to CEBS 
• Trigger – the community trigger definition describes a constellation of signs and symptoms 
which are syndromes or prodromes for a disease or event of public health concern 
• Alert – a report of a patient who exhibits a trigger to the surveillance system 
• True Alert – an alert which met the trigger definition (verified weekly by HF supervisors) 
• False Alert – an alert which did not meet the trigger definition (verified weekly by HF 
supervisors) 
• Case – a patient who fits the suspect, probable, or confirmed case definition 
• True Positive – an alert which became a case (compared against IDSR records) 
• False Positive – an alert which did not match a case definition (compared against IDSR records) 




The primary objective of syndromic surveillance is to improve the sensitivity of 
case detection and provide early warning for a public health response. High sensitivity 
decreases the number of ‘missed cases’ (false negatives) in the population. There is no 
clear benchmark for sensitivity, as it is dependent on local context, disease, and 
objectives of the surveillance system. In Liberia, where the focus of CEBS was on 
infectious disease and high impact conditions, the aim was to capture cases which would 
not otherwise be reported by the health facility.  
High sensitivity targets are not always necessary, surveillance systems with low 
but consistent sensitivity can be informative when assessing disease trends and risk.134 
Sensitivity targets can also change depending context - during outbreaks case 
definitions can be flexible if a higher sensitivity is necessary. Comparison of program 
performance based on sensitivity between programs is problematic as the measure 
depends heavily on the trigger definition.135 
Measuring sensitivity requires a gold standard comparison which captures all cases in 
the target population. It is difficult to identify a gold standard for syndromic surveillance 
systems. The most common gold standard is a household survey; however, these surveys 
estimate the prevalence based on probability sampling and may not identify missed 
outbreaks at the subnational level. Routine household surveys focus on a small subset of 
disease conditions, and seldom encompass rare diseases. Two pass verifications are also 
common, wherein experienced supervisors identify cases in the community and compare 
against cases identified by CSWs.  
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For this analysis, we are unable to directly calculate sensitivity as we lack an external 
gold standard. Instead, we measure coverage, or the proportion of cases in the National 
Disease Surveillance Information System (DSIS) database which originated in CEBS. The 
DSIS is the warehouse containing case-based reports of all immediately reportable 
disease in the country. DSIS derives its data from passive reporting from health facilities, 
active outbreak investigations, and immunizations campaigns. We expect a well-
functioning CEBS program would report the bulk of its cases at the community level for 
the selected triggers. However, without an independent reference, we are unable to 
quantify false negatives which were not detected by either CEBS or the routine 
surveillance system. As during the EVD outbreak underreporting was estimated as a high 
as 60% in some areas, this is a considerable limitation.66 Using DSIS as a standard, false 
negatives are representative of: 
• Cases missed at the community but detected by the health facility (e.g., the case 
did not exhibit the trigger, CSW was not aware of the case, or patient self-refers) 
• Cases detected in the community, but not reported or validated (e.g., patient 
refusal or inability to reach the health facility or facility/district officers were not 
able to see the patient) 
• Cases with symptom onset at the health facility (e.g., maternal death, neonatal 
death, etc.)  
• Cases detected through outbreak investigation (e.g., the first measles case may 
have been detected through CEBS, but subsequent cases were picked up through 
active investigation; or AFP detected through immunization campaigns) 
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In our desk review, we use the following metrics: 
Coverage defined as the proportion of all cases in the disease surveillance 
system captured through CEBS. Calculation of coverage is hampered by reporting loses 
between the health facility and national level.28  The database contains a field to indicate 
whether a case the health facility was reporting was a result of a CSW. However, it was 
not reliably collected. As a result, we cannot verify if all confirmed alerts are reflected in 
the national database. In the established reporting process, all alerts which meet the case 
definition would be reported to the national level within one week. To compensate, we 
define a high and low estimate, where the true value will likely fall between as: 
𝑃𝑟(+|𝐷)𝑙𝑜𝑤 =
#𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
# 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 + #𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
𝑃𝑟(+|𝐷)ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ =
#𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
# 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
 
Positive predictive value (PPV) defined as the proportion of all alerts which met the 
trigger definition which also met the IDSR case definition. PPV was calculated by dividing 
the number of cases by the reported cases detected through CEBS.   
𝑃𝑟(𝐷|+) =
# a𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
# 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Rate of reported triggers represents a population standardized metric of the diagnostic 
sensitivity of CEBS activities. This is not a perfect comparison as the disease burden may 
be higher or lower dependent of geographic area. This will also be heavily impacted by 
outbreaks, which may vastly increase the number of reported triggers compared to the 




Sustainability was reviewed using the Schell sustainability framework. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with the National Community Event-Based Surveillance 
Technical Lead, Community Health manager, IOM implementation manager, and Director 
of Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology. The review also used minutes from 
the CEBS evaluation review discussion and observations based on personal attendance in 
the CEBS Technical Working Group. 
Interviewers 
Interviewers were provided from the International Organization for Migration 
program staff and WHO national staff. The staff was supervised by external consultants 
and a MOH observer. Interviewers were trained in best practices, surveys, and electronic 
reporting into tablets using OpenDataKit. When tablets were inoperable, the teams 
reverted to paper forms, and double entered the data into ODK at a later date. Though 
there is an English standard for all cadres, interviewers were trained to simplify translate 
and questions into the local dialect. 
The instrument was adapted from the newest iteration of the Performance of 
Routine Information System Measurement (PRISM) used to assess routine health 
information systems within health facilities. The survey assessed knowledge of triggers, 
infrastructure, reporting, supervision, and behaviors. 
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Respondents & Sampling Methods 
All CSOs and DSOs were administered the survey by phone. For health facilities and 
community workers,, the survey used a multi-level, multi-stage cluster sampling 
approach: 
Stage 1. Random selection of counties implementing the program 
Stage 2. Random selection of health facilities 
Stage 3. Random selection of community surveillance workers 
In Stage 1, the county surveillance officer, district surveillance officers, implementing 
partner field surveillance staff, and point-of-entry screeners were selected for surveys. In 
stage 2, the surveillance focal person (SFP) of health facilities in the selected counties 
were surveyed, usually the officer-in-charge of the facility. In stage 3, community 
surveillance workers were selected in the catchment areas of the selected health facilities.  
The number of health facilities and community surveillance workers sampled was based 
the available time and number of interviewers available during the two-day program 











is applied where 𝑛 = 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝑁 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠. For the 𝑖𝑡ℎ sampled county, 
𝑘𝑖 health facilities sampled of the total 𝐾𝑖 health facilities. For the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ sampled health 
facility, 𝑚𝑖𝑗 community surveillance workers of the total 𝑀𝑖𝑗 community surveillance 
workers. Due to the relatively large proportion of the program population was sampled, 
a finite population correction was applied. 
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Between Epidemiological Week 15 and 38 (April to September) 2016, the program 
generated an average of 156 alerts and 37 suspect cases per week in the eight counties. 
Overall, 3,746 alerts were reported. The rates were driven by acute watery diarrhea, 
accounting for 45.9% of all reports, followed by Viral Hemorrhagic fever (15.5%), and 
measles (11.1%) (Table 3-1).  
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Table 3-1. CEBS Program Results 
 
The majority (95%) of reported alerts met the community trigger definition. Of 
these, 885 met the suspected, probable, or confirmed IDSR case definition and were 
reported to the district level for further investigation. The positive predictive value was 
highest for reports of death: maternal death (81.8%), neonatal death (70.4%), and 
unexplained death (42.7%). The system also had high PPV in the detection of clusters of 
unknown disease (60.9%). Conversely, there was low PPV for rare diseases of epidemic 
potential; VHF (7.9%), meningitis (10.4%) and acute flaccid paralysis (14.1%). 
Cases identified through CEBS were not often recorded in IDSR, as evidenced by 
the lack of cases for clusters of unknown death and unexplained disease. Based on this, 
the lower estimate of coverage which assumes none of the cases in CEBS are included in 
the IDSR database is likely more accurate. Coverage was highest for the clusters of 
unknown death and disease, neonatal tetanus, and acute watery diarrhea (100%). 
Coverage was above 25% for all diseases except viral hemorrhagic fever at 0.6%. 
Disregarding the EVD reporting (which was highly sensitive and had multiple active 
surveillance initiatives ongoing) and using IDSR numbers as an upper limit, we estimate 
Reported Coverage
Alerts # # % # % high-low  est
Acute Bloody Diarrhea 262 230 88% 37 14% 16.1% 75 49-33%
Acute Watery Diarrhea 1720 1,575 92% 485 28% 30.8% 19 100-96%
Cluster of Unknown Disease 78 64 82% 39 50% 60.9% 0 100%
Maternal Death 36 33 92% 27 75% 81.8% 82 33-25%
Measles 417 370 89% 61 15% 16.5% 162 38-27%
Meningitis 143 125 87% 13 9% 10.4% 19 68-41%
Neonatal Death 76 71 93% 50 66% 70.4% 131 38-28%
Neonatal Tetanus 30 28 93% 9 30% 32.1% 3 100-75%
Acute Flaccid Paralysis 80 71 89% 10 13% 14.1% 12 83-46%
Animal Bite 190 180 95% 64 34% 35.6% 114 56-36%
Unexplained Death 135 117 87% 50 37% 42.7% 0 100%
Viral Hemorrhagic Fever 579 505 87% 40 7% 7.9% 6603 0.6%














that 31.% of IDSR cases in these 8 counties originated in CEBS reporting., using the low 
estimate 
Table 3-2. Annualized Trigger Report Rate per 100,000 (Annualized Suspect Case 
Identification Rate per 100,000) by County 
 
Annualized reported rates (Table 3-2) differed massively between counties, highest in 
Bong (1166.6 reports per 100,000) driven by reporting of acute watery diarrhea, and 
lowest in Gbarpolu, the most rural and lowest population of Liberia’s counties. Overall, 
there were 493 reports per 100,000 persons. 
A total of 1246 CSWs were recruited to serve the eight counties. Approximately 
80.6% of the CSWs were male, with an average age of 37 years. The majority (68.5%) of 
CSWs had completed high school. Nearly 70% of CSWs had another source of income, 
and 41.1% provided other health services through government programs. CSWs 
reported they spent an average of 3.6 hours per day on health activities. On average, 
72.2% of CSWs walked to the health facility, and 64.3% of CSWs walked more than an 








CSWs were asked for an on-the-spot recall of trigger definitions. Recall percentages were 
highest for acute watery diarrhea (83.7) and lowest for clusters of unknown disease (19.3) 
and unexplained death (20.7%) (Table 3-4). These patterns were similar at all levels, with 
national priorities (maternal death, viral hemorrhagic fever) increasing in recall 
percentage among CSOs and national staff. 
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The most popular source of information and rumor gathering from the CSWs was from 
house to house visits and general word-of-mouth (75.2%) (Table 3-5). Religious and 
community organizations, community leaders, and businesses/markets accounted were 
utilized by 40% of CSWs. About 1 in 5 CSWs linked with other health providers such as 
midwives (22%) or traditional healers (23.3%). About 10.4% of CSWs elicited information 
from medicine stores and pharmacies.  
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A significant challenge reported by CSWs was the refusal of community members to go 
to the health facility after a referral (Table 3-6).  






The top two reasons for refusal were transportation related, 34.2% reported the health 
facility was too far, and no transportation was available, and 22.9% said the available 
transportation was too expensive. Issues with the health facility were also prevalent, 
20.1% said the facility kept inconvenient hours (most open from 9-5pm), 7.7% reported 
the services (mostly prescriptions) were too expensive, and 12% reported the drugs were 
usually unavailable. 




Most (94.5%) of CSWs discussed community health issues with the health facility weekly 
(Table 3-8). About 72.7% received feedback from the health facility after referring a 
patient to the health facility. While 88.8% of OICs reported the DSO visited the health 
facility weekly, only 62.5% reported the DSO specifically asked about CEBS reporting and 
reviewed community data. This was mirrored between the district and county level, 
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where 64.1% of DSOs reported discussing community data with the CSO. About 82.1% of 
DSOs reported being a part of the CEBS implementation team. 
Table 3-8. Supervision 
 
 
3.4.1 Sustainability  
An analysis of sustainability is summarized in Table 3-9. Emergency response to 
the Ebola epidemic left strong community structures and a general appreciation for the 
importance of health surveillance. Liberia also benefited from the lack of path 
dependency, with a previous CSW program collapse in 2007. The revised Community 
Health Policy was under development concomitantly and integrated CEBS activities into 
its core package. The policy supports a cadre of Community Health Assistants (CHA) who 
Proportion of [cadre] who has weekly: n % Std. Err. [95% Conf.Interval]
Feedback from the health facility supervisor on community 
referrals
465 72.7% 0.03 59.2% 86.3%
Discussions with health facility about community health 
issues
465 94.6% 0.02 87.5% 101.7%
CHV discussions on the outcome of a referral and next steps? 81 71.6% 5.0% 60.6% 80.5%
Does the DSO weekly….
ask about cases of priority disease that you saw 81 88.8% 0.04 81.7% 95.8%
talk to you about the data completeness, quality, and 
timeliness of IDSR reporting
81 63.8% 0.05 53.0% 74.5%
look at your HMIS logbooks to see if there are any other 
cases of interest
81 33.8% 0.05 23.2% 44.3%
look at the CEBS reporting forms 81 62.5% 0.05 51.7% 73.3%
Visits to health facilities to identify IDSR cases 41 87.2% 0.05 76.2% 98.2%
Feedback to OICs about CEBS and POE triggers 41 71.8% 0.07 57.0% 86.6%
Meetings with the DHO to discuss IDSR performance and 
reporting of health facilities
41 61.5% 0.08 45.6% 77.5%
Meetings with the entire DHT to review IDSR cases 41 25.6% 0.07 11.3% 40.0%
Meetings with the CSO to review IDSR data 41 66.7% 0.08 51.2% 82.1%
Meetings with the CSO to review CEBS and POE data? 41 64.1% 0.08 48.3% 79.9%
Meetings with the CSO talk to you about the data 
completeness, quality, and timeliness of your IDSR 
reporting?
41 84.6% 0.06 72.8% 96.5%
Meetings with the community health committee? 41 74.4% 0.07 60.0% 88.7%

































































perform a package of health services, and are incentivized at $70 per month. The 
community health program has secured long-term funding but is limited in scope to 
remote areas outside 5 kilometers from the nearest health facility, covering about 70% of 
the population.133 The remainder of the country will be a partnership with a patchwork of 
NGOs, but funding is sporadic, and only part target population is currently covered. 




















• Leadership supports the program, but grapple with competing priorities and diminishing 
resources post-outbreak 
• Operational responsibility is split between the Community Health Program in the Ministry of 
Health, and the Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology in the National Public Health 
Institute. As the NPHIL is a new institution, there is not yet any clear coordination bodies to 
manage joint programs 
• CEBS is broadly recognized at all levels of the health system as a core activity part of the broader 














plans based on a 
stable funding 
environment 
• The initial funding was tied to outbreak-related emergency funding, the mechanisms for 
continued support must be found elsewhere 
• CEBS activities outside of a 5km radius of a health facility have been integrated into long-term 
funding for the community health program 
• Funding for the remainder (70% of the population) is currently piecemeal through NGO partners 
working in different areas of the country 













• There is a defined structure for engaging communities in referrals through the community health 
committee 
• The CEBS implementation team incorporates community representatives for input into program 
operations 
• The stigma of reporting health conditions remains high 























• Since program inception, surveillance staff have been hired and trained in CEBS activities 
• High turnover of staff requires frequent refresher training 
• A limited number of health facility staff, especially clinicians targeted at fieldwork, create a 
burden on supervision and assessments of patients who cannot travel to the facility 
• Lack of resources for transportation and communication continues to be a pervasive barrier to 




















• The program has defined indicators integrated into routine supervision, mentorship, and 
monitoring tools, as well as external assessments such as JEE 
• Absorption and translation of the data are difficult beyond the basic assessment of the 
proportion of cases detected in the community. More advanced analysis such as hot-spots and 
















the ability to 
adapt and 
improve 
• Technical bodies and multi-stakeholder representation (community health committee, CEBS 
implementation meetings, CEBS technical working group) provide platforms for continuous 
review and adaptation of program activities 
• Clear lines of reporting and supervision provide a pathway for quick dissemination of 



















• All messages and forms are tested by the health promotion professionals at the Ministry of 
Health 
• Job aids were devised to help the community better understand the signs and symptoms of the 
triggers, and understand the potential risk of epidemic-prone disease 
• Defined health promotion strategy 











s the program's 
effect on the 
health of the area  
• It is difficult to quantify the impact to health after the identification of suspect cases 
• CEBS mechanisms were used for health promotion activities in cases of Rift Valley Fever, 


















• Program activities are built into the 5-year Community Health and Disease Surveillance strategies 
• Technical bodies meet routinely to discuss program activities and direction, and is included a 
yearly program review of disease surveillance programs 
Data from in-depth interviews, community surveillance worker surveys, financial and operational documents, and 
participation in technical group meetings  
 
The introduction of the CEBS program in Liberia was funded by international 
donors through emergency funding. The program covered an estimated 1.8 million 
persons in the eight counties, many of them in some of the hardest to reach areas of the 
country. The annualized expenditure per capita was 3.69 USD. CSWs only provided CEBS 
activities, and this cost is not shared with other programs, though integration into the 
larger community program is planned. About 44.5% (1.64 USD) of this cost was 
associated with salaries for local and international NGO staff. About 25.6% (0.95 USD) of 
this cost was related to overhead, field offices, etc. The remaining 29.9% (1.10 USD) of 
the cost was related to workshops and incentives.  
The other bottleneck to sustainability is the disjointed political ownership of the 
program. Technical inputs for CEBS activities are typically shared between Community 
Health, Health Information Systems, and Disease Surveillance units. In most settings, 
Community Health units will be responsible for implementation, with technical input 
from other units. In Liberia, these national working groups exist, but competing priorities 




The impact of CEBS on the overall coverage and timeliness case detection is 
difficult to quantify as the disease surveillance information system was developed 
alongside the implementation of the program. However, the ability of CEBS to capture 
and detect cases is without question. Between April and September of 2016, the program 
reported 3746 alerts and 885 suspect cases of the disease. CEBS detected approximately 
one in eight suspected cases of immediately reportable conditions.  
Disease Triggers 
Selection of community case definitions is guided by disease control goals. In this 
study, we found CSWs were able to recall on average six of the ten case definitions. 
Prevalent diseases (e.g., watery diarrhea, measles) and high impact conditions (e.g., 
maternal death, neonatal death) were most likely to be remembered.  The PPV was also 
low for conditions with a broad community trigger definition, such as acute watery 
diarrhea, despite its high prevalence.  
By far, the lowest recall rates were for the less specific triggers for unknown 
clusters of death or disease. These triggers, which emphasize general vigilance for 
‘Disease X,’ are arguably the most critical function of community surveillance. This result 
implies that mixing prevalent/specific triggers with rare/amorphous triggers can result in 
a de-emphasis of the amorphous triggers. For programs which aim to focus on abnormal 
events, the solution is not necessarily to remove prevalent conditions from the program. 
Communities value CSWs who are responsive to immediate health needs and are more 
likely to utilize them.136,137 Inclusion of these prevalent triggers also provides an 
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opportunity to practice activities and receive feedback from the health facility. Instead, 
the programs should emphasize the identification of abnormal events at every 
opportunity. Training should utilize simulations focusing on abnormal events, and 
supervisors should be instructed routinely inquire if anything else abnormal happening 
within the community. 
Regardless, over 95% of reported alerts matched the community case definition, 
indicating CSWs were able to efficiently screen patients in the community and did not 
overload facilities with false negatives. PPV was lower than expected for some conditions. 
Viral hemorrhagic fever (PPV = 0.6%) had high numbers of reports due to the 
heightened case detection following the EVD outbreak. Measurement of PPV is affected 
by prevalence, and thus less prevalent conditions will naturally have lower PPV rates. 
Trigger selection for CEBS can be determined by identifying the conditions which 
require a higher sensitivity than is being achieved by the facility-based surveillance 
system and (1) have easily identifiable prodromes or syndromes (3) can reduce overall 
morbidity or mortality through early detection (4) will not overload the CSWs or health 
facilities or (4) provide valuable syndromic information for risk mapping. 
Community Case Finding and Referral 
All cases of an unknown disease and unexplained death in the national 
surveillance system originated from community-based reporting. This result highlights 
the most significant advantage for CEBS activities – early identification of emerging 
public health threats. Reporting unknown events allows communities to self-report 
health concerns, rather than relying on health facilities in remote areas to identify these 
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trends. It also captures events such as sick livestock and unexplained deaths which 
otherwise may not be reported to the health facility.  
Word-of-mouth was by far the most common mode of case detection. CSWs 
were insufficiently connected to other key sources of information, particularly other 
health providers such as traditional healers, herbalists, and midwives. These community 
health providers often have a competitive outlook towards community referrals as they 
lose business. Going forward, including these health providers in CEBS training or 
incentivizing referral from these cadres may increase linkage to care rates. 
The vast majority of CSWs reported the community trusted the CSW and talked 
about their health conditions, despite 80% of CSWs reporting sick persons often face 
stigma. The CSWs were also able to navigate referral refusals by reasoning with the 
patient and notify the town chief. As expected, the most significant barrier to care 
seeking was transportation. Many CSWs worked with communities to mobilize 
transportation resources such as hammocks and motorbikes. These sort of contingencies 
for patient transport should be formalized, such as connecting CSWs to ambulance 
services or providing field surveillance officers with transportation equipment and 
logistics support.  
Interactions with the Facility-Based Surveillance System 
Multiple disease conditions with a lower number of suspect cases in the national 
database compared to programmatic data indicate a significant reporting loss between 
the community and the national level. This is a common difficulty, where turnover of 
already limited health professionals and heavy reporting responsibilities unravel the 
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connection between CEBS and facility-based reporting.93,138 Routine discussion of CEBS 
data at surveillance meetings and inclusion of subnational surveillance staff in 
operational meetings will act as reinforcing influences on this connection. It is essential 
to view the connection between CEBS and the surveillance system as a two-way street 
rather than a unidirectional reporting pathway. The surveillance system can leverage 
CSWs to improve risk communication, quickly respond to newly emerging threats, and 
gain access to community structures. 
Building information systems and staff to handle the influx of community 
surveillance data should is a significant investment often neglected when implementing 
CEBS programs. Community data systems produce an enormous amount of data which 
are difficult to absorb and translate into action in real-time at the national level.93,138 At 
the facility level, information use is often organic and informal. In Liberia, one clinician 
reported how a diarrhea case helped identify a community with a broken hand pump 
and poor sanitation conditions using contaminated water from a nearby creek. Some 
clinicians leveraged CSWs during measles outbreaks to identify cases and provide 
additional health promotion. 
Sustainability 
The CEBS program, if sustained without change for a year would account for 0.3% 
of GDP per capita in 2016 (PPP) and 19.4% of the domestic government health 
expenditure per capita (PPP).16 This high cost is a consequence of maintaining parallel 
surveillance and reporting structures during the restructuring of the national surveillance 
system. Going forward, there are opportunities for cost sharing with the planned national 
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community health program. We estimate a government-run vertical program will cost 
2.04 USD per year; 43% of the cost is the incentive ($30/month) and 41% for supervision, 
training, and coordination meetings. If CEBS activities are fully integrated into a 
nationwide community health program (as planned), the additional cost for CEBS 
activities is estimated to be 0.55 USD per capita, assuming shared costs for joint training, 
supervision, and for surveillance staff but not incentives. This is similar to costs reported 
by other integrated CEBS programs, and would reduce the cost share to 2.9% of the 
domestic government expenditure on health per capita.102,139 We argue that as a 
common good for health and resiliency to health shocks, this is affordable compared to 
the cost of clinical care. Integration into the broader community services program would 
also distribute the management burden. Currently, the program is managed at the 
national level by the disease surveillance unit, and at district and county levels by 
surveillance officers. Integration would shift the data analysis tasks to monitoring & 
evaluation officers, and day to day management to the community services staff, freeing 
the epidemiologists to focus on use of information and verification of alerts. 
A significant portion of the cost of CEBS is in the incentive. The appropriate 
amount and type of incentive will depend on the scope of activities a CSW must perform. 
For CEBS programs which are passive or less formal, relying on pure altruistic motives 
and pure volunteerism is a viable option. When asked what alternative incentives would 
be acceptable, 11% of the CSWs reported no incentive was needed, or only simple 
identification (ID cards, branded t-shirts, uniforms) would be needed to keep motivated. 
Similar to findings in other settings a quarter of CSWs requested supplies and equipment 
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such as bars of soap, rain gear, backpacks, and gardening equipment, nominal 
investments compared to regular incentives.139 Active surveillance programs requiring 
more hours can circumvent monetary incentives by pairing with education or labor 
interventions to provide preferential placement. Over 35% of CSWs noted that a pathway 
to education and employment would be a powerful motivator. In Liberia, CSWs are often 
favored for paid term work for health promotion and vaccination campaigns. 
Another considerable portion of the budget (an estimated 25% in Liberia) for an 
integrated program is dedicated to direct (routine monthly payments) and secondary 
(modest supplements for travel outside county and supplies) incentives. At 30 USD per 
month, nearly 60% of CSWs reported they inadequately compensated for their work, and 
more than a quarter listed the lack of incentive as a major challenge. Part of the issue is 
the fragmentation of implementation in community interventions. Many CSWs are 
employed by multiple programs and provided different levels of compensation. When 
the incentive does not provide motivation, the quality of the data will suffer.139 
3.5.1 Towards a Typology 
Contributing to the challenge in developing and sustaining CEBS programs has been the 
lack of consensus on program activities, and structure.93 Community surveillance 
programs have many formulations, ranging from passive to active surveillance, formal 
event-based reporting to awareness and self-referral. CEBS programs are tailored to a 
given disease and setting, complicating the sharing of best practices and adaptation to 
emerging health threats.  
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In Figure 3-5 below, we propose a typology of CEBS programs on the dimensions 
of organizational capacity and desired sensitivity. We define capacity as the “ability to 
perform the defined functions effectively, efficiently and sustainability and so the 
functions contribute to the mission, policies and strategic objectives of the health 
system”.140 Organizational capacity also includes the competency of staff to manage the 
program, ability to translate the data, financial resources, and leadership.  
The desired sensitivity is dependent mainly on disease characteristics. Diseases which are 
high case fatality, highly infectious, or are targeted for elimination are suitable targets for 
a high sensitivity program. Conversely, conditions which are highly prevalent and 
contribute to a high proportion of the overall disease burden but have a low 
morbidity/mortality rate are appropriate for lower sensitivity approaches.  
The four archetypes outlined by these dimensions are: 
Awareness programs are passive surveillance, and do not have any frontline 
surveillance workers. As a result, these programs require low capacity and provide a 
modest increase in sensitivity through health facility and hotline reporting. They are 
typically intended to increase linkage to care between the community and the health 
system. Awareness can be conducted passively through mass media, or through health 
promotion structures, and targeted at the general population or sentinel sites such as 
schools, business, and markets. 
Community-driven programs are also passive, but recruit key informants to 
increase sensitivity without burdening the health system. These programs rely on 
community mobilization, and positive relationships between the local health facility and 
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community are a prerequisite. As many key informants will report passively and have 
little training, community driven programs are best for conditions with simple triggers 
and low stigma. Allows communities to tailor the message and can be adapted to a local 
context. 
Routine programs can be active or passive, and employ trained cadres of 
frontline surveillance workers. The management the cadre and use of the resulting 
information typically requires substantial technical and organizational capacity to 
manage. Establishing routine training and supervision pathways allow for reporting 
multiple disease triggers with more complicated syndromes. These types of programs 
are responsive to changing environments, as new triggers can be added in response to 
new public health risks. 
Active response programs use trained cadres of frontline surveillance workers to 
actively identify disease conditions. Active surveillance activities often include house-to-
house disease identification, reporting on disease vectors, and a basic response role. 
Elimination and eradication programs often use this strategy. These programs achieve 
high sensitivity, but are intensive and can only be maintained by local govenments for 
short periods of time. When cases are detected, there is a pathway for immediate action. 
Routine programs can be scaled to active response. 
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This typology may be useful in determining whether proposed activities correspond to 
the with the required sensitivity and the existing organizational capacity in the area. This 
typology also helps clarify the rationale for varying CEBS formulation from region to 
region. For instance, a county may choose to implement a routine CEBS activity in the 
areas with the lowest health facility accessibility and implement a community-driven 
activity in urban areas.  
Awareness Community-driven Routine Active response
Increase linkage to care for severe 
disease, combat mis-information and 
stigma, and disseminate risk reduction 
and home treatment information.
Engage communities in passive self-
reporting conditions of local public 
health concern
Sustained increase in sensitivity of 
routinely monitored diseases or 
conditions, especially incorporating 
response measures
Substantially increase sensitivity of the 
disease surveillance system during an 
outbreak, or as part of an 
elimination/eradication campaign
Public-at-large: relies on linkage to 
health facilities or hotlines which are 
open to the public
Key informants: community members 
who are influential or representative 
of a certain segment of the 
community. May benefit from 
recruiting diverse backgrounds. 
Minimal capability required.
Formal or informal employment of 
community members. Often full or 
near full-time position, with 
supplemental health related duties. 
May require literacy benchmarks and 
specific demographic requirements.
Formal employment of community 
members or local health workers. 
Experience in health delivery, 
education, or past experience as a 
CHW is preferred
Can improve health literacy and 
combat mistrust in the health system. 
Works best for diseases of high local 
prevalence or community impact
Requires active community 
engagement and dialogue. Reinforce 
role of CSW and recognize their 
contribution, and incorporate 
feedback into program evaluation and 
adaptation
In addition, Transportation barriers 
may become problematic due to 
routine reporting
In addition, requires a robust health 
messaging campaign and high level of 







Relatively inexpensive; ongoing costs 
are limited to dissemination methods
Significant start-up costs to recruit 
and train key informants, with minor 
ongoing costs for refresher training
Requires ongoing supervision (and 
perhaps incentives and 
transportation). Expensive to maintain 
in a vertical program, but can incur 
significant cost savings when 
integrated into a large community 
program
Vertical program which can be 
expensive to sustain for a large 


















Requires understanding of social 
determinants, knowledge, attitude, 
and perceptions of the disease. Can 
be quickly spun up and targetted at 
specific populations
In addition, requires ability to maintain 
strong community partnerships, and 
capacity to apapt and respond to 
community concerns. Periodic 
refresher trainings may be required, 
especially for diseases of low 
prevalence
In addition, requires strong 
surveillance structures and reporting 
systems to process and use data. 
Frequenct supervision and training 
required, often integrated into 
community programs
In addition, requires ability to respond 
to identified health threats, ability to 
absorb and use large amounds of 
data, mobilize resources, and 















Outreach activities through diverse 
media to promote passive surveillance 
through presentation at the health 
facility. May self-report through direct 
hotlines
Community-driven passive reporting, 
often through the health facility and in 
irregular as-needed intervals
Routine reporting (weekly/month), 
often through the health facility. May 
include rudimentary response 
activities such as basic treatment or 
vector control
Active surveillance, often including 
house to house case finding. Often will 
include response activities, and 






rs Relies on easily identifiable signs and 
symptoms with high PPV to motivate 
reporting behavior
Not suited to stigmatized conditions. 
Best focused on a few select triggers.
Can report on a variety of endemic or 
epidemic-potential diseases









None. Relies on passive reporting and 
behavior change
Minimal incentives which may be non-
monetary. Non-monetary incentives 
should emphasize and recognize role 
as a community leader
Often includes a minimal incentive 
paired with materials, transportation 
incentives, and
Monetary incentives recommended to 
compensate for rigorous active 






































Based on this typology, the CEBS pilot would likely fall under the active response 
category. This distinction is reasonable, as the program was implemented during the tail-
end of the Ebola epidemic and focused on early warning of EIDs and rapid response to 
potential cases. The nascent surveillance system and decreasing financial funding make it 
unlikely a program with this design will be sustainable, and the tasks for addressing 
endemic and reportable conditions are different. The options for Liberia are to transition 
to a “routine” or “community-driven ” program, or some hybrid of the two. 
3.5.2 Limitations and Next Steps 
The CEBS program described in this paper was designed during an emergency and 
ran for less than a year, and thus may not have been able to achieve a steady state in 
reporting and structures. Further, the surveillance system in Liberia was not fully 
implemented at the time of the project, resulting in parallel structures and problems with 
identifying cases between databases. Without an independent and external source for 
identifying false negatives, such as household level data, we were not able to establish 
the marginal coverage boost contributed by the program. The short duration of the 
program and unique circumstances of implementation limit our ability to concretely 
establish predictions of sustainability, or externally generalize these results to other 
settings. Further research should focus on developing a quantitative assessment of the 
impact of CEBS programs on disease surveillance.  
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Community event-based surveillance programs in Liberia were a useful tool in 
increasing the coverage of the disease surveillance system in response to a serious Ebola 
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epidemic. While we were not able to externally benchmark sensitivity, the CEBS program 
accounted for 31.5% of non-EVD cases in the national surveillance system. CEBS 
provided a secondary benefit by providing community engagement in the surveillance 
system and allows disease surveillance to adapt to changing health threats more quickly.  
The sustainability of CEBS programs is challenging in multiple dimensions, most 
notably political support, organizational capacity, and financial stability. As a high 
intensity elimination-based system, the CEBS program in Liberia costs 3.69 USD per 
capita. If transitioned to a routine program and fully integrated into the broader 
community health service, the additional cost for CEBS could be reduced to a more 
affordable $0.55 USD per capita by cost sharing training and supervision activities with 
ongoing community programs, accounting for 2.9% of domestic expenditure on health. 
A better understanding of CEBS activities and the archetypes they fall into can aid in 
identifying best practices and promote discussions on which activities are most 
appropriate for the context. 
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4 DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKER 
PERFORMANCE IN COMMUNITY DISEASE 
SURVEILLANCE IN LIBERIA 
4.1 ABSTRACT 
Background: Stopping outbreaks in low-income settings requires a sensitive, timely, and 
representative disease surveillance system. Community-event based surveillance (CEBS) 
programs were piloted in Liberia during the tail end of the 2014-2016 EVD epidemic to 
increase sensitivity by extending the surveillance apparatus to frontline community-level 
surveillance workers (CSWs). CSWs referred potential cases to the health facility and 
provided alerts on adverse health events. We explore the individual and program factors 
which may impact performance of CSWs in the detection and referral of health events in 
the CEBS program in Liberia. 
Methods: We use data from a cross-sectional survey of CSWs performed in November 
2016, after the end of the 21-week surveillance program. CSW performance was defined 
by a primary outcome indicator (reporting one trigger during the program period) and 
three quality indicators: trigger recall, process knowledge, and the number of 
information sources. Determinants included individual, community, and health facility 
level factors. Association between determinants and performance was assessed using 
logistic regression, ordinal logistic regression, and partial proportional odds models and 
90% confidence intervals. 
Results: Approximately 40% of CSWs in our sample reported during the program period. 
There was statistically significant variation across counties for each of the four 
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performance indicators, suggesting influence of unobserved variables such as differently 
underlying endemic burden of disease, or health system factors such as underreporting. 
Reporting at least one trigger during the program period was positively associated with 
proximity to the health facility (OR=0.30, 95%CI 0.17-0.52), and was not significantly 
associated with the process indicators. CSWs who were satisfied with their incentive were 
more likely to recall triggers (OR= 2.05, 95%CI 1.39-3.04), recall program protocol 
(OR=1.65, 95%CI 1.645-2.40) and have more information sources (OR=1.7, 95%CI 1.16-
2.50). CSWs who reported good relationships with their supervisors also performed 
better in these three indicators. A high burden of supervision negatively impacted the 
number of CSW information sources (OR=0.59, 95%CI 0.35-0.99). 
Conclusions: For the sampled CSWs in the Liberia CEBS pilot, CSWs at peak performance 
were trusted by community, positive relationships with supervisors, satisfied with 
incentives, and were close to a health facility. Transportation barriers continue to be a 
significant challenge for reporting. Knowledge of the program protocol can be improved 
through incentivization, recognition, and quality supervision. However, the lack of 
correlation and common explanatory variables suggest the driver of quantity and quality 
for the sampled population may be unique. This suggests best practices for maximizing 
performance of CSWs should vary based on context, desired sensitivity, and capacity. 
These findings can inform the design and management of similar programs in other 





Community health worker (CHW) programs often employ detection and referral of health 
events as a core activity.98,101,102 When integrated into a national disease surveillance 
system, these activities offer improvements to timeliness and sensitivity and provide 
actionable information in populations with limited access to formal health care.87 When 
constructed in a participatory manner, these programs also engage communities in the 
health system, improve health care utilization, and promote a better environment for risk 
communication.94,141  
The effectiveness of community surveillance depends heavily on the performance 
of frontline personnel (CHWs). Rowe et al. (2005) suggest determinants of performance 
of community workers fall into two categories: interventions (e.g., training, supervision) 
and individual characteristics (e.g., CHW age, gender).142 The objective of this study is to 
estimate the relative effect of these determinants on the performance of community 
health workers engaged in a community surveillance program in Liberia. The Liberian 
CEBS program was put into practice during the 2014-2016 West African Ebola Epidemic 
where timely detection at the community level was paramount in combatting the spread 
of disease. Implementation of the CEBS program also coincided with the relaunch of the 
national community health worker program, and the results of this study will inform the 
ongoing development of CEBS programs as a core building block in the national 
surveillance system. 
4.2.1 Liberian Context 
Fourteen years of civil war devastated infrastructure and left Liberia among the 
poorest countries in the world. The United Nations Development Program categorizes 
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Liberia as a least developed country, ranking 177 of 188 countries in the Human 
Development Index in 2015.143 The 2014-2016 West African Ebola epidemic 
compounded existing fragilities in the health sector, further eroding public trust in the 
health system.127 Capacity of service delivery from health facilities in the county remains 
weak as of 2017; Liberia has 1.7 health facilities (public and private) per 10,000 persons 
compared to the WHO benchmark of two, and utilization rates of public sector health 
facilities are one outpatient visit per person per year (OECD average is six, with a regional 
target in West Africa of five).144,145 Outside of urban areas, private sector care provision is 
extremely limited. Among public facilities, only 11% of facilities have an emergency 
transport vehicle, and only about 1 in 2 are ready to provide general care services.144 
Overall, delivery of health services to remote communities is extremely poor, with some 
communities over 8 hours from the nearest health facility.146 
CEBS was introduced as a core function of the Integrated Disease Surveillance 
and Response (IDSR) program in 2016, a direct response to the 2014-2016 West African 
Ebola epidemic.131,147 Under-reporting of Ebola (estimated up to 40% of cases during the 
epidemic), poor health facility utilization, porous borders, and indications of an outbreak 
driven by community-level dynamics highlighted the ongoing need for community-level 
surveillance structures.24,82,148  
The Ministry of Health implemented CEBS programs in partnership with a 
consortium of NGOs. The first and most extensive of these were implemented by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) during the tail-end of the epidemic in 
early 2016. At the time of implementation, most subnational surveillance staff were newly 
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hired, and health facility clinicians were recently trained in the new surveillance protocols. 
The rapid start-up, unstable funding, and narrow goals resulted in a program window 
one year. These limitations were used advantageously by treating this program as a pilot 
to guide the scaling of CEBS nationally. Lessons learned from the IOM project informed 
the community health policy and the development of National CEBS Technical Guidelines 
which were integrated into the national community health program.133  
4.2.2 CHW Performance Considerations in Community Event-Based Surveillance 
CEBS is a specialized referral activity involving the collection of information on 
events of public health concern.90,149 As described in Paper 2, the design of CEBS 
program can differ based on context and goals. For routine and active response 
programs which require a trained, formal cadre, event-based surveillance introduces a 
unique structural burden on the performance of frontline workers. 
The community case definitions can range from straightforward signs to a 
constellation of non-specific syndromes.87 These definitions are sometimes purposefully 
amorphous to encourage reporting of unusual circumstances indicative of emerging 
infectious disease. These increasingly popular unstructured or semi-structured definitions 
demand a high level of competency from frontline workers, as well as engagement with 
health facility staff to understand how to classify rumors. If sucessful, this can also be 
useful in indigenous communities where perceived supernatural etiology may otherwise 
result in suppressed reporting. 
There is a substantial time investment required from health facility staff to 
manage, supervise, and provide feedback specific to CEBS.150 In routine programs, direct 
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supervision is conducted by clinicians, who may not have the epidemiological 
background and local knowledge necessary to provide mentorship in case detection and 
community entry. Mentorship in CEBS also presents a challenge; though case finding is a 
constant activity, focusing on low prevalence conditions leads to fewer opportunities to 
exercise reporting, receive feedback and correct errors.  
Shifting the responsibility for community surveillance from the health facility can 
result in burdening communities with logistical constraints.139,151 Community surveillance 
workers may frequently travel to complete their duties; often assisting in the transport of 
sick patients or to receive supervision and training. While the burden varies with 
population coverage and diseases of interest, these logistical and operational obstacles 
present a difficulty sustaining a cadre of high performing staff.  
Referrals are the first step in a broader public health response, in addition to 
individual treatment and case management. As a result, most CEBS programs demand 
immediate event-level information, rather than the weekly or monthly aggregated 
indicator data commonly collected at the community level. Combined with the 
preference towards maximizing sensitivity and minimizing false negatives, this can result 
in a torrent of information at the national level which is challenging to parse. If these 
data are not used, and in turn demanded at high quality, performance at all levels is 
likely to decline. 
In time of active response to a health threat, community surveillance workers may 
serve as a conduit between the health system and the community. In this role, 
community surveillance workers may be tasked with health promotion, community 
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engagement, and mobilization, in addition to active surveillance activities such as contact 
tracing and house to house case finding. In this paper, we focus on the performance 
during routine reporting, as active reporting incentives and motivations may be 
significantly different. 
4.2.3 Defining and Conceptualizing CHW Performance in CEBS 
As shown in the typology in paper 2, community surveillance activities are not the sole 
province of formally trained health workers. Context informs design. Broad approaches 
are appropriate in many contexts, such as educating community members en masse to 
increase general awareness of disease conditions. A more targeted approach is to recruit 
key informants in the community; school teachers, pharmacists, livestock handlers, and 
environmental technicians. In Liberia’s CEBS program, community members are recruited, 
trained, supervised, and given a $30 incentive per month. To distinguish these 
community members from health facility staff and highlight the non-employee legal 
status, they are designated community health volunteers (CHVs). Community Health 
Assistants (CHAs) are a planned cadre of community members who will participate in a 
broader range of health services and are given a larger $70 per month incentive package 
(minimum wage is $4 per day for unskilled workers). To simplify our discussion and 
distinguish this cadre from community workers with a broader package of services as 
described in literature, we will use community surveillance worker (CSW) as a holistic 
term for frontline staff providing primarily surveillance services.  
Ideally, performance would be measured in terms of marginal sensitivity and 
timeliness benefits. We cannot measure timeliness directly due to the lack of comparison 
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and reporting dates, though we are aware that during implementation health facilities 
reported weekly while communities reported immediately. Instead, we focus on the 
elements of sensitivity, with our operational definition of CSW performance of “high 
quality of reporting through multiple rumor sources, knowledge of community triggers, 
and knowledge of program process, combined with a high quantity of reporting 
determined by history of reporting disease to the health facility.” We define performance 
as the ability of the CSW to actively identify signs of reportable conditions in the 
community and notify the health facility appropriately (Figure 1-1). Accordingly, the 
primary outcome indicator is reporting any disease during the program period. Process 
indicators of performance are (1) proportion of community case definitions recalled, (2) 
proportion of protocol steps recalled, and (3) number of sources of health rumors 
utilized in the community. We expect the process indicators to be correlated with the 
output indicator and together result in high quality, sensitive community reporting.  
4.2.4 Health System Context 
Health system context, taken as a combination of both the “hardware” of fundamental 
functions of financing, medical products, information systems, human resources, service 
delivery; and “software” – ideas and interests, means, norms, and relationships between 
actors; have broad impacts on CSW performance.152 Most system-level factors influence 
program performance indirectly. Leadership which prioritizes community programs can 
readily reallocate resources to community programs. Use and demand for surveillance 
data can prompt measures to improve data quality and supervision. An organization-
wide appreciation and recognition of the contributions of CSWs provide two-way 
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accountability.141,153 In contrast, disorganized health systems result in frustrating delays in 
pay, demotivating apathy, and inaction.20 These effects are difficult to isolate, and 
estimating their marginal effect requires rigorous study. 
In Liberia, health facilities are tasked with oversight and supervision of CSWs and 
interface with the community. Supervision of CSWs is the responsibility of the Officer-In-
Charge (OIC), the head clinician who is also primarily responsible for service delivery and 
daily operation. The workload of the OIC is a concern; health facilities with overburdened 
staff who are not incentivized for CEBS services may deprioritize community surveillance 
in favor of clinical duties. Liberia plans to recruit clinicians to focus solely on supervision 
of community workers, including CSWs, to reduce the workload on the OIC. The overall 
community satisfaction with service delivery is also a focus; responsive health sectors 
reduce stigma and promote care-seeking behaviors, increasing social standing, and 
utilization of CSWs.154,155 Community members are unlikely to follow through on a 
referral if health facilities provide poor quality of care and have frequent drug stock-outs 
and long wait times. 
4.2.5 Community Context 
Community context encompasses a broad range of community-level attributes 
ranging from the built environment to ethnomedical beliefs and values. We highlight two 
pertinent to community surveillance programs in Liberia: geography and social standing. 
Geography plays a particularly large role; transportation barriers are a commonly cited 
performance challenge by CSWs.156–158 The issue is exacerbated when screening for 
epidemic-prone disease in rural areas, essentially shifting the transportation burden from 
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the health facility clinicians to the CSW. The social standing of CSWs within the 
community is a frequently named driver for participation in community health 
programs.159 Non-monetary incentives such as branded materials, support for travel, and 
the ability to navigate the local health system serve to increase social standing.101,153  
4.2.6 Individual Inputs 
Socioeconomic background of CSWs in community programs can be regulated 
by defining the recruitment pool and eligibility criteria. However, there is limited 
evidence linking demographics to performance in community surveillance programs. 
Bhattacharji et al. (1986) found that performance in a community program encompassing 
referral activities in India was lower among CSWs with more years of education, 
theorizing that education represented a barrier to visiting poorer and lower caste 
homes.160 This effect was mitigated when the catchment area size was small, and the 
CSW had experience in delivering programs. Viswanathan et al. (2012) found female 
CSWs increased utilization of reproductive health services in Afghanistan, hypothesizing 
community members preferred female CSWs and females were better suited to 
encourage other women to utilize services.161 These two examples share a commonality 
in describing a mechanism in which demographics do not directly impact performance. 
Instead, the relationship is modified by the aggregated set of differences between the 
CSW and the community and the specific activities in the program. This likely holds in 
community surveillance programs; the impact of demographics on performance will be 
modified by choice of target diseases and community context. 
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Acquired characteristics have a more evident impact. For instance, CSWs with prior 
experience tend to perform better, whether through higher levels of competence, self-
selection of individuals who understand responsibilities, or better interpersonal 
relationships with health facility staff. Multiple studies have found altruism is a strong 
motivator to perform well, though it would be challenging to screen on individual 
motivations.162,163 
4.2.7 Program Design Inputs 
 Aligning programs with local context can improve overall program performance. 
Alternatively, designs featuring complex reporting requirements and large catchment 
area sizes can result in reduced data quality and timeliness, and reduced participation in 
the most difficult tasks.104 Designing CEBS programs to maximize performance is an 
exploration of compromises. The most obvious of these is the number and type of target 
conditions and the intricacy of their respective community case definitions. Investments 
in supervision and CSW provisions can improve performance as well. Job aids and mobile 
devices can reduce CSW burden and engender feelings of competency.136,164 Direct 
monetary incentives are contentious, and literature is divided on its impact on 
performance. Monetary incentives can reduce attrition and improve performance, 
especially among CSWs who use the income as the primary resource to support their 
family.136,159,165  Not providing incentives may burden families who must support the 
CSW.163 However, incentives may have unintended effects, such as favoring incentivized 
activities or eroding innate altruistic ethos.166–169 The association between monetary 
incentives and performance is mixed, and modified by the context, design of incentives, 
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type of cadres, services performed, and program goals20,170 Programs frequently rely on 
training and supervision as the core strategy to improve performance. Knowledge gained 
through training is reemphasized during supportive supervision and mentorship by 
health facility clinicians, providing valuable feedback which can provide short-term 
benefits.151,171 Though these benefits have proven difficult to realize, the evidence 
suggests that community support combined with quality, practice-focused training is 
effective at improving performance.142,172,173 
4.3 METHODS 
4.3.1 Liberia Community Event-Based Surveillance Program 
The CEBS program supported by the International Organization for Migration operated 
between April and September of 2016. The goal was to increase sensitivity near the 
porous land border to prevent re-infection of Ebola from neighboring countries. The 
eight border counties account for approximately 36.5% of the population of Liberia 
(Appendix Table 2). Table 4-1 presents the community case definitions (or triggers) 
which were constructed by the Liberia Ministry of Health (MOH) based on near term 
health priorities. 
Table 4-1. Community Case Definitions and Job Aids 
IDSR Condition CEBS Community Case Definition Job Aid 
Acute Flaccid Paralysis 
(Poliomyelitis) 
 
Any person with weakness in the legs and arms 







Running stomach. Any -person passing three 
(3) or more water pu-pu within one day. 
 
 






Diarrhea with blood (pu-pu with blood)-Any 
person passing bloody pu-pu or slimy (slippery) 

















Ebola, Lassa Fever , & 
Yellow Fever 
 
Any person who has -fever and two or more 
other symptoms (headaches; vomiting; runny 
stomach; weak in the body, yellow eyes), or who 













Big belly death, Woman who dies with -big 
belly or within 42 days (six weeks) after the 








Jerking Sickness, Baby who is normal at birth, 





Young baby death, Baby who dies at birth or 
within 28 days (four weeks) after birth 
 
Unexplained Cluster of 
events or disease 
Unknown health problems grouped together. 
Any health problem that you don’t know about 
that is happening to many, many people or 
animals in the same community. 
 
Unexplained death 
Any death in human or group of animals that you 
don’t know why it happened 
 
 
One CSW was employed for roughly every 100 households (500 persons), totaling 
2972 workers in the program area. Selection criteria for CSWs included (1) permanent 
residency within the community (2) age between 18 and 50, and (3) a basic level of 
literacy (defined by a 6th-grade reading and writing equivalency). Community Health 
Committees (CHCs) nominated eligible individuals, and from this pool, the CSW was 
selected by the officer-in-charge. Many CSWs were previously community health 
volunteers, though this was not a requirement. A monthly incentive of $30 and 
transportation allowance during training and monthly coordination meetings were 
provided, in addition to logistical supplies including rain gear and backpacks. Where 
active, Community Health Committees provided a venue for CSWs to participate in 
monthly health talks and provide feedback to community leaders on alert outcomes. The 
officer-in-charge or designate was responsible for supervision on a routine basis. See 
Chapter 3 for more detailed implementation information. 
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4.3.2 Study design and context 
Data for this study were derived from a cross-sectional evaluation conducted 
between October and November of 2016. We administered a multistage cluster survey in 
three randomly selected counties. Data collection occurred at each of the four stages of 
the health system: county, district, health facility, and community. Simple random 
sampling determined clusters and respondents. The number of interviews was 
predetermined based on the available resources. See Chapter 3 for more details on 
sampling. The interview tool was adapted from the Liberia IDSR Supervision Toolset and 
MEASURE Evaluations’ Performance of Routine Information System Management 
(PRISM) survey.38 The questionnaire was designed to examine implementation and 
sustainability concerns identified by the Technical Working Group. The CEBS Technical 
Working Group validated the final survey tool. The International Organization for 
Migration field staff were recruited as interviewers with knowledge of the local tribal 
languages (over 10 in the three counties). Though IoM implemented the program, field 
staff were not in direct supervisory positions over the respondents. and were employed 
through local NGOs. Though all respondents were expected to have a minimum English 
literacy equivalent to a 6th-grade level, interviewers were coached in interpreting 
questions into Liberian Kreyol if the respondent did not understand the question. Tablets 
with OpenDataKit were used for data entry. During the project period, the International 
Organization for Migration administered a database containing alerts and their 
outcomes for each CSW. This database was independent of the Ministry of Health 
information system. This CEBS database tracked the full history of alerts through the 
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reporting chain, from initial identification, reception at the health facility, and whether 
the alert matched both the CEBS and IDSR case definitions. Each report was verified by 
an IOM affiliate surveillance field officer and cross-signed by the community, health 
facility, and district surveillance officers.  
4.3.3 Variable Construction 
Outcomes of Interest  
We identified four performance metrics of interest, three process indicators, and one 
outcome indicator:  
• Ever reported during the program period: Each 250-500-person community 
catchment area was expected to generate at least one alert over a 23-week 
period due to the expected high sensitivity of the case definitions. A subset of 
diseases available in the national HMIS system indicates the average community 
in Liberia would have an average of 2.18 per 375 persons during the 23 week 
program period (Table 7-3). This is a very conservative estimate, as not all disease 
conditions are available in HMIS, and HMIS only reports cases which were seen in 
a health facility. We assume then, that communities without any alerts likely 
indicate a failure of the CSW to identify or report a case. The total number of 
alerts from each community was not interpreted as a performance metric, due to 
the influence of ongoing epidemics. Data for this indicator was taken from IOM’s 
independent data source of alerts, verified by field staff. 
• Number of community case definitions recalled: Job aids were provided to all 
CSWs to aid in the verification of suspect triggers in the community. CSWs who 
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have been able to internalize definitions may be more likely to have been 
involved in active case finding and have more success in identifying potential 
triggers in the community. The number of definitions recalled was categorized as 
very low (0%-25%), low (26%-50%), medium (51%-75%), and high (76%-100%).  
• Number of reporting processes recalled: CSWs were taught a rudimentary four 
step alert identification process: verifying the suspect case meets the community 
case definition, documenting and reporting the case to the health facility, 
referring the patient and assisting in transportation, and receiving feedback from 
the health facility and providing feedback to the community. 
• Number of health rumor sources: Community resource mapping provided 
identified sources of health rumors in the community, such as businesses, 
schools, peers, religious institutions, and community structures. CSWs who can 
draw from multiple types of informants are more likely to detect cases in their 
catchment community. CSWs with 5 or more rumor sources were analyzed 
together to account for urban communities with a large variety of sources.  
The PRISM framework and survey tool were adapted for the focus on the community 
level and real-time data collection. PRISM uses three categories to describe the success 
of information system interventions in creating quality data for public health action: (1) 
organizational determinants, (2) technical determinants, and (3) behavioral determinants. 
In the survey, we included organization characteristics such as supervision, mentorship, 
coordination, and feedback; technical determinants such as cell phone coverage, internet 
and computers, transportation barriers, and paper form stock; and behavioral 
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determinants such as data use, perceptions of stigma, culture of data, trust and respect, 
and data demand. Ancillary data elements included the respondent’s background 
characteristics, and implementation issues such as incentives, challenges, and process. 
Notably, direct measures of motivation are not included. However, some of these data 
elements would affect motivation. 
Construction of Performance Determinants 
All determinants were self-reported by either CSWs or OICs. CSW education was 
dichotomized as “high”; high school education or greater or “low”: no schooling or any 
education lower than high school. Age of CSWs was grouped into ten-year increments. 
CSWs with any income excluding incentive payments were categorized as having a 
supplemental income. Participation in any previous community health program or 
activity was categorized as prior experience in providing health services. Phone 
ownership was defined as owning or access to a functioning phone which could send 
and receives texts. However, this did not consider whether CSWs had funds or scratch 
cards to make calls or connect to a cellular network while within the village. Walking time 
was self-assessed as either more than an hour or less than an hour’s walk from the health 
facility. Nearly three-fourths of CSWs reported that walking was their primary mode of 
transportation when traveling to the health facility.   
A battery of Likert questions was given to respondents to assess perceptions and 
attitudes towards program activities. These Likert questions were adapted from the 
PRISM tool, designed to assess the culture of data. All questions were scored on a scale 
of Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree. Questions related to 
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supervision, trust, and incentives were considered individually to explore their policy 
impact. The relationship between the CSW and community was assessed in two ways. 
CSWs were asked to assess whether people trusted and talked to them about their 
health conditions. Those who agreed with this statement were categorized as having a 
trusting relationship. We also coded a trust variable from semi-structured answers 
indicating the top three challenges in completing CEBS activities. CSWs who indicated 
trust or respect as a major challenge was recoded as not having a trusting relationship. 
Incentive satisfaction was assessed based on CSW perceptions of compensation. CSWs 
who agreed to the statement “I feel adequately compensated for my work” were 
categorized as being satisfied with the $30 incentive. 
We used exploratory factor analysis on the remaining questions in the tool to 
reduce overall dimensionality while preserving the information by extracting latent 
factors which may be associated with CSW performance. Results of the factor analysis 
were rotated with an oblique Promax procedure, which allows inter-factor correlation. 
The first factor accounted for 65.7% of the total variance, with an eigenvalue of 3.89. All 
other factors were discarded as their eigenvalues were less than 1. The extracted factor 
loaded heavily on the relationship to health facility and field supervisors, which we 
interpret as supervision validation and respect. As the relationship with the health facility 
supervisor explained the majority of variance, the variable was used directly in the model 
to simplify the interpretation of results. See the appendix tables for EFA results. 
 Health facility-level factors were obtained from OIC interviews. These included 
self-reports of whether the health facility maintains a list of the contact information or 
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displays graphs of priority disease trends in the catchment area. Supervision frequency 
was determined based on the communication frequency between the CSW and OIC. 
Weekly (mandated by the program) or greater frequency was categorized as “frequent.” 
High burden of supervision was identified by OICs who agreed to the statement “I feel 
that supervision and mentorship of CSWs is a burden.”  
4.3.4 Statistical Analysis 
Proportion distributions were estimated for the CSW and health facilities characteristics. 
The data was unweighted as the intent of the model is to measure the association 
between determinants and CSW performance rather than conduct a representative 
descriptive evaluation CSWs in the program.174 Though we do not suspect or measure for 
sources of heterskedasticityheteroskedasticity or heteregenousheterogenous effects, 
weighted models which take into account survey design effects are presented in the 
Appendices for comparison. Variables of interest were imputed using Multivariate 
Imputation using Chained Equations (MICE) procedure, which sequentially imputes 
variables based on specified distributions, and does not assume assuming normality for 
all variables. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were performed for these factors. The 
outcome of ever reported (𝑦𝑟 )was modelled as a logistic regression using the logit 
command in Stata 13 SE. The outcomes for recalled triggers and processes were 
modelled using the ordered logistic regression. Ordered logistic regression assumes 
proportional odds; where the odds is constrained across categories. Ordered logistic 
regression was modelled using the ologit package in Stata 13. The proportional odds 
assumption was tested using a Brant Test for Parallel Regression Assumption, which 
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provides a 𝜒2 test with the null hypothesis that the parallel regression assumption is true, 
evaluated at a 95% confidence. For models which violate this assumption, variables were 
re-specified by collapsing unstable categories in the case of a small number of 
observations. If the assumption was still violated, a partial ordered logistic regression was 
used instead. This model relaxes the proportional odds constraint on variables which 
vary on values of the dependent variable but is more parsimonious than the fully 
unconstrained model. The partial proportional odds were modeled using the gologit2 
package of Stata 13 SE. 
 Two models were specified for each performance outcome: A) models containing 
both health facility and community factors and B) models with only health facility factors. 
The primary comparison criteria was the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Bayesian 
Information Criterion favors parsimonious models and is a more conservative test at 
smaller sample sizes compared to the Aikake Information Criterion. Lower BIC indicates a 
more informative model. 
4.4 RESULTS 
4.4.1 Sample Characteristics 
Our study included 432 of the 3875 CSWs in the three target counties. The key 
characteristics of the CSWs sampling and breakdowns by performances indicator are 
shown in Table 4-2. The majority of CSWs in the sample (82%) were male; the median 
age was 36 years (x=36.9 s=10.2). Most had at least a high school education (66%), and 
two-thirds reported having another source of income. One-third of CSWs ine the sample 
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resided more than an hour’s walk to the health facility, similar to the household average 
estimated by the 2013 Liberia Demographic Health Survey.175  
A higher than expected percentage of CSWs in our sample (19%) reported a lack 
of community trust presented a major challenge towards carrying out their CEBS 
responsibilities. The majority of CSWs reported an adequate level of satisfaction with 
their incentive (63%). 
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Table 4-2. Univariate and bivariate descriptive statistical for selected characteristics 
 
Variable ¹
Total (n=432) - - 0.42 (0.02) 1.74 (0.05) 6.38 (0.13) 2.82 (0.10)
CSW Level variables (n=432)
Number of CSWs per county
Bong 167 39% 0.66 (0.04) 1.77 (0.07) 6.34 (0.21) 3.01 (0.17)
Grand Cape Mount 146 34% 0.19 (0.03) 1.69 (0.08) 5.90 (0.21) 2.54 (0.15)
Lofa 119 28% 0.34 (0.04) 1.75 (0.09) 7.01 (0.25) 2.91 (0.19)
CSW Gender
Male 353 82% 0.42 (0.03) 1.70 (0.05) 6.72 (0.34) 2.89 (0.24)
Female 79 18% 0.42 (0.06) 1.91 (0.11) 6.30 (0.14) 2.81 (0.11)
CSW Age
<=35 years old 200 46% 0.35 (0.03) 1.75 (0.07) 6.12 (0.17) 2.69 (0.14)
>35 years old 232 54% 0.48 (0.03) 1.72 (0.06) 6.68 (0.20) 2.94 (0.14)
CSW Educational Level
None 29 7% 0.52 (0.09) 2.03 (0.14) 7.08 (0.60) 4.00 (0.52)
Elementary 116 27% 0.49 (0.05) 1.69 (0.08) 6.07 (0.24) 2.86 (0.21)
High School 273 63% 0.37 (0.03) 1.74 (0.06) 6.43 (0.16) 2.70 (0.11)
College 13 3% 0.46 (0.14) 1.31 (0.21) 6.38 (0.80) 2.31 (0.31)
CSW has other source of Income
Yes 294 68% 0.45 (0.03) 1.74 (0.06) 6.52 (0.16) 3.02 (0.13)
No 138 32% 0.36 (0.04) 1.73 (0.08) 6.07 (0.21) 2.40 (0.13)
CSW provides other health services²
Yes 173 40% 0.42 (0.04) 1.77 (0.07) 6.72 (0.20) 2.91 (0.17)
No 258 60% 0.42 (0.03) 1.71 (0.06) 6.14 (0.17) 2.76 (0.12)
CSW has a phone
Yes 289 67% 0.43 (0.03) 1.67 (0.05) 6.65 (0.16) 3.01 (0.13)
No 141 33% 0.39 (0.04) 1.88 (0.09) 5.82 (0.21) 2.44 (0.13)
CSW satisf ied w ith incentive³
Yes 266 63% 0.45 (0.03) 1.84 (0.06) 6.72 (0.17) 3.11 (0.14)
No 158 37% 0.36 (0.04) 1.56 (0.08) 5.80 (0.21) 2.34 (0.13)
Lack of trust betw een CSW/Community⁴
Yes 80 19% 0.34 (0.05) 1.89 (0.12) 6.38 (0.14) 3.01 (0.24)
No 352 81% 0.43 (0.03) 1.70 (0.05) 6.35 (0.30) 2.78 (0.11)
Walk time to health facility
More than 1 hour 285 66% 0.37 (0.03) 1.72 (0.06) 6.25 (0.22) 2.87 (0.13)
Less than 1 hour 146 34% 0.50 (0.04) 1.77 (0.08) 6.44 (0.16) 2.72 (0.16)
CSW feels HF Supervisor values/trust them
Yes 242 56% 0.44 (0.03) 1.83 (0.06) 6.89 (0.18) 3.40 (0.15)
No 188 44% 0.39 (0.04) 1.62 (0.07) 5.73 (0.17) 2.08 (0.10)
HF Level variables (n=71)
HF keeps a CSW registry
Yes 402 96% 0.41 (0.02) 1.72 (0.05) 6.35 (0.13) 2.83 (0.10)
No 18 4% 0.52 (0.12) 1.99 (0.29) 6.92 (0.62) 2.70 (0.58)
HF graphs disease trends
Yes 207 49% 0.36 (0.03) 1.70 (0.07) 6.30 (0.19) 2.80 (0.14)
No 213 51% 0.47 (0.03) 1.77 (0.07) 6.45 (0.18) 2.85 (0.15)
High Supervision Frequency⁵
Yes 308 73% 0.38 (0.03) 1.71 (0.05) 6.37 (0.15) 2.82 (0.11)
No 112 27% 0.51 (0.05) 1.81 (0.09) 6.39 (0.26) 2.82 (0.22)
OIC is burdened by supervision for HF³
Yes 89 24% 0.47 (0.05) 1.79 (0.10) 6.44 (0.27) 2.70 (0.23)












Standard error in parantheses 
1     All data are unweighted and based on CSW and health facility clinician self-reports 
2   Other health services encompass any involvement in community health programs, 
often health promotion activities and vaccination campaigns 
3    Adequately compensated and high supervision burden was dichotomized as Yes = 
“Strongly Agree” or “Agree” and No = Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree 
responses 
4    Lack of trust was based on a Likert response indicated “disagree” or “strongly 
disagree” that the community trusts them, or indicated community trust as a top three 
challenge in performing CEBS duties 
5     High frequency indicates the CSW responded that supervision by the health facility 
occurred “Often” rather than “Sometimes’ or “Rarely” 
 
4.4.2 Multivariate Regressions 
 
Based on BIC, Model 1 was superior for each performance metric (Table notes). We 
report the remaining results using this model (Model A), containing determinants from 
both community and health facility levels. 
Determinants of Ever Reporting a Trigger 
Overall, about 40% of CSWs ever reported an alert during the program period (Table 
4-2). Reporting was not associated with any process indicators in the unadjusted 
bivariate analysis. CSWs with more than an hour’s walk to the health facility were more 
than three times fewer odds to have reported a case during the program period 
(OR:0.306, p: <0.001) (Table 4-3). CSWs who indicated a trusting relationship between 
themselves and the community had nearly twice the odds to have no reports during the 
program (OR: 1.744, p: 0.073). An alternative source of income increased odds of 
reporting by approximately 50% (OR: 1.551, p: 0.89). We also found CSWs in Grand Cape 
Mount (OR: 0.089, p: <0.001) and Lofa (OR: 0.315, p: <0.001) were less likely to report 
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than CSWs in Bong. The large magnitude of effect for counties indicates unobserved 
variables are contributing variation towards reporting performance between counties. 
Table 4-3. Determinants of CSW ever reporting during program 
  
Outcome 1=any reported trigger by CSW during the program, 0=no triggers reported 
by CSW during the program 
1. All data are unweighted and based on CSW and health facility clinician self-reports. 
See “Yes” responses from Table 4-2 for reference categories 
2. Explained variance greater than unexplained variance overall, based on omnibus F-
test p-value < 0.05, Model 1 was more informative (more explained variance), the 
difference in BIC χ2=39.34 (Model2-1) 
3. High CSW education is defined as some high school education or greater 
4. Other health services encompass any involvement in community health programs, 
often health promotion activities and vaccination campaigns 
5. CSW incentive satisfaction and high supervision burden was dichotomized as Yes = 
“Strongly Agree” or “Agree” and No = Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree 
responses 
6. Trust was based on a Likert response indicated “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” that the 
community trusts them, or indicated community trust as a top three challenge in 
performing CEBS duties 
7. Supervisor validation is the extracted first factor from the exploratory factor 
analysis7High frequency indicates the CSW responded that supervision by the health 
facility occurred “Often” rather than “Sometimes’ or “Rarely” 
8. These variables correspond to other performance metrics and are not included in 
modeling 
 
Model A: Facility + Community² Model B: Community Only²
OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
Intercept 0.714 ( 0.61 , 0.84) 0.001 8.296 ( 2.04 , 33.74) 0.013 3.633 ( 1.30 , 10.18) 0.039
County
Bong (ref) - - - (ref) - - - (ref) - - -
Grand Cape Mount 0.120 ( 0.08 , 0.19) <0.001 0.089 ( 0.05 , 0.15) <0.001 0.091 ( 0.06 , 0.15) <0.001
Lofa 0.265 ( 0.17 , 0.40) <0.001 0.315 ( 0.19 , 0.52) <0.001 0.284 ( 0.18 , 0.45) <0.001
Female CSW 1.005 ( 0.66 , 1.52) 0.983 0.784 ( 0.46 , 1.34) 0.456 0.775 ( 0.46 , 1.32) 0.428
CSW Age (10 year increment) 1.180 ( 1.01 , 1.38) 0.077 1.027 ( 0.84 , 1.25) 0.828 1.022 ( 0.84 , 1.24) 0.857
High CSW education³ 0.615 ( 0.44 , 0.86) 0.018 0.669 ( 0.45 , 1.00) 0.102 0.654 ( 0.44 , 0.97) 0.080
CSW has other income 1.460 ( 1.03 , 2.07) 0.076 1.551 ( 1.01 , 2.37) 0.089 1.580 ( 1.04 , 2.41) 0.074
CSW provided prior health services⁴ 0.989 ( 0.71 , 1.37) 0.954 1.178 ( 0.79 , 1.75) 0.498 1.162 ( 0.79 , 1.72) 0.529
CSW has a phone 1.153 ( 0.82 , 1.63) 0.497 0.985 ( 0.65 , 1.49) 0.951 0.998 ( 0.66 , 1.51) 0.993
CSW adequately compensated⁵ 1.495 ( 1.06 , 2.10) 0.052 1.316 ( 0.88 , 1.97) 0.265 1.294 ( 0.87 , 1.93) 0.290
Walking time >1 hour to HF 0.594 ( 0.42 , 0.83) 0.011 0.306 ( 0.19 , 0.49) <0.001 0.308 ( 0.19 , 0.49) <0.001
Trust between CSW/Community⁶ 1.509 ( 0.98 , 2.31) 0.113 1.744 ( 1.05 , 2.90) 0.073 1.717 ( 1.03 , 2.85) 0.080
CSW is validated by supervisor⁷ 1.222 ( 0.88 , 1.69) 0.311 1.093 ( 0.74 , 1.62) 0.708 1.093 ( 0.74 , 1.61) 0.706
HF has a CSW registry 0.661 ( 0.30 , 1.45) 0.387 0.538 ( 0.20 , 1.47) 0.310
HF displays graphs of disease trends 0.635 ( 0.46 , 0.88) 0.022 1.011 ( 0.67 , 1.52) 0.964
Daily/weekly supervisor communication 0.606 ( 0.42 , 0.87) 0.023 0.716 ( 0.44 , 1.17) 0.263
OIC is burdened by supervision⁵ 1.380 ( 0.94 , 2.03) 0.170 0.869 ( 0.52 , 1.46) 0.655
Number of CSW information sources⁸ 1.039 ( 0.96 , 1.12) 0.419
Number of recalled triggers⁸ 1.022 ( 0.96 , 1.08) 0.553
Number of recalled process steps⁸ 0.975 ( 0.82 , 1.15) 0.800  





Determinants of Trigger Recall Performance 
The average CSW was able to recall 6.4 community case definitions (Table 4-2), and less 
than 10% were able to recall all twelve. Female CSWs had 60% better odds of recalling 
triggers (OR: 1.600, p=0.079) (Table 4-4). Experience in providing other health services 
improved odds of recall by about half (OR: 1.523, p=0.029). CSWs with a phone were 
more likely to recall triggers (OR: 1.730, p=0.006). CSWs who felt adequately 
compensated (OR: 2.054, p<0.001) or felt their supervisor recognized and validated them 
(OR: 1.914, p<0.001) were nearly twice as likely to recall triggers.  
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Table 4-4. Determinants of recalling community trigger definitions 
 
Outcome variable is number of triggers recalled, aggregated into ordinal categories of 
0 to 3, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, and 10-12 
1. All data are unweighted and based on CSW and health facility clinician self-reports. 
See “Yes” responses from Table 4-2 for reference categories 
2. Proportional odds assumption was rejected (Likelihood-ratio test vs. multinomial 
model χ2=265.37, p<0.001); however modeling as partial proportional odds resulted in 
proportional odds for all variables except county. Only nominal differences were 
observed in estimates across the outcome. Ordinal model is presented for ease of 
interpretation. Model of partial proportional odds is given in the appendix for 
comparison. 
3. An explained variance greater than unexplained variance overall, based on omnibus 
F-test p-value < 0.05, Model 1 was more informative (more explained variance), the 
difference in BIC χ2=106.0(Model2-1) 
4. Intercepts indicate cut points (sometimes considered thresholds) and are not directly 
used in model interpretation 
5. High CSW education is defined as some high school education or greater 
6. Other health services encompass any involvement in community health programs, 
often health promotion activities and vaccination campaigns 
7. CSW incentive satisfaction and high supervision burden was dichotomized as Yes = 
“Strongly Agree” or “Agree” and No = Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree 
responses 
8. Trust was based on a Likert response indicated “disagree” or “strongly disagree” that 
the community trusts them, or indicated community trust as a top three challenge in 
performing CEBS duties 
9. Supervisor validation is the first factor of the EFA 
10. These variables correspond to other performance metrics and are not included in 
modeling 
Model A: Facility + Community²˒³ Model B: Community Only³
Variables¹ OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
Intercept 1⁴ 0.165 ( 0.13 , 0.21) <0.001 -0.635 (-1.70 , 0.43) 0.327 -0.146 (-0.97 , 0.67) 0.770
Intercept 2⁴ 0.191 ( 0.03 , 0.35) 0.049 1.517 ( 0.45 , 2.58) 0.019 1.992 ( 1.16 , 2.83) <0.001
Intercept 3⁴ 1.861 ( 1.63 , 2.09) <0.001 3.330 ( 2.24 , 4.42) <0.001 3.796 ( 2.92 , 4.67) <0.001
County
Bong (ref) - - - (ref) - - - (ref) - - -
Grand Cape Mount 0.926 ( 0.66 , 1.31) 0.714 1.033 ( 0.71 , 1.51) 0.889 0.989 ( 0.69 , 1.42) 0.961
Lofa 1.593 ( 1.11 , 2.29) 0.034 1.791 ( 1.18 , 2.72) 0.022 1.651 ( 1.12 , 2.44) 0.035
Female CSW 1.205 ( 0.82 , 1.77) 0.423 1.600 ( 1.03 , 2.48) 0.079 1.532 ( 1.00 , 2.35) 0.102
CSW Age (10 year increment) 0.938 ( 0.82 , 1.08) 0.443 1.010 ( 0.86 , 1.18) 0.917 1.007 ( 0.86 , 1.18) 0.941
High CSW Education⁵ 1.172 ( 0.86 , 1.60) 0.399 1.203 ( 0.87 , 1.67) 0.355 1.163 ( 0.84 , 1.61) 0.446
CSW has other income 1.178 ( 0.86 , 1.61) 0.384 1.189 ( 0.85 , 1.66) 0.391 1.196 ( 0.86 , 1.66) 0.372
CSW provides other health services⁶ 1.363 ( 1.01 , 1.83) 0.086 1.523 ( 1.11 , 2.09) 0.029 1.512 ( 1.10 , 2.07) 0.030
CSW has a phone 1.758 ( 1.29 , 2.40) 0.003 1.730 ( 1.24 , 2.41) 0.006 1.736 ( 1.25 , 2.41) 0.006
CSW adequately compensated⁷ 1.960 ( 1.44 , 2.67) <0.001 2.157 ( 1.56 , 2.99) <0.001 2.100 ( 1.52 , 2.90) <0.001
Walking time >1 hour to HF 1.021 ( 0.75 , 1.38) 0.912 1.014 ( 0.72 , 1.43) 0.946 1.019 ( 0.72 , 1.43) 0.927
Trust between CSW/Community⁸ 1.126 ( 0.78 , 1.64) 0.601 1.196 ( 0.57 , 1.23) 0.445 0.834 ( 0.57 , 1.23) 0.438
CSW is validated by supervisor⁹ 2.129 ( 1.58 , 2.87) <0.001 1.914 ( 1.40 , 2.62) 0.001 1.915 ( 1.40 , 2.61) 0.001
HF has a CSW registry 0.839 ( 0.41 , 1.74) 0.691 0.567 ( 0.26 , 1.26) 0.241
HF displays graphs of disease trends 0.857 ( 0.64 , 1.15) 0.391 0.912 ( 0.65 , 1.27) 0.650
Daily/weekly supervisor communication 1.120 ( 0.80 , 1.56) 0.577 0.989 ( 0.65 , 1.51) 0.967
OIC is burdened by supervision⁶ 1.018 ( 0.68 , 1.51) 0.942 1.112 ( 0.65 , 1.90) 0.740
At least one reported case¹⁰ 1.083 ( 0.81 , 1.45) 0.654
Number of CSW information sources¹⁰ 1.611 ( 1.48 , 1.75) <0.001
Number of recalled process steps¹⁰ 1.492 ( 1.28 , 1.74) <0.001
90% CI
Unadjusted Proportional ORs





Determinants of Protocol Recall 
Table 4-5 shows the determinants of recalling the reporting protocol. CSWs recalled on 
average 1.74 steps of the 4-step protocol (verify, report, refer, feedback). CSWs with a 
phone were less likely to remember the protocol (OR: 0.599, p=0.011). CSWs who were 
satisfied with their compensation were more likely to remember process (OR: 1.642, 
p=0.011). Female CSWs were more likely to recall the protocol (OR: 1.534, p=0.091).  
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Table 4-5. Determinants CSW recall of the reporting process 
 
Outcome variable is the reported number of process steps recalled (Verify, Record, 
Report, Feedback) from 1 to 4 
1. All data are unweighted and based on CSW and health facility clinician self-reports. 
See “Yes” responses from Table 4-2 for reference categories 
2. Proportional odds assumption was rejected (Likelihood-ratio test vs. multinomial 
model χ2=79.58, p=0.028); however, modeling as partial proportional odds resulted in 
a nominal difference in coefficient estimates across the outcome. Ordinal model is 
presented for ease of interpretation. Model of partial proportional odds is given in the 
appendix for comparison. 
3. An explained variance greater than unexplained variance overall, based on omnibus 
F-test p-value < 0.05, Model 1 was more informative (more explained variance), the 
difference in BIC χ2=102.45(Model2-1) 
4. Intercepts indicate cut points (sometimes considered thresholds) and are not directly 
used in model interpretation 
5. High CSW education is defined as some high school education or greater 
6. Other health services encompass any involvement in community health programs, 
often health promotion activities and vaccination campaigns 
7. CSW incentive satisfaction and high supervision burden was dichotomized as Yes = 
“Strongly Agree” or “Agree” and No = Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree 
responses 
8. Lack of trust was based on a Likert response indicated “disagree” or “strongly 
disagree” that the community trusts them, or indicated community trust as a top three 
challenge in performing CEBS duties 
9. Supervisor validation is the first factor of the EFA 
10. High frequency indicates the CSW responded that supervision by the health facility 
occurred “Often” rather than “Sometimes’ or “Rarely” 
Model A: Facility + Community²˒³ Model B: Community Only³
Variables¹ OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
Intercept 1⁴ -2.339 (-2.67 , -2.01) <0.001 -2.619 (-3.72 , -1.51) <0.001 -1.844 (-2.83 , -0.86) <0.001
Intercept 2⁴ -0.308 (-0.50 , -0.12) 0.002 -0.492 (-1.57 , 0.59) 0.454 0.272 (-0.69 , 1.23) 0.578
Intercept 3⁴ 1.280 ( 1.05 , 1.51) <0.001 1.172 ( 0.09 , 2.25) 0.074 1.924 ( 0.95 , 2.90) <0.001
Intercept 4⁴ 3.473 ( 2.92 , 4.02) <0.001 3.420 ( 2.27 , 4.57) <0.001 4.164 ( 3.07 , 5.26) <0.001
County
Bong (ref) - - - (ref) - - - (ref) - - -
Grand Cape Mount 0.839 ( 0.60 , 1.18) 0.397 0.907 ( 0.62 , 1.32) 0.668 0.888 ( 0.58 , 1.36) 0.582
Lofa 0.959 ( 0.67 , 1.37) 0.846 1.275 ( 0.85 , 1.91) 0.325 1.151 ( 0.73 , 1.82) 0.545
Female CSW 1.512 ( 1.04 , 2.19) 0.068 1.534 ( 1.01 , 2.33) 0.091 1.468 ( 0.90 , 2.39) 0.122
CSW Age (10 year increment) 1.087 ( 0.94 , 1.25) 0.329 1.122 ( 0.96 , 1.31) 0.230 1.120 ( 0.93 , 1.35) 0.230
High CSW Education⁵ 0.914 ( 0.68 , 1.24) 0.624 0.969 ( 0.71 , 1.33) 0.871 0.922 ( 0.63 , 1.34) 0.670
CSW has other income 1.017 ( 0.75 , 1.38) 0.927 0.929 ( 0.67 , 1.30) 0.718 0.941 ( 0.63 , 1.40) 0.761
CSW provides other health services⁶ 1.115 ( 0.83 , 1.49) 0.542 1.334 ( 0.98 , 1.82) 0.127 1.324 ( 0.92 , 1.91) 0.133
CSW has a phone 0.656 ( 0.48 , 0.90) 0.028 0.599 ( 0.43 , 0.84) 0.011 0.601 ( 0.40 , 0.89) 0.012
CSW adequately compensated⁷ 1.661 ( 1.22 , 2.25) 0.006 1.642 ( 1.19 , 2.26) 0.011 1.585 ( 1.09 , 2.31) 0.017
Walking time >1 hour to HF 1.408 ( 0.96 , 2.07) 0.142 1.434 ( 0.97 , 2.13) 0.134 1.418 ( 0.88 , 2.27) 0.147
Trust between CSW/Community⁸ 1.524 ( 1.14 , 2.04) 0.018 1.516 ( 1.11 , 2.07) 0.027 1.533 ( 1.06 , 2.21) 0.023
CSW is validated by supervisor⁹ 0.882 ( 0.65 , 1.20) 0.502 0.844 ( 0.60 , 1.18) 0.409 0.844 ( 0.57 , 1.26) 0.406
HF has a CSW registry 0.620 ( 0.29 , 1.34) 0.307 0.452 ( 0.20 , 1.02) 0.109
HF displays graphs of disease trends 0.851 ( 0.64 , 1.14) 0.361 0.969 ( 0.70 , 1.33) 0.871
Daily/weekly supervisor communication 0.813 ( 0.59 , 1.13) 0.298 0.875 ( 0.60 , 1.28) 0.565
OIC is burdened by supervision⁶ 1.110 ( 0.78 , 1.58) 0.628 1.082 ( 0.71 , 1.65) 0.757
At least one reported case¹¹ 0.978 ( 0.73 , 1.31) 0.902
Number of CSW information sources¹¹ 1.370 ( 1.23 , 1.53) <0.001
Number of recalled triggers¹¹ 1.170 ( 1.11 , 1.24) <0.001
Unadjusted Proportional ORs
90% CI 90% CI 90% CI
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11. These variables correspond to other performance metrics and are not included in 
the modeling 
Determinants of Number of Information Sources 
Figure 4-1 illustrates slight differences in the type of sources favored by each gender, 
though there is little difference in the overall number of sources as seen in Table 4-2. 
Figure 4-1. Type of community rumor source by CSW Gender  
 
 
**All categories are mutually exclusive; other people in the community refer to word-of-
mouth 
 
Supervisor validation made it more likely to have more information sources (OR: 3.209, 
p<0.001) (Table 4-6). CSWs who were satisfied with their incentive were nearly twice as 
likely to have more information sources (OR: 1.677, p<0.001) The impact of CSW age, 
education level, and past involvement in health interventions varied based on the 
number of information sources. A ten-year increase in age resulted in slight increases in 
the number of information sources, significant at 3 or more (OR: 1.674, p=0.003) 
compared to only one source. CSWs with a high school or greater level of education 
were significantly less likely to have 4 (OR:0.371, p=0.002) or 5 or more sources of 
information (OR:0.368, p=0.002). CSWs who worked on past health interventions in their 
community or health facility were more than twice as likely to have 4 (OR: 2.163, 
p=0.070) or 5 or more information sources (OR: 2.246, p=0.015).  
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Table 4-6. Determinants of the number of reported rumor sources 
A. Unadjusted Bivariate Results 
 
B. Model A: Health Facility and Community Variables2,3 
 
C. Model B: Community variables only3 
 
Outcome variable is the reported number of sources used in information gathering, 
categorized as, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 or more.  
1. All data are unweighted and based on CSW and health facility clinician self-reports. 
See “Yes” responses from Table 4-2 for reference categories 
2. Proportional odds assumption violated (Likelihood-ratio test vs multinomial model 
χ2=174.92, p=0.006); modelling as partial proportional odds resulted in a noteworthy 
difference in coefficient estimates across the outcome 
3. An explained variance greater than unexplained variance overall, based on omnibus 
F-test p-value < 0.05, Model 1 was more informative (more explained variance), the 
difference in BIC χ2=59.12(Model2-1) 
4. Intercepts indicate cut points (sometimes considered thresholds) and are not directly 
used in model interpretation 
Variables¹ OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
Intercept -0.108 (-0.36 , 0.14) 0.403 -0.425 (-0.70 , -0.15) 0.003 -0.932 (-1.26 , -0.60) <0.001 -0.784 (-1.09 , -0.47) <0.001
County
County (ref) - - - (ref) - - - (ref) - - - (ref) - - -
Bong 0.523 ( 0.35 , 0.79) 0.009 0.884 ( 0.61 , 1.29) 0.589 0.754 ( 0.48 , 1.17) 0.291 0.891 ( 0.52 , 1.53) 0.728
Grand Cape Mount 0.965 ( 0.61 , 1.52) 0.899 0.962 ( 0.65 , 1.43) 0.871 1.073 ( 0.69 , 1.67) 0.795 0.859 ( 0.48 , 1.54) 0.668
Lofa 1.097 ( 0.70 , 1.73) 0.738 1.372 ( 0.91 , 2.07) 0.205 0.789 ( 0.48 , 1.29) 0.430 0.798 ( 0.42 , 1.51) 0.558
CSW Age (10 year increment) 1.193 ( 1.01 , 1.41) 0.085 1.161 ( 1.00 , 1.35) 0.108 1.353 ( 1.14 , 1.61) 0.004 1.233 ( 0.99 , 1.54) 0.123
High CSW Education⁵ 1.065 ( 0.74 , 1.54) 0.776 0.956 ( 0.68 , 1.34) 0.825 0.698 ( 0.48 , 1.02) 0.118 0.490 ( 0.31 , 0.78) 0.012
CSW has other income 1.681 ( 1.17 , 2.42) 0.019 1.091 ( 0.77 , 1.54) 0.676 1.381 ( 0.92 , 2.07) 0.191 2.498 ( 1.37 , 4.55) 0.012
CSW provides other health services⁶ 0.693 ( 0.49 , 0.98) 0.086 1.159 ( 0.84 , 1.61) 0.455 1.587 ( 1.10 , 2.30) 0.040 1.526 ( 0.95 , 2.44) 0.139
CSW has a phone 1.328 ( 0.92 , 1.91) 0.201 1.254 ( 0.89 , 1.77) 0.276 1.871 ( 1.23 , 2.85) 0.014 2.612 ( 1.43 , 4.75) 0.008
CSW adequately compensated⁷ 1.942 ( 1.36 , 2.78) 0.002 1.804 ( 1.29 , 2.53) 0.004 2.024 ( 1.34 , 3.05) 0.005 2.858 ( 1.60 , 5.09) 0.003
Walking time >1 hour to HF 1.066 ( 0.74 , 1.54) 0.774 0.835 ( 0.60 , 1.17) 0.378 1.155 ( 0.78 , 1.71) 0.546 1.274 ( 0.77 , 2.12) 0.432
Trust between CSW/Community⁸ 1.211 ( 0.76 , 1.92) 0.494 1.252 ( 0.83 , 1.88) 0.366 1.585 ( 1.02 , 2.47) 0.088 1.035 ( 0.57 , 1.87) 0.925
CSW is validated by supervisor⁹ 3.836 ( 2.65 , 5.55) <0.001 3.166 ( 2.25 , 4.45) <0.001 3.011 ( 2.00 , 4.53) <0.001 3.455 ( 1.97 , 6.05) <0.001
HF has a CSW registry 1.091 ( 0.47 , 2.52) 0.864 1.912 ( 0.79 , 4.64) 0.229 1.446 ( 0.48 , 4.34) 0.580 1.084 ( 0.32 , 3.68) 0.914
HF displays graphs of disease trends 1.101 ( 0.78 , 1.56) 0.651 1.233 ( 0.89 , 1.70) 0.285 0.934 ( 0.64 , 1.36) 0.764 0.884 ( 0.55 , 1.42) 0.667
Daily/weekly supervisor communication 1.457 ( 0.99 , 2.15) 0.111 1.147 ( 0.80 , 1.65) 0.537 1.037 ( 0.68 , 1.58) 0.887 1.307 ( 0.74 , 2.30) 0.435
OIC is burdened by supervision⁶ 0.684 ( 0.45 , 1.04) 0.132 0.756 ( 0.49 , 1.16) 0.284 0.864 ( 0.51 , 1.45) 0.642 0.940 ( 0.44 , 2.00) 0.891
At least one reported case¹¹ 1.316 ( 0.92 , 1.88) 0.206 1.056 ( 0.76 , 1.46) 0.781 0.858 ( 0.59 , 1.25) 0.499 0.986 ( 0.62 , 1.58) 0.962
Number of recalled process steps¹¹ 1.410 ( 1.17 , 1.69) 0.002 1.688 ( 1.42 , 2.01) <0.001 1.485 ( 1.22 , 1.81) 0.001 1.573 ( 1.20 , 2.05) 0.005
Number of recalled triggers¹¹ 1.753 ( 1.41 , 2.18) <0.001 1.726 ( 1.42 , 2.10) <0.001 2.405 ( 1.92 , 3.01) <0.001 3.973 ( 2.95 , 5.35) <0.001
Five or more sourcesThree sources Four SourcesTwo sources
90% CI 90% CI 90% CI 90% CI
Variables¹ OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
Intercept 0.317 ( 0.10 , 1.01) 0.103 0.085 ( 0.03 , 0.27) <0.001 0.013 ( 0.00 , 0.04) <0.001 0.006 ( 0.00 , 0.03) <0.001
County
Bong (ref) - - - (ref) - - - (ref) - - - (ref) - - -
Grand Cape Mount 0.498 ( 0.32 , 0.78) 0.011 0.931 ( 0.61 , 1.41) 0.778 0.798 ( 0.50 , 1.28) 0.432 1.092 ( 0.60 , 1.98) 0.807
Lofa 0.890 ( 0.59 , 1.34) 0.642 0.890 ( 0.59 , 1.34) 0.642 0.890 ( 0.59 , 1.34) 0.642 0.890 ( 0.59 , 1.34) 0.642
Female CSW 1.294 ( 0.84 , 2.00) 0.330 1.379 ( 0.85 , 2.24) 0.276 1.176 ( 0.66 , 2.08) 0.637 1.190 ( 0.67 , 2.11) 0.617
CSW Age (10 year increment) 1.180 ( 0.97 , 1.43) 0.159 1.261 ( 1.05 , 1.51) 0.034 1.674 ( 1.36 , 2.06) <0.001 1.282 ( 0.98 , 1.68) 0.133
High CSW Education⁵ 1.257 ( 0.83 , 1.90) 0.363 0.803 ( 0.55 , 1.18) 0.349 0.460 ( 0.30 , 0.71) 0.003 0.371 ( 0.22 , 0.63) 0.002
CSW has other income 1.437 ( 0.96 , 2.15) 0.140 0.951 ( 0.65 , 1.39) 0.828 0.931 ( 0.59 , 1.46) 0.794 1.971 ( 1.04 , 3.75) 0.083
CSW provides other health services⁶ 0.873 ( 0.59 , 1.29) 0.567 1.367 ( 0.95 , 1.97) 0.160 2.163 ( 1.42 , 3.30) 0.003 2.246 ( 1.30 , 3.88) 0.015
CSW has a phone 1.224 ( 0.82 , 1.83) 0.410 1.182 ( 0.79 , 1.77) 0.498 1.786 ( 1.06 , 3.02) 0.070 2.284 ( 0.99 , 5.26) 0.103
CSW adequately compensated⁷ 1.677 ( 1.21 , 2.32) 0.009 1.677 ( 1.21 , 2.32) 0.009 1.677 ( 1.21 , 2.32) 0.009 1.677 ( 1.21 , 2.32) 0.009
Walking time >1 hour to HF 1.082 ( 0.77 , 1.53) 0.707 1.082 ( 0.77 , 1.53) 0.707 1.082 ( 0.77 , 1.53) 0.707 1.082 ( 0.77 , 1.53) 0.707
Trust between CSW/Community⁸ 1.190 ( 0.81 , 1.76) 0.463 1.190 ( 0.81 , 1.76) 0.463 1.190 ( 0.81 , 1.76) 0.463 1.190 ( 0.81 , 1.76) 0.463
CSW is validated by supervisor⁹ 3.209 ( 2.33 , 4.41) <0.001 3.209 ( 2.33 , 4.41) <0.001 3.209 ( 2.33 , 4.41) <0.001 3.209 ( 2.33 , 4.41) <0.001
HF has a CSW registry 1.025 ( 0.47 , 2.24) 0.959 1.025 ( 0.47 , 2.24) 0.959 1.025 ( 0.47 , 2.24) 0.959 1.025 ( 0.47 , 2.24) 0.959
HF displays graphs of disease trends 1.334 ( 0.96 , 1.85) 0.148 1.334 ( 0.96 , 1.85) 0.148 1.334 ( 0.96 , 1.85) 0.148 1.334 ( 0.96 , 1.85) 0.148
Daily/weekly supervisor communication 1.388 ( 0.94 , 2.06) 0.169 1.388 ( 0.94 , 2.06) 0.169 1.388 ( 0.94 , 2.06) 0.169 1.388 ( 0.94 , 2.06) 0.169
OIC is burdened by supervision⁶ 0.671 ( 0.42 , 1.08) 0.170 0.671 ( 0.42 , 1.08) 0.170 0.671 ( 0.42 , 1.08) 0.170 0.671 ( 0.42 , 1.08) 0.170
Two sources Three sources Four Sources Five or more sources
90% CI 90% CI 90% CI 90% CI
Variables¹ OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value
Intercept 0.435 ( 0.18 , 1.05) 0.120 0.112 ( 0.05 , 0.27) <0.001 0.026 ( 0.01 , 0.09) <0.001 0.013 ( 0.00 , 0.05) <0.001
County
Bong (ref) - - - (ref) - - - (ref) - - - (ref) - - -
Grand Cape Mount 0.599 ( 0.39 , 0.91) 0.046 1.142 ( 0.77 , 1.70) 0.583 0.967 ( 0.62 , 1.52) 0.903 1.346 ( 0.76 , 2.39) 0.393
Lofa 1.128 ( 0.77 , 1.65) 0.603 1.128 ( 0.77 , 1.65) 0.603 1.128 ( 0.77 , 1.65) 0.603 1.128 ( 0.77 , 1.65) 0.603
Female CSW 1.295 ( 0.87 , 1.93) 0.289 1.295 ( 0.87 , 1.93) 0.289 1.295 ( 0.87 , 1.93) 0.289 1.295 ( 0.87 , 1.93) 0.289
CSW Age (10 year increment) 1.168 ( 0.97 , 1.41) 0.171 1.200 ( 1.01 , 1.42) 0.075 1.416 ( 1.05 , 1.92) 0.061 1.233 ( 0.98 , 1.55) 0.135
High CSW Education⁵ 1.268 ( 0.84 , 1.91) 0.338 0.823 ( 0.56 , 1.20) 0.399 0.532 ( 0.35 , 0.81) 0.014 0.409 ( 0.25 , 0.67) 0.003
CSW has other income 1.288 ( 0.87 , 1.90) 0.282 1.103 ( 0.73 , 1.67) 0.694 1.106 ( 0.72 , 1.71) 0.701 1.506 ( 0.75 , 3.04) 0.331
CSW provides other health services⁶ 0.847 ( 0.58 , 1.24) 0.477 1.355 ( 0.94 , 1.95) 0.169 1.924 ( 1.27 , 2.93) 0.010 2.047 ( 1.18 , 3.55) 0.032
CSW has a phone 1.269 ( 0.87 , 1.86) 0.304 1.237 ( 0.83 , 1.84) 0.378 1.575 ( 0.94 , 2.63) 0.145 1.820 ( 0.79 , 4.21) 0.233
CSW adequately compensated⁷ 1.707 ( 1.24 , 2.35) 0.006 1.707 ( 1.24 , 2.35) 0.006 1.707 ( 1.24 , 2.35) 0.006 1.707 ( 1.24 , 2.35) 0.006
Walking time >1 hour to HF 1.012 ( 0.72 , 1.42) 0.954 1.012 ( 0.72 , 1.42) 0.954 1.012 ( 0.72 , 1.42) 0.954 1.012 ( 0.72 , 1.42) 0.954
Trust between CSW/Community⁸ 1.175 ( 0.80 , 1.73) 0.492 1.175 ( 0.80 , 1.73) 0.492 1.175 ( 0.80 , 1.73) 0.492 1.175 ( 0.80 , 1.73) 0.492
CSW is validated by supervisor⁹ 3.046 ( 2.22 , 4.17) <0.001 3.046 ( 2.22 , 4.17) <0.001 3.046 ( 2.22 , 4.17) <0.001 3.046 ( 2.22 , 4.17) <0.001
90% CI 90% CI 90% CI 90% CI
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5. High CSW education is defined as some high school education or greater 
6. Other health services encompass any involvement in community health programs, 
often health promotion activities and vaccination campaigns 
7. CSW incentive satisfaction and high supervision burden was dichotomized as Yes = 
“Strongly Agree” or “Agree” and No = Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree 
responses 
8, Lack of trust was based on a Likert response indicated “disagree” or “strongly 
disagree” that the community trusts them, or indicated community trust as a top three 
challenge in performing CEBS duties 
9. Supervisor validation is the first factor of the EFA 
10. High frequency indicates the CSW responded that supervision by the health facility 
occurred “Often” rather than “Sometimes’ or “Rarely” 
11. These variables correspond to other performance metrics, and are not included in 
modelling 
 
The most common source of information was rumors from others in the community, 
following by faith based institutions, businesses, and community leaders (Figure 4-2).  
Figure 4-2. Type of community rumor source by number of total sources 
 










In this analysis, we explored the impact of contextual and input factors across a 
range of CSW performance metrics for a CEBS program in Liberia. Utilized in the 
appropriate circumstance, reporting of syndromes from the community increases the 
sensitivity of disease surveillance and conveys secondary advantages. These programs 
demand substantial investments. Improving CSW performance provides an opportunity 
to maximize program efficiency without compromising program activities.  
Contrary to the proposed framework (Figure 1-1), we found no correlation 
between the primary outcome of reporting and process indicators of performance. We 
had hypothesized that process indicators reflect the quality of active case finding in the 
community and would, in turn, increase the rates of reporting. This conflicting result 
suggests CSWs who demonstrate strong performance in reporting without 
corresponding performance in the process may have missed, or misreported, cases in the 
community. Communities with active reporting may have under-represented segments 
of the population, unreported conditions, or inadequate follow-up or verification of 
suspect triggers. In these cases, trigger reporting alone may not be a reliable or valid 
indicator of high sensitivity, and both outcome and process indicators should be used in 
concert during the monitoring and evaluation of the program. This result may also be an 
artifact of our focus on any reports, rather than the magnitude of report – improved 
quality metrics may increase the overall number of reports. A focus on determinants of 
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reporting is a valid approach for conditions such as Guinea-worm disease which identify 
endemics at village and not individual level. 
Substantial county variation was observed for reporting and trigger recall 
indicators. This was particularly true for reporting outcomes: CSWs in Grand Cape Mount 
and Lofa had substantially lower odds of ever reporting than CSWs in Bong, accounting 
for all other determinants. We do not know which unobserved determinants account for 
this variation. A possible explanation could be localized epidemics or different underlying 
endemic risks between counties. For instance, in 2016 Bong reported a higher than the 
usual number of diarrhea cases. Our assumption of at least one report per community 
during the program period may not be robust. More likely, underreporting rates vary by 
county based on unobserved health system factors including variable health information 
system infrastructure. Grand Cape Mount, in particular, had chronic underreporting for 
all administrative data, evidenced when comparing population-based measles cases in 
the 2013 Demographic Health Survey to HMIS reports in the same period.175 Health 
information reforms which increase demand and use of CEBS data at all levels may 
improve overall data quality.  
4.5.1 Determinants of CSW Performance in Liberia 
Incentives and CSW Performance 
The lack of correlation between satisfaction with the $30 monthly incentive and 
reporting was an unexpected finding. During program design, the discussion around 
incentives centered solely on its expected effect on reporting rates. It is not clear if this 
adverse finding suggests reporting is more sensitive to structural rather than behavioral 
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factors. The relationship between incentives and reporting may be confounded by 
altruism.21 Deci et al. (1999) propose incentives may crowd out intrinsic altruistic values - 
creating an inverse relationship.176 Liberia is a unique setting in this respect. Vigilance in 
Liberia is high following the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic, likely driving altruistic behavior 
to report disease and prevent further morbidity. As new triggers are added and 
memories of the epidemic fade, this effect may dissipate. Deci et al. (1999) suggest 
maintaining altruistic values by 1) minimizing authoritative style in disbursing incentives 
2) acknowledging excellent performance but not using incentives to strengthen behavior 
3) providing a choice on completing tasks and 4) emphasizing the exciting and 
challenging aspects of the work.176 
Incentive satisfaction was associated with increases across all three process 
indicators of performance. It is notable that the altruistic behavior hypothesized to 
modify reporting outcomes does not appear to have the same effect on these metrics. 
This disparity may be partially explained by CSWs connecting reporting as the main 
direct benefit to their community. Further, performance in the process indicators requires 
a more considerable effort than reporting in many instances.  Reporting is a comparably 
lower burden and can be completed by sending documentation to the patient to the 
health facility. This finding also suggests that volunteerism may be a satisfactory 
approach to implementing CEBS programs in non-emergency situations. This is 
particularly appropriate when disease reporting is prioritized over immediate public 
health response. Assuming performance in process indicators positively influences active 
case finding, programs aiming to curb the spread of epidemic-prone and high case 
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fatality conditions should consider incentivizing workers to reduce false negatives 
further.  
Recognition, Validation, and CSW Performance.  
Social validation was assessed through two determinants; trust by the community 
and recognition by supervisors. The two are complementary; positive relationships with 
the community increased reporting and recall of process steps, positive relationships 
with supervisors increased odds of trigger recall and the higher numbers of information 
sources. We hypothesize a shared mechanism of action. Validation and trust estimate 
socialization and prestige, which engenders in the CSW a sense of accountability and 
drives performance.169 We must also observe the reverse conclusion in this cross-
sectional assessment: good performance may lead to cordial relations. Both mechanisms 
likely are true to some degree, and we are not able to verify any causal pathways in this 
study. Nevertheless, discussing performance as a downstream result of social validation 
allows for preparation through program design, and is supported by the literature.101,177 
Status within the community was anecdotally the main motivation for CSW 
participation in CEBS, consistent with prior findings.153 This status is dependent on 
community trust in the health system, and building trust is a gradual process. Benefits 
and risks should be clearly communicated during community entry. The design and 
implementation of CEBS programs should be undertaken with the support and 
involvement of each community. In Liberia, CSWs were nominated by community health 
committees and selected by health facilities and NGOs with the goal of recruiting 
individuals with implicit community support. Community trust in the CSW can also mirror 
142 
 
trust in the larger health system. Association with the health system can be detrimental 
towards community relationships if service delivery is substandard.20 Patients are unlikely 
to inform CSWs of illness if they expect the health facility will not have medicine or the 
ability to provide treatment. The influence of supervisor validation is more 
straightforward. Following protocol in Liberia, supervisor meetings should review daily 
CSW activities, particularly efforts involved in active case finding. It follows that CSW 
performance in process indicators increase when the relationship is viewed positively. 
Investing in building social validation can result in ancillary benefits not assessed in this 
study. Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) posit social and monetary incentives are mutually 
reinforcing. The optimal approach is a purposeful combination of both.168,178 
Supervision and CSW Performance 
The goal of supervision and mentorship is to increase performance through 
iterative improvement. Consistent with previous work, we found no correlation between 
supervision frequency and performance in any of the four indicators.153 Despite this, 
supervision provides secondary benefits, such as acting as a pathway for providing 
essential supplies and logistics.179 However, there is potential to overburden already 
constrained health facility staff with supervisory responsibilities. This should be 
considered when setting supervision frequency. Likely, clinicians are less familiar with the 
goals of surveillance activities compared to treatment-focused case management 
activities. Clinicians in Liberia are provided an incentive to work in rural areas and may 
not be familiar with the traditions of local tribes. These clinicians may find it challenging 
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to mentor CSWs in context-specific activities such as building trust, identifying 
community rumor sources, or convincing a patient to travel to the health facility.  
In these settings, supplementing health facility supervision with a diversity of 
approaches (i.e., self-assessment, peer assessment) may be useful.180 One solution is to 
have a CSW report to community leaders or health committees, who are better suited to 
provide mentorship in these areas. Another approach is to set regular meetings at the 
health facility attended by all CSWs in the area. This has an added advantage of allowing 
peers to exchange ideas, benchmark performance, and feel part of a larger effort.101 
Walking Time and CSW Performance 
A walking time of more than one hour between the community and health facility 
resulted in a substantial reduction in odds of reporting. The impact of walking time 
varies by setting. In Liberia, walking time is associated with distance, poor infrastructure, 
and various socioeconomic factors. Lack of transportation was consistently cited as a 
major barrier in completing activities. CEBS shifts the travel burden from the health 
facility to the community, resulting in barriers for both patients and CSWs. 
Documentation sent with referred community members comprises most of the reports. 
When patients are too sick to travel, the CSW will act as an escort. However, procuring 
transportation is often prohibitively expensive.  
The implications of this finding are alarming: CEBS was not effective at increasing 
reporting in areas far from the health system where increased sensitivity is most needed. 
Programs operating in hard to reach areas must take deliberate steps to mitigate the 
effects of structural barriers to reporting. Investments in health extension workers can 
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shift the transportation burden and increase the frequency of field visits. Travel 
reimbursements decrease the monetary burden for community members. Providing 
resources for communications can help alert the health facility to possible cases. Though 
logistics are costly, these are worthwhile investments to remove structural barriers to 
improve reporting performance among CSWs.  
Interestingly, owning a phone did not improve the odds of reporting. Availability 
of a network connection and funds to make phone calls were not considered and may 
play a role in this adverse finding. Phone ownership may also be associated with 
unobserved effects such as status within the community or relative wealth. Phone 
ownership did increase the odds of trigger recall, and the number of information sources 
used in the community. The decreased odds of recalling process steps is likely tied to 
ease of reporting – CSWs are more likely to recall the “reporting” step, and neglect 
follow-up and verification. This result suggests that phone ownership is not enough to 
increase reporting in Liberia. A mHealth intervention, such as an electronic IDSR (eIDSR) 
program, may improve reporting by designing around these infrastructure barriers. 
Individual Characteristics and CSW Performance 
Older CSWs had higher odds of additional sources of information, potentially due 
to more extensive and established social networks in this group. Further, elders in the 
community may be community leaders with access to a variety of information sources 
through their position. On average, CSWs had about three sources of information: 1) 
community members 2) faith-based or community organizations and 3) community 
leaders. Older individuals were more likely also to gather information from businesses, 
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and traditional healers, and midwives. CEBS programs with similar community structures 
as Liberia can take advantage of this by preferentially recruiting older CSWs, or by 
designing community entry protocols to ensure CSWs are integrated with elders in the 
community.  
Education at a high school level or greater was negatively associated with having 
more than three sources of information. This link has been observed in previous research 
on CHW performance, concluding education leads to overqualification and less 
investment in the work.181 Bhattacharji et al. (1986) found a similar effect in a broad-
based CSW program in India, suggesting educated workers were less willing and able to 
engage with households with lower socioeconomic status, though the effect was 
overcome with supervision.160 The actual effect of educational level on performance will 
be highly dependent on context. In Liberia, the high level of unemployment regardless of 
education status may confound the true magnitude of the association. There may be 
value in exploring the benefit of setting both minimum and maximum criteria for 
education during CSW recruitment.  
Participation in previous health interventions increased odds for trigger recall and 
the number of information sources. Most of this experience derived from vaccination 
campaigns and the Ebola epidemic, though some areas have had community 
programming provided by international organizations. CSWs with experience in 
delivering health services are likely to be a known health resource in the community and 
gained familiarity with health facility staff. Surprisingly, prior experience increases odds 
of trigger recall, but not the knowledge of the program protocol. On average, CSWs with 
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prior experience recalled reporting and referral steps at a much higher rate than 
verification or follow-up. It is possible that prior programs did not incorporate these 
types of activities and reporting and referral were heavily emphasized during multiple 
trainings. These findings suggest that programs can gain performance benefits by giving 
recruitment preference to individuals with prior experience or building surveillance tasks 
into existing CHW programs. 
We found marginal differences between genders; female CSWs had 
approximately 50% better odds of recalling triggers and process steps. The Liberia CEBS 
programs focus on highly visible events which will likely be known by many in the 
community. This characteristic may mask potential individual demographic differences in 
case finding ability. The effect of gender in CEBS programs is likely grounded in the 
interaction between the epidemiology of reportable conditions and social norms and 
constructs. In Liberia, for example, we hypothesize women have an advantage in 
identifying measles triggers as they were more likely to utilize local schools and word-of-
mouth rumor sources, and directly observe cases develop due to their role in child care.  
The above findings support recommendations made by Rowe et al. (2005) 
suggesting performance can be improved by a detailed selection process.142 However, 
the above associations are likely specific to the Liberian CEBS program. Kok et. Al (2015) 
emphasize that individual characteristics have a mixed influence on performance and  
should be taken into account on a case-by-case basis.182 Recruitment should also 
consider ancillary benefits. For instance, our finding that genders have differences in 
rumor sources suggests a program which strives to achive gender parity in recruitment 
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will diversify information sorces, anday result in increased knowledge-sharing between 
CSW peers.20  
4.5.2 Limitations and Future Work 
Liberia's CEBS program was in response to the 2014 West African EVD outbreak, a 
large-scale event and significant shock to the health system. Galvanized communities 
likely resulted in performance increases in reporting and detection across all counties. 
This may have overemphasized estimates for structural barriers over behavioral factors 
for reporting outcomes. There were limitations in the assessment of some factors. The 
relationship between CSW demographic profile and performance may be mediated by 
the client community. The small sample for this study prevented the analysis of these 
intersectionality effects. Analysis of supervision effects did not include consideration of 
supervision quality. High-quality supervision is expected to increase the work 
performance and alter estimates for supervision frequency and supervisor validation.180 
We tested a subset of the conceptual framework which varied across communities 
and health facilities. Further assessment of determinants will require comparison across 
countries and programs. Generalization of these results to other contexts depends on 
the consideration of both local context and program goals. Despite these limitations, this 
study quantifies and provides insight into CSW performance in CEBS in Liberia. We also 
suggest mechanisms which inform the contexts in which they may be relevant. 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS & CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this study, we explored the influence of determinants of performance in a pilot 
CEBS program in Liberia implemented in response to the 2014-2016 West-African Ebola 
148 
 
epidemic. We identified areas which are influence performance in Liberia and may be 
important for other similar settings as well. High performance of CSWs alone does will 
not create an effective CEBS program, it must be coupled with informed design choices 
which promote sustainability and maximize sensitivity and PPV as discussed in Paper 2. 
As indicated in paper 1, during the epidemic, it proved difficult for the health system to 
reach the community, and there was a large amount of distrust. An effective CEBS 
program can build trust, and provides a pathway to increase community participation in 
disease surveillance and response. 
In Liberia, CSWs were at peak performance when they had the trust of the 
community, positive relationships with their supervisors, were satisfied with their 
incentives, were within an hour’s walking time of the facility, and had prior experience in 
delivering programs. We also identified a division between reporting and the program 
activities leading up to reporting.  
No factor significantly increased performance across all four indicators. County 
variation for reporting was also significant, indicating the considerable effect of 
unobserved variables. We recommend a more rigorous assessment of health system 
effects on community surveillance which encompass a variety of settings and program 
design. This will be useful when comparing professional cadres of CSWs and programs 
which utilize volunteer or informal participants. These findings provide direction for 
maintaining high levels of CSW performance and sustainable community surveillance 
programs in Liberia. Though community disease surveillance programs vary in structure 
149 
 
between settings, these data may be useful for similar programs in other low-income 





Emerging infectious diseases continue to pose a significant threat to global 
health.83,109 Low-income countries are especially vulnerable. Development brings new risk 
factors for emerging disease: shifting migration patterns, new human-animal interfaces, 
and anthropogenic climate change. Under-resourced disease surveillance systems limit 
the ability to detect EIDs. The lack preventative vaccines and pharmaceutical 
interventions further burden the disease surveillance system by imposing complicated 
case management and disease control interventions. Using surveillance data and results 
from a community surveillance pilot, this dissertation explores the epidemiological 
phenomena of the 2014-2016 EVD outbreak in Liberia and explores the potential of 
community surveillance to add capacity to the disease surveillance system.  
5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 In Paper 1, we estimate the EVD outbreak in Liberia resulted in 10,280 cases and 
5,121 deaths. The basic reproduction number was estimated to be 1.78, on the lower end 
of the range of previous Ebola Zaire epidemics.72,183 we estimate the attack rate to be 5.3 
per 1,000 persons in exposed communities, and the case fatality rate to be 48.4%, and 
illustrate substantial variation in all measures over space and time. Coverage of contact 
tracing, dead body management, and ETU treatment increased over time. Effectiveness 
of these interventions are less clear. Contact tracing was initiated for only 8.6% of cases, 
and most of the ETUs treatment beds were built late in the epidemic, and many were 
never used. There is also evidence that the surveillance system struggled to identify cases 
in a timely manner; nearly one in three cases were identified after death. The time trends 
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in transmission and interventions suggest that a reorganization in leadership and 
community engagement strategy was a turning point in bringing the epidemic under 
control. 
 Papers 2 and 3 explore the potential for a community surveillance program to 
address shortcomings in disease surveillance systems by increasing coverage and 
engaging communities. We found that over the 29 weeks, the CEBS pilot in the eight 
bordering counties identified resulted in 3,369 reports which met community trigger 
definitions, 885 of which met the case definition for the epidemic-prone disease. While 
we were not able to externally benchmark sensitivity, CEBS reports accounted for at least 
31.5% of reports in the national disease surveillance system from these countries during 
the program.  CSWs performed best when reporting diseases which were common, but 
the reporting of rarer conditions suffered. We identified 4 main archetypes for 
community surveillance programs; awareness programs are low capacity and typically 
intended to passively increase linkage to care for risk-prone diseases, community driven 
programs depend on informal cadres of volunteers trained as key informants, routine 
programs employ a more formal cadre of CSWs who are able to systematically report 
and respond to more complicated triggers, and active response programs include active 
case finding, response activities, and near real-time reporting. Designed as an active 
response, and transitioned to a routine program, we concluded if the pilot was scaled as 
initially designed, Liberia would not be able to sustain CEBS programs, primarily due to 
lack of political and domestic or long term external financial support. A transition to a 
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community-driven or routine program integrated into existing community health 
initiatives was proposed as a pathway to scale. 
 In paper 3, we further investigated CSW performance within CEBS programs. 
CEBS programs present unique challenges for CSW performance, including the 
identification of complex disease syndromes, a high burden of reporting, and the ability 
to affect behavior change and gather diverse sources of information. We also observed 
that remoteness continues to be a challenge for community reporting in Liberia. CSWs 
who were within an hour’s walk from the health facility had three times the odds of 
reporting a trigger during the program period compared to those who were more than 
an hour away. Odds of trigger recall, having more information sources and remembering 
program protocol were greatest among CSWs who were satisfied with their incentive and 
had a positive relationship with their supervisor. Personal characteristics also played a 
role; older CSWs had more sources of information in the community, whereas CSWs with 
a higher education had fewer sources of information. Female CSWs had higher odds of 
recalling the reporting process and were able to recall more triggers and had slightly 
different types of information sources than their male counterparts. The lack of common 
drivers between reporting and the quality indicators suggest that the quantity of 
reporting and quality of reporting have unique drivers.  
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERIA’S IDSR PROGRAM 
The EVD outbreak makes clear the potential for community programs in Liberia to 
increase the adoption of control measures and increase timeliness of reporting and 
improve overall resilience to a future emerging disease. However, the country must 
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garner political support, and identify a program structure which will be financially 
sustainable. Any attempt at systematizing CEBS in Liberia must also directly tackle 
transportation barriers, maintain a health supervisory relationship between health 
facilities and CSWs, and identify a motivating mix of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives. 
The Liberia Ministry of Health and Incident Management System is aware of these 
concerns. Results from the CEBS evaluation contained in papers 2 and 3 were presented 
to the Incident Management system in February 2017. CEBS was fully integrated into 
ongoing plans for recruitment of a formal CSW cadre in rural areas and became the first 
of eight core modules in a broader care package. In urban areas, a community-driven 
approach which recruited informal cadre of community volunteers was selected, whereas 
rural areas maintained a routine approach. The community disease triggers were 
standardized across the country and published in the National Technical Guidelines for 
Community Event-Based Surveillance, the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response 
Guidelines, and the Community Health Strategy, and all training materials. During the 
2017 Research Agenda formulation, community health was at the forefront. NGOs and 
the Ministry of Health committed to develop a community health information system to 
further monitor performance of frontline health workers and programs, and research 
projects pursuing the effectiveness of community engagement strategies and 
effectiveness of community health structures. 
While the integration of CEBS into the broader community health strategy was a 
welcome first step, there is an ongoing concern about the sustainability of a formalized 
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CSW program. This new initiative is a relaunch; the last CHW program provided 
surveillance activities but collapsed in 2012 after many months of missed payments and 
poor management. The current project is taking a more conservative approach, with 
recruitment and tools phased over a seven-year period and funded by a World Bank 
grant. But it is unclear how the country will afford a $70 monthly incentive without 
support from donors and aid organizations. Further, integration of CEBS into the broader 
package of services brings substantial savings but also dilutes the recall of rare disease 
conditions with the daily activities in the larger package of services. Routine simulations, 
quality training, and proactive monitoring and evaluation can aid in detecting 
performance issues which do arise. We also suggest an annual calculation of sensitivity 
and specificity for triggers which have external data sources, such as the upcoming 
demographic and health survey. These results can be used to fine-tune community 
trigger definitions to minimize false negatives and respond to changes in clinical 
presentation.  
5.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNITY SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS IN LICS 
The application of these findings to community surveillance programs in other settings 
depends on the similarity in context and program goals.182 Liberia’s program is focused 
on detecting epidemic-prone disease. The reporting burden for CSWs in Liberia is 
expected to be substantially lower than CSWs in programs which focus on common 
conditions. This increases the danger of false negatives in Liberia’s program, which puts a 




In Liberia’s CEBS approach, CSWs are legally volunteers and receive an incentive, 
with no salary or ancillary benefits. CSWs are required to fill out paper reports, and thus 
must be literate at the 6th-grade level and are integrated into a formal line of supervision 
and reporting. Other settings will have different structures and goals, resulting in 
different recruitment strategies and definition of metrics. Programs with fewer triggers 
and a less formal structure may not focus on the same quality metrics. Programs in areas 
with better infrastructure may not face the same barriers in transportation and reporting.  
Liberia is also unique in circumstance. CEBS was piloted in the wake of the EVD 
epidemic, and the benefit of disease surveillance to the community was known. Many 
CSWs reported they would continue to work without monetary incentive, as the service 
provided to the community and stature afforded were motivating factors themselves. As 
the memory of the epidemic wanes, or in settings without a recent health shock, 
motivations to participate and extent of general community involvement will differ.  
With these caveats in mind, inferences from this body of work can be applied to 
low-income countries, humanitarian and public health crises, or other settings with 
under-resourced disease surveillance systems. There is a clear potential of community 
surveillance programs to improve sensitivity of disease surveillance and community 
relations and multiply the effectiveness of traditional disease control measures to reduce 
morbidity and mortality. To be sustainable, program design should align with sensitivity 
goals and organizational and financial resources, as defined by our CEBS typology.  
Community driven programs which recruit key informants should maximize the 
variability in recruitment by age, gender, and education to take advantage of the 
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different types and number of information sources in the community. If multiple key 
informants are not possible, older, lower education level community members would 
maximize the overall number of information sources. Another option would be to target 
recruitment (especially if the disease target is more prevalent in a certain demographic) 
to take advantage of certain venues, such as recruiting school teachers or traditional 
healers. A mapping of markets, businesses, and vectors can aid in identifying potential 
resources and risks. Community driven programs can also incorporate community-led 
supervision to increase performance without establishing expensive formal supervision 
structures.  
Routine programs which require frequent reporting should minimize structural 
barriers, especially in communities’ distance from health facilities. This can include 
transportation vouchers at the health facility, transportation allowance, or a mHealth 
intervention which allows for reporting by phone from the field, where network 
infrastructure exists. In addition to the recommendations above, active programs should 
provide incentives to CSWs to maximize the quality of reporting. 
5.4 NEXT STEPS 
 This work identified several areas for further research to better understand the 
theory behind community surveillance sustainability and performance. To improve 
implementation, we must better understand how case finding occurs in the community, 
and how the complexity of trigger definitions affects rates of false negatives. This is 
especially important for passive programs which do not have a defined case finding 
process. Our finding that unknown disease and death triggers were often not recalled by 
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CSWs suggests more work needs to be done to improve the performance of programs 
with a central goal of detecting emerging infectious disease. Since community 
surveillance relies on timely reporting, further investigation on the types of 
transportation barriers and effectiveness of potential solutions may yield insights on how 
to increase the overall rate of reporting.  
A more in-depth investigation on the differences between the proposed CEBS 
typology can further inform policy options. There are many program design options and 
blending of program types is common. The effect of some policy options (such as the 
size of the catchment area, effectiveness of non-monetary incentives, single vs multiple 
triggers) could not be explored in this work; and may have major impacts on 
sustainability and case finding. As the pilot evaluated in this study was implemented 
vertically, the effect and considerations when surveillance activities are integrated into a 
larger package of services is not clear. Our findings when looking across recall of triggers 
suggest surveillance activities may be a secondary priority to services which conducted 
more routine, but further research should be done to measure this effect. We also did 
not explore how CEBS data could be used other than for starting case investigations. 
Programs should explore how the information is fed back to the community, which may 
improve overall engagement and establish a line of accountability back to the 
community. In this work, we describe community trust as a necessary pre-requisite, but it 
is possible community surveillance activities can be leveraged to reduce stigma and 
increase trust in the health system. Given the barriers in disease control community 
distrust created in both this outbreak, and the ongoing EVD outbreak in the Congo, 
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community surveillance programs may be able to play a important role in turning the 
tide of community. 
Preventing widespread outbreaks due to emerging infectious disease will require 
community cooperation and engagement. Community surveillance programs provide a 
structured method to quickly identify disease and an avenue for health communication 
from within the community. Though these programs are an asset, their limited 
implementation and integration into large scale programs can be traced to the difficulty 
to sustain and scale such programs, especially in low-income countries with low health 
care accessibility, where this benefit would be most felt. The results presented in this 
dissertation attempt to clarify the role of community surveillance programs and identify 
the levers which can be controlled to improve sustainability and performance of these 
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7.1 PAPER 1 SUPPLEMENT 
7.1.1 Supplemental figure and tables 
Table 7-1. Key Pairs for Deterministic Matching 
 
 
Table 7-2. Selected Epidemiological Parameter Estimates of for Previous Zaire Ebolavirus, 
from Kerkhove et. al.72 
Parameter Estimate 
Incubation Period Distribution (range of central estimates, (range)) * 5.3–12.7 (1–21) days 
Serial interval Distribution (range of mean estimates) 10–16.1 days 
 Khan et al. (mean)184 14 days‡ 
 Muyembe & Kipasa (approximation)185 10 days ‡ 
 Dowell et al. (median, (range))186 Med=17 days (9–25) 
 White & Pagano (mean, (IQR))187 5.82 days (5.43–7.60) 
 Maganga et al. (median, (range), mean, s.d.)188 Med=16 days (3–27), 16.1 days, 4.4 
R 0 (range of estimates) 1.36–4.71 
Key # Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 3 Variable 4 Variable 5 Variable 6 Variable 7
1 County of Residence Case ID from DHIS
2 County of Residence
Case ID from Survivor 
Database
3 County of Residence
Case ID from VHF 
Database
4 County of Residence First and Last Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Has a source listed Quarter of Onset Date Patient Sex
5 County of Residence First and Last Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Missing Age Patient Sex Rare First/Last Name Pair
6 County of Residence First and Last Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Missing Age Patient Sex Same week of onset
7 County of Residence First and Last Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Patient Age Patient Sex Quarter of Onset Date
8 County of Residence First and Last Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Patient Age (Decade) Has a source listed
9 County of Residence First and Last Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Patient Age (Ones digit) Village of Residence Quarter of Onset Date
10 County of Residence First and Last Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Quarter of Death Date Patient Sex Village of Death
11 County of Residence First and Last Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Rare First/Last Name Pair Patient Sex Patient Age
12 First and Last Name First and Last Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Rare First/Last Name Pair Patient Sex Quarter of Onset Date
13 County of Residence
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Rare First/Last Name Pair Patient Sex Same week of onset
14 County of Residence First and Last Name Missing Age Patient Sex Missing Age Same week of onset
15 County of Residence First and Last Name Missing Age Patient Sex Same week of onset
16 County of Residence First and Last Name Patient Age Date of Report
17 County of Residence First and Last Name Patient Age Date of Symptom Onset
18 County of Residence First and Last Name Patient Age
Date of Symptom Onset 
(Month/day transposed)
19 County of Residence First and Last Name Patient Age (Decade) Date of Death
20 County of Residence First and Last Name Patient Age (Decade) Date of Report
21 ID of Source Case First and Last Name Patient Age (Decade) Same week of onset Village of Death
22 County of Residence Is a source record
Reversed First and Last 
Name
Patient Age (Decade) Patient Age (Decade) Patient Sex Quarter of Death Date
23 County of Residence
Reversed First and Last 
Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Patient Age (Decade) Quarter of Onset Date Municipality
24 County of Residence
Reversed First and Last 
Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Patient Age_remainder Quarter of Onset Date Village of Residence
25
Reversed First and Last 
Name
Less than 3 occurences of 
full name in combined 
dataset
Patient Sex Quarter of Onset Date Village of Residence Patient Sex
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 Chowell et al. (estimate, s.d.)8 1.83, 0.06 
 Ferrari et al. (estimate, (95% CI)189 3.65 (3.05, 4.33) 
 Legrand et al. (estimate, (95% CI))75 2.7 (1.9, 2.8) 
 Lekone & Finkenstädt (estimate, s.d.)190 1.36, 0.13 
 Ndanguza et al. (estimate, (95% CI)) 2.22 (1.90, 2.73) 
 White & Pagano (estimate, (IQR))187 1.93 (1.74–2.78) 
 Camacho et al. (estimate, (95% CI))191 4.71 (3.92, 5.66) 
Rt (range of estimates) 0.84-1.29 
 Maganga et l. (estimate, (95% CI)188 
1.29 (-4.72-7.29) 
0.84 (-0.38,2.06) 
Symptom onset to hospitalization  4–5; Med=3–4 
 Khan et al. (mean, median, (range), n184 5, Med=4 (0–19), n=219 
 Rowe et al. (mean, s.d., median, (range))192 4, 3.3, Med=3 (0–14) 
 Camacho et al. (median, (95% CI)) 191 Med=3.00 (2.81, 3.20) 
Symptom onset to death 6–10.1 
 Camacho et al. (median, (95% CI)) 191 Med=7.49 (7.30, 7.69) 
 Bwaka et al. (mean, (range), n) 37 10.1 (3–21), n=86 
 Dowell et al. (median)186 Med=10 
 Khan et al. (mean, median, (range), n)184 9.6, Med=9 (0–34), n=224 
 Nkoghe et al. (mean, (range), n)193 6.2 (3–13), n=12 
  Med=6 (<15 years old) 
  Med=9 (15–29 years old) 
 Sadek et al. (median, n)194 Med=10 (30–44 years old) 
  Med=8 (45–59 years old) 
  Med=9.5 (>59 years old), overall n=226 
 Georges et al. (range)195 12–18 
 Maganga et al. (median, (range), mean, s.d.) 188 11 (1–30), 11.3, 6.8 
Symptom onset to recovery 10 
 Camacho et al. (median, (95% CI)) 191 10.00 (9.80, 10.19) 
Hospitalization to discharge  17 
 Khan et al. (mean, median, (range), n)184 17, Med=14 (0–56), n=34 
Hospitalization to death 4.6 




















































7.1.2 Reporting Forms 




















7.2 PAPER 2 SUPPLEMENT 
 
7.2.1 Community Event-Based Surveillance Triggers 
 
Acute Flaccid Paralysis (Cripple Sickness) 
Any person with weakness in the legs and arms 
or not able to walk 
 
Measles 




Human Exposure to Rabies 




Acute Bloody Diarrhea 
Any person passing bloody pu-pu or slimy 






Any person with hot skin and stiff neck 
 
 
Viral Hemorrhagic Fever 
Any person who has fever and two and two or 
more other symptoms (headaches, vomiting, 
runny stomach, weak in the body, yellow eyes), 




Acute Watery Diarrhea 
Running stomach. Any person passing three or 
more watery pu-pu within one day 
 
 
Neonatal Tetanus (jerking sickness) 
Baby who is normal at birth, then after two 







Neonatal (young baby) death 
Baby who dies at birth or within 28 days after 
birth 
 
Maternal (Big belly) death 
Women who dies with big belly or within 42 





Unexplained cluster of disease 
Unknown health problems group together; any 
health problem that you don’t know about that 
is happening to many many people or animals 
in the same community 
? 
Unexplained cluster of death 
Any death in human or group of animals that 







7.2.2 CEBS and IDSR Reporting Forms 

















7.3 PAPER 3 SUPPLEMENT 
Table 7-3. Expected number of community reports by county 
 
Data from national Health Management Information System for subset of diseases 









































































































Bomi - 8 - - 70 2 4 1,105 - 15 110,762 1.80
Bong* 48 8 5 4 137 74 2 5,396 1 27 439,104 2.15
Gbarpolu* - 53 4 - 6 14 - 832 - 18 109,799 1.40
GrandBassa - 84 21 6 59 6 - 2,423 - 38 291,910 1.50
GrandCapeMount*
5 1 16 - - 11 3 - 371 2 23 167,325 0.42
GrandGedeh* 4 86 3 - 40 1 3 617 14 184 164,931 0.96
GrandKru - 62 7 - 5 5 - 1,835 2 18 76,256 4.21
Lofa* 3 248 93 - 186 69 - 10,114 120 170 364,554 5.01
Margibi 4 668 19 - 183 37 1 3,258 3 183 276,412 2.61
Maryland* - 225 18 - 21 9 - 2,915 1 21 178,994 2.97
Montserrado 565 420 49 5 402 53 - 8,632 4 416 1,472,421 1.19
Nimba* 8 83 25 28 524 16 5 12,456 12 258 608,363 3.66
RiverCess 2 18 - - 4 28 - 807 6 5 94,158 1.53
RiverGee* - 30 - - 5 - 2 507 13 14 87,943 1.08
Sinoe 33 104 1 - 31 - - 2,357 - 5 134,821 3.11













7.3.1 Weighted Regressions 
Table 7-4. Odds of CSW Ever Reporting during program period (23 weeks), adjusted  
 
Adjusted for survey design effects (multi-level model with finite population correction, 




Bong (ref) - - -
Grand Cape Mount 0.082 <0.001 ( 0.05 , 0.15)
Lofa 0.305 <0.001 ( 0.18 , 0.52)
Female CSW 0.749 0.415 ( 0.42 , 1.35)
CSW Age (10 year increment) 1.013 0.926 ( 0.81 , 1.27)
High CSW Education⁵ 0.635 0.068 ( 0.42 , 0.95)
CSW has other income 1.713 0.037 ( 1.12 , 2.61)
CSW provides other health services⁶ 1.255 0.397 ( 0.80 , 1.96)
CSW has a phone 0.961 0.875 ( 0.63 , 1.47)
CSW adequately compensated⁷ 1.393 0.208 ( 0.90 , 2.15)
Walking time >1 hour to HF 0.252 <0.001 ( 0.15 , 0.43)
Trust between CSW/Community⁸ 1.406 0.334 ( 0.78 , 2.52)
CSW is validated by supervisor⁹ 1.013 0.960 ( 0.66 , 1.56)
HF displays graphs of disease trends 1.071 0.814 ( 0.66 , 1.73)
Daily/weekly supervisor communication 0.680 0.249 ( 0.39 , 1.18)
OIC is burdened by supervision⁶ 0.865 0.657 ( 0.50 , 1.49)




Table 7-5. Odds of CSW Recalling Triggers, adjusted  
 
Adjusted for survey design effects (multi-level model with finite population correction, 






Bong (ref) - - -
Grand Cape Mount 1.139 0.611 ( 0.75 , 1.74)
Lofa 1.806 0.025 ( 1.17 , 2.78)
Female CSW 1.583 0.145 ( 0.94 , 2.66)
CSW Age (10 year increment) 1.019 0.871 ( 0.84 , 1.23)
High CSW Education⁵ 1.410 0.133 ( 0.97 , 2.06)
CSW has other income 1.391 0.127 ( 0.97 , 1.98)
CSW provides other health services⁶ 1.417 0.118 ( 0.98 , 2.04)
CSW has a phone 1.586 0.034 ( 1.11 , 2.26)
CSW adequately compensated⁷ 2.152 0.001 ( 1.50 , 3.08)
Walking time >1 hour to HF 1.096 0.697 ( 0.74 , 1.62)
Trust between CSW/Community⁸ 1.176 0.481 ( 0.80 , 1.73)
CSW is validated by supervisor⁹ 1.936 0.002 ( 1.38 , 2.72)
HF displays graphs of disease trends 0.778 0.265 ( 0.54 , 1.13)
Daily/weekly supervisor communication 1.014 0.962 ( 0.62 , 1.66)
OIC is burdened by supervision⁶ 1.064 0.854 ( 0.61 , 1.87)
Intercept 1 0.217554 0.748 (-0.91 , 1.34)
Intercept 2 2.417298 0.001 ( 1.32 , 3.52)




Table 7-6. Odds of CSW Recalling Program Process, adjusted  
 
Adjusted for survey design effects (multi-level model with finite population correction, 





Bong (ref) - - -
Grand Cape Mount 0.965 0.878 ( 0.65 , 1.42)
Lofa 1.304 0.283 ( 0.87 , 1.96)
Female CSW 1.320 0.282 ( 0.86 , 2.02)
CSW Age (10 year increment) 1.090 0.437 ( 0.91 , 1.31)
High CSW Education⁵ 0.921 0.676 ( 0.66 , 1.28)
CSW has other income 0.830 0.424 ( 0.56 , 1.22)
CSW provides other health services⁶ 1.221 0.319 ( 0.88 , 1.70)
CSW has a phone 0.573 0.015 ( 0.40 , 0.83)
CSW adequately compensated⁷ 1.630 0.024 ( 1.14 , 2.32)
Walking time >1 hour to HF 0.860 0.468 ( 0.61 , 1.21)
Trust between CSW/Community⁸ 0.722 0.271 ( 0.44 , 1.18)
CSW is validated by supervisor⁹ 1.368 0.146 ( 0.96 , 1.95)
HF displays graphs of disease trends 0.828 0.366 ( 0.59 , 1.17)
Daily/weekly supervisor communication 0.880 0.626 ( 0.57 , 1.36)
OIC is burdened by supervision⁶ 0.964 0.882 ( 0.64 , 1.45)
Intercept 1 -2.59486 <0.001 (-3.76 , -1.43)
Intercept 2 -0.48606 0.470 (-1.60 , 0.63)
Intercept 3 1.21356 0.072 ( 0.11 , 2.32)




Table 7-7. Odds of CSW using more information sources, adjusted  
 
Adjusted for survey design effects (multi-level model with finite population correction, 










Grand Cape Mount 0.908 0.705 ( 0.59 , 1.39)
Lofa 0.996 0.986 ( 0.67 , 1.49)
Female CSW 1.508 0.074 ( 1.03 , 2.20)
CSW Age (10 year increment) 1.327 0.013 ( 1.10 , 1.60)
High CSW Education⁵ 0.857 0.491 ( 0.59 , 1.24)
CSW has other income 1.171 0.475 ( 0.81 , 1.69)
CSW provides other health services⁶ 1.272 0.243 ( 0.90 , 1.79)
CSW has a phone 1.383 0.108 ( 0.99 , 1.93)
CSW adequately compensated⁷ 1.858 0.003 ( 1.32 , 2.61)
Walking time >1 hour to HF 1.112 0.623 ( 0.78 , 1.59)
Trust between CSW/Community⁸ 0.944 0.807 ( 0.64 , 1.39)
CSW is validated by supervisor⁹ 3.317 <0.001 ( 2.35 , 4.68)
HF displays graphs of disease trends 1.220 0.354 ( 0.85 , 1.74)
Daily/weekly supervisor communication 1.200 0.497 ( 0.77 , 1.87)
OIC is burdened by supervision⁶ 0.710 0.224 ( 0.45 , 1.13)
Intercept 1 1.457834 0.017 ( 0.47 , 2.45)
Intercept 2 2.724246 <0.001 ( 1.73 , 3.72)
Intercept 3 3.71051 <0.001 ( 2.72 , 4.70)




HBMM CEBS EVALUATION 
COMMUNITY QUESTIONAIRE 
 
Instructions: Use this tool to interview gCHVs about CEBS and POE activities. Ensure the gCHV 
interviewed is the same as on your listing, as multiple gCHVs may be present in a community. Record 
answers in the boxes. 
Identification 
A0_1 Respondent ID 
  
  
A0_2 County Name 
  
  
A0_3 District Name 
  
  





A0_6 Interviewer Name   
A0_7 Time beginning of interview |_||_|:|_||_| 






2. Partly Completed 




A0_10 Interview Date 
___ ___ / ___ ___ / ___ ___ ___ ___ 



















PROMPT: Today we will be talking about Community Event Based Surveillance, or 
“CEBS” as a part of the IDSR strategy to improve disease surveillance in Liberia. As 
you may know, CEBS is a way to use Community Health Workers and Assistants to 
refer potential cases of priority disease to the health facility. We have been 
implementing CEBS in your county, and want to understand how we can make the 
program sustainable and produce better data. This is an evaluation of the 
program, not a supervision or performance assessment. Your responses will be 
kept completely anonymous. 
A0_10 
Do you consent to the interview and wish 
to proceed? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
SECTION 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A1_1 








A1_2 What is your district of residence?  








A1_5 What is your community of residence? 
  
  
A1_6 What is your gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
8. No response 
 
A1_7 How old are you? 
 
|__||__| years 
(DK = 88) 
A1_8 
What is the last grade you completed in 
school? 
1. No formal schooling 
2. Elementary 
3. Junior High 
4. Senior High 
5. College/University 
8. Don’t Know 
9. Other 
 
A1_9 Do you have another source of income? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
A1_10 
A1_9x 
If you have another source of income, 








8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
next section 
A1_10x 




SECTION 2: BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS  
A2_1 Have you been trained in CEBS 





8. Don’t Know 
 
A2_2 Can you give me some reasons 
why your CEBS work is 







A2_3 In CEBS we use community 
triggers, which are symptoms 
which may indicate a sickness 
in the community and a need to 
go to the health facility. Can you 
please list all the triggers you 
can remember? 
 
DO NOT READ ANSWERS. 
Check off the following as the 
respondent mentions them, 
and prompt for more.  
Check off the following as the gCHV mentions 
them: 
Any person with weakness in the 
legs and arms or not able to walk 
(polio) 
 
Running stomach. Any person 
passing three or more watery pu-
pu within one day (acute water 
diarrhea) 
 
Diarrhea with blood, Any person 
passing bloodying pu-pu or slimy 
pu-pu with stomach pain (acute 
bloody diarrhea) 
 
Any person who is bitten by a dog 
or other animal (rabies)  
Any person with hot skin and 
spot-spot or red eyes (measles)  
Any person who has fever with 
two or more of headaches, 
vomiting, runny stomach, weak in 
the body, yellow eyes, or died 
after serious sickness with fever 
and bleeding (viral hemorrhagic 
fever) 
 
Any person with hot skin fever 
and stiff neck (meningitis)  
Big belly death, woman who dies 
with big belly or within 42 days 
after baby is born when belly 




Jerking sickness. Baby who is 
normal at birth, then after two 
days is not able to suck starts 
jerking (neonatal tetanus) 
 
Young baby death. Baby who dies 
at birth or within 28 days after birth 
(neonatal death) 
 
Unknown health problems 
grouped together, that is 
happening to many many people 
or animals in the community 
 
Any death in human or animals 
that you don't know why it 
happened 
 
A2_4 Briefly list the steps you take 








SECTION 3: Technical Determinants 
A3_1 
Do you currently have a phone 
that can text? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
A3_2 
Which of these networks can 
you use in your community?  
 






5. No network available 







If not 9, skip 
to A3_3 
A3_2x 





A3_3 Do you have access to internet? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
A3_4a 
In the past month, have you run 
out of reporting forms? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
A3_4b 
On average, how long does it 
take to get more forms after you 
have run out? 
1. Less than a day 
2. A few days 




In the past month, how often did 
you fill out the CEBS alert form 
after detecting a trigger? 
1. Often (every person) 
2. Sometimes (most persons) 






What is a reason you might not 
give a form to the person?  
A3_7 
How long does it take you to get 
to the nearest health facility by 
walking? 
1. Less than an hour 
2. More than an hour  
A3_8 





4. Personal car 
9. Other 
 







If another form of transportation 





What are the sources of health 
information in the community?  
 
DO NOT READ ANSWERS. 
Give examples of types of 
information: finding out about 
vaccinations or health alerts. 
Check all that apply and prompt 
for more answers 
1. Other people in the community 














What are the sources of rumors 
or information about sickness in 
your community which you use? 
 
DO NOT READ ANSWERS. 
Check all that apply and prompt 
by asking CHV to think about 
who they have received triggers 
from 
1. Local school 
2. Pharmacy or medicine store 
3. Other healers or midwives 
4. Stores, businesses, and 
markets 
5. Churches, mosques, or 
community organizations 
6. Community leaders 
7. Traditional healer 
8. Other people in the community 




















SECTION 4: Organizational Determinants 
A4_1 
How often do you talk with the 
OIC of your health facility about 







6. Don’t Know 
 
A4_2 




8. Don’t Know 
 
A4_3 
Have you been involved in any 
outbreak response activities 
with the DSO or OIC? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
A4_4 
Is your community leader 




8. Don’t Know 
 
A4_5 
How often do you meet with 






6. Don’t Know 
 
A4_6 
How often do you receive 
feedback from the OIC after 
referring someone to the health 
facility? 
1. Often (every person) 
2. Sometimes (most persons) 
3. Rarely (some persons) 
4. Never 
 
A4_7a Is there a Community Health 
Committee in your community 




8. Don’t Know  
A4_7b 
What kinds of things do you talk 
about?  
A4_8 
How many households do you 
cover? 
 
__ __ households 
     (DK = 88) 
A4_9 
How often do people with 
triggers go to the health facility 
after you ask them to? 
1. Often (every person) 
2. Sometimes (most persons) 




In the past one month, has 
there been anyone from your 
community who does not seek 
care because of: 
 
(reach each choice and check if 
yes) 
1. Thought it would go away by 
itself 
2. Transportation is too expensive 
3. Too far, no transportation 
4. Services too expensive 
5. Unfriendly staff 
6. Inconvenient hours 
7. Religious beliefs 
8. No one to accompany me 












If other reason someone does 





What do you do if the patient is 
not able or refuses to go to the 
health facility? 
 
A4_12 Did you receive any sort of 
CEBS job aid with pictures 
which help you do your work? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
A4_13 About how many hours a day 
do you spend doing this job? 
__ __ hours 
     (<1 hours = 00 hours; DK = 88) 
A4_14 How many days a month are 
you away from the community? 
__ __ days 
     (<1 days = 00 days; DK = 88) 
A4_15 When you have to leave the 
community, how do you find out 
about the health events that 




Tell me the main challenges of 








Do you have suggestions for 
how CEBS could be improved? 
 










8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
A4_20 
A4_19 
How much do you receive a 
month in USD for CEBS 
activities? 
 
__ __ USD 
     (DK = 88) 
 
A4_20 
If the government can’t pay 
money what other things would 










SECTION 5. Culture of Information 
 
PROMPT: For the last section, I will give you statements. You will tell me to what extent do you agree 
with the following on a scale?  
 

















I feel discouraged when the data that 
I collect/record is not used for taking 
action 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_2 
Collecting data is meaningful/useful 
for me 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_3 
I feel that the data I collect is 
important for the community 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_4 
I feel that collecting data is a burden, 
I have better things to do 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_5 
My work of collecting data is 
appreciated and valued by my 
supervisors 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_6 
I feel adequately compensated for 
my work 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_7 
People in the community trust the 
health facility to provide health 
services 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_8 
I feel people trust and talk to me 
about their health conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_9 
People sometimes face stigma from 
the community about health 
conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_10 
I feel that the OIC trusts me and 
values me 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_11 
I feel that the Field supervisor trusts 
and values me 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_12 
I feel like I get regular feedback 
about CEBS activities 
1 2 3 4 5 
A5_13 
I feel that people.in the community 
know about CEBS and why it is 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
END OF INTERVIEW 




HBMM CEBS EVALUATION 
HEALTH FACILITY QUESTIONAIRE 
Instructions:  
1. Use this tool to interview OICs about CEBS and POE activities.  
2. Fill in the information below based on the provided sample listing 
3. Record answers in the boxes. 
Identification 
B0_1 Respondent ID 
  
  
B0_2 County Name 
  
  
B0_3 District Name 
  
  





B0_6 Interviewer Name   
B0_7 Time beginning of interview |_||_|:|_||_| 






2. Partly Completed 





B0_10 Interview Date 
___ ___ / ___ ___ / ___ ___ ___ ___ 


















PROMPT: Today we will be talking about Community Event Based 
Surveillance, or “CEBS” as a part of the IDSR strategy to improve disease 
surveillance in Liberia. As you may know, CEBS is a way to use Community 
Health Workers and Assistants to refer potential cases of priority disease 
to the health facility. We have been implementing CEBS in your county, 
and want to understand how we can make the program sustainable and 
produce better data. This is an evaluation of the program, not a 
supervision or performance assessment. Your responses will be kept 
completely anonymous. 
B0_10 
Do you consent to the interview and wish 
to proceed? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
SECTION 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
B1_1 What is your district of residence? 
  
   
B1_2 What is your current position? 
  
   
B1_3 What is your profession? 
1. Physician 
2. Physician’s Assistant 
4. Nurse 








What level of schooling have you 
completed? 
1. Medical School 
2. Certificate Program 
3. BSN/BA 
4. High School 
9. Other  
 
 









SECTION 2: BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS 
  
B2_1 Have you been trained in CEBS 
sometime in the past year 




8. Don’t Know 
 
B2_2 Can you think of some reasons 
why your CEBS work is 







B2_3  In your opinion, are 
communities in your catchment 
area aware of and understand 












LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY 




B2_4 In CEBS we use community 
triggers, which are symptoms 
which may indicate a sickness 
in the community and a need to 
go to the health facility. Can you 
please list all the triggers you 
can remember? 
 
DO NOT READ ANSWERS. 
Check off the following as the 
respondent mentions them, 
and prompt for more.  
Check off as the respondent mentions them: 
Any person with weakness in the 
legs and arms or not able to walk 
(polio) 
 
Running stomach. Any person 
passing three or more watery pu-
pu within one day (acute water 
diarrhea) 
 
Diarrhea with blood, Any person 
passing bloodying pu-pu or slimy 
pu-pu with stomach pain (acute 
bloody diarrhea) 
 
Any person who is bitten by a dog 
or other animal (rabies)  
Any person with hot skin and 
spot-spot or red eyes (measles)  
Any person who has fever with 
two or more of headaches, 
vomiting, runny stomach, weak in 
the body, yellow eyes, or died 
after serious sickness with fever 
and bleeding (viral hemorrhagic 
fever) 
 
Any person with hot skin fever 
and stiff neck (meningitis)  
Big belly death, woman who dies 
with big belly or within 42 days 
after baby is born when belly 
move (maternal death) 
 
Jerking sickness. Baby who is 
normal at birth, then after two 
days is not able to suck starts 
jerking (neonatal tetanus) 
 
Young baby death. Baby who dies 
at birth or within 28 days after 
birth (neonatal death) 
 
Unknown health problems 
grouped together, that is 
happening to many many people 
or animals in the community 
 
Any death in human or animals 




Describe some items you check 
during a weekly data quality 
audit of your CEBS data? 
1) 
  






SECTION 3: Technical Determinants 
B3_1 




8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_2 
Which of these networks can 
you use within the facility?  
 















If not 9, skip 
to B3_3 
B3_2x 










8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_4 




8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_5 
Does the facility have access to 
a functional laptop for storing 
data, checking mail, and looking 




8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_6 
Do you have the priority disease 
clinical case definitions posted 
on the wall?  
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_7 
Do you have the community 




8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_8 
How often does your direct 
supervision or patient treatment 
take place in the community? 
1. Often (weekly) 
2. Sometimes (few times a month) 




If you had to travel to a 
community within 5km of your 
health facility for any reason, 




4. Personal car 
9. Other 
 
If not 9, skip 
to B3_11 





Do you keep an updated 




8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_11 
Do you have graphs of the 
priority disease trends within 
the catchment area updated in 









When patients are referred to 
the health facility by a gCHV, 
how often do they have the 
CEBS trigger form with them 
when they arrive? 
 
1. Often (every person) 
2. Sometimes (most persons) 




Who is responsible for verifying 




Who is responsible for filling out 





How often do you fill out an 
IDSR Case Alert Form after a 
CEBS referral matches an IDSR 
case definition? 
1. Often (every person) 
2. Sometimes (most persons) 




What are some reasons that a 
trigger meeting the case 
definition might not be reported 
on an IDSR case alert form? 
 
Prompt the respondent to come 








Do you have a place to keep 
CEBS forms at the facility? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_18 
In the past one month, have you 




8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_19 
Are there any formal Point of 
Entry in your catchment area? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_20 
Have any gCHVs or screeners 
at POEs referred any suspect 
cases to you? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_21 
Besides the gCHV or 
screeners, do you receive 
priority disease referrals from 
traditional leaders or other 




8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_22 
Do you have a room or area in 
the health facility for isolation? 
1. Yes 
2. No 






SECTION 4: Organizational Determinants 
B4_1 
Who at your facility is primarily 
responsible for the supervision 
of the gCHVs?  
1. Myself 
2. Another clinician at the facility 
3. IOM Implementing partner 
4. District Health Team Member 




How often do you communicate 
with the gCHV? 
 
1. Often (weekly) 
2. Sometimes (a few times a 
month) 




How often do you communicate 
to the gCHV about the outcome 
of a referral and any next 
steps? 
1. Often (every case) 
2. Sometimes (most cases) 
3. Rarely (some cases) 
4. Never 
 
B4_4a Is CEBS data used to inform 




8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
B4_5 
B4_4b 
Can you give me an example of 
when CEBS data was used to 




How often does the DSO 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B4_6a 
How often does the DSO ask 
about cases of priority disease 




4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B4_6b 
How often does the DSO talk to 
you about the data 
completeness, quality, and 




4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B4_6c 
How often does the DSO look at 
your HMIS logbooks to see if 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B4_6d How often does the DSO look at 




4. Rarely  
5. Never 






Tell me the main challenges of 
your job for CEBS?  
 
Prompt the respondent to come 








Do you have suggestions for 
how CEBS activities could be 
improved? 
 
Prompt the respondent to come 





B4_9 What is the biggest IDSR 
priority disease of concern in 
your catchment area? 
  
B4_10 Are there specific communities 
at high risk of disease or public 




8. Don’t Know 
 
B4_11 
Can you name the top at-risk 
communities? 
 
Prompt the respondent to come 








Have you been involved in any 
outbreak response activities 
with the DSO? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
B4_13 
B4_12b 
Can you give me an example of 
an outbreak response activity 
with the DSO? 
 
B4_13 
In the last one month, has the 










PROMPT: For the last section, I will give you statements. You will tell me to what extent do 
you agree with the following scale? 
















I feel discouraged when the data that I 
collect/record is not used for taking 
action 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_2 
Collecting data is meaningful/useful for 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_3 
I feel that the data I collect is important 
for the community 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_4 
I feel that collecting data is a burden, I 
have better things to do 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_5 
My work of collecting data is 
appreciated and valued by my 
supervisors 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_6 
People in the community trust the 
health facility to provide health services 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_7 
I feel people trust and talk to me about 
their health conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_8 
People sometimes face stigma from 
the community about health conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_9 
I feel that I get regular feedback about 
IDSR data quality from the District 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_10 
I feel that supervision and mentorship 
of CHVs is a burden 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_11 
I feel that I have support in addressing 
potential outbreaks in my catchment 
area 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_12 
I feel that I have the necessary training 
or experience to check data quality 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_13 
I can use data for identifying service 
performance gaps and setting 
performance targets 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_14 
I can use data for providing feedback to 
CHVs 
1 2 3 4 5 
B5_15 
I feel that my supervisors and policy-
makers demand complete, timely, 
accurate, relevant and validated IDSR 
and CEBS data 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
B5_16 
I feel that stigma about certain 
diseases in the community is a barrier 
to involving gCHVs in health education 
1 2 3 4 5 







1. Use this tool to interview DSOs about CEBS and POE activities.  
2. Record answers in the boxes. 
Identification 
E0_1 Respondent ID 
  
  
E0_2 County Name 
  
  





E0_4 Interviewer Name   
E0_5 Time beginning of interview |_||_|:|_||_| 






2. Partly Completed 





E0_8 Interview Date 
___ ___ / ___ ___ / ___ ___ ___ ___ 





































PROMPT: Today we will be talking about Community Event Based 
Surveillance and Point of Entry activities, as a part of the IDSR strategy to 
improve disease surveillance in Liberia. As you may know, CEBS and POE 
screening is a way to use Community Health Workers and Assistants to 
refer potential cases of priority disease to the health facility. We have been 
implementing CEBS in your county, and want to understand how we can 
make the program sustainable and produce better data. This is an 
evaluation of the program, not a supervision or performance assessment. 
Your responses will be kept completely anonymous. 
E0_10 
Do you consent to the interview 
and wish to proceed? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
 
First we will start by asking some basic background information. 
SECTION 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
E1_1 What is your district of residence? 
  
   
E1_2 What is your profession? 
1. Physician 
2. Physician’s Assistant 
4. Nurse 




If not 9, skip 
to E1_3 




What level of schooling have you 
completed? 
1. Medical School 
2. Masters 
3. Certificate Program 
4. BSN/BA 
5. High School 
9. Other 
 
If not 9, skip 
to E1_4 





When did you first start working as a 
DSO? 
 






SECTION 2: BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS  
E2_1 
Have you been trained in 
frontline FETP in the past year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E2_2 Have you been trained in 
Community Event-Based 
Surveillance sometime in the 





8. Don’t Know 
 
E2_3 Can you think of three reasons 
why your CEBS work is 
important to the health of the 
district? 
 






E2_4 In CEBS we use community 
triggers, which are symptoms 
which may indicate a sickness 
in the community and a need to 
go to the health facility. Can you 
please list all the triggers you 
can remember? 
 
DO NOT READ ANSWERS. 
Check off the following as the 
respondent mentions them, 
and prompt for more.  
Check off as the respondent mentions them: 
Any person with weakness in the 
legs and arms or not able to walk 
(polio) 
 
Running stomach. Any person 
passing three or more watery pu-pu 
within one day (acute water 
diarrhea) 
 
Diarrhea with blood, Any person 
passing bloodying pu-pu or slimy 
pu-pu with stomach pain (acute 
bloody diarrhea) 
 
Any person who is bitten by a dog 
or other animal (rabies)  
Any person with hot skin and spot-
spot or red eyes (measles)  
Any person who has fever with two 
or more of headaches, vomiting, 
runny stomach, weak in the body, 
yellow eyes, or died after serious 
sickness with fever and bleeding 
(viral hemorrhagic fever) 
 
Any person with hot skin fever and 
stiff neck (meningitis)  
Big belly death, woman who dies 
with big belly or within 42 days after 
baby is born when belly move 
(maternal death) 
 
Jerking sickness. Baby who is 
normal at birth, then after two days 
is not able to suck starts jerking 
(neonatal tetanus) 
 
Young baby death. Baby who dies 





Unknown health problems grouped 
together, that is happening to many 
many people or animals in the 
community 
 
Any death in human or animals that 
you don't know why it happened  
E2_5 
Describe three activities you 
would conduct during a data 
quality audit of CEBS or IDSR 
data 
 








SECTION 3: Technical Determinants 
E3_1 




8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_2 
Which of these networks can 
you use within your district?  
 













If not 9, skip 
to E3_3 
E3_2x 






Are you able to access internet 
within your district? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
E3_4 
E3_3b 




3. Internet at the district health 
office 
4. Internet at the county health 
office or county EOC 
9. Other (specify) 
 
If not 9, skip 
to E3_4 
E3_3x 
If another source of internet is 
available, specify  
E3_4 
Do you have a district office or 
room where you work? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
E3_6a 
E3_5a 
Do you have the priority disease 
clinical case definitions posted 









Do you have the community 
trigger definitions posted on the 
wall of your district office?  
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_5c 
Do you have a daily electricity 
supply in your district office? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_6a 
Do you keep a registry of CHVs 
with contact information? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_6b 
Do you have a copy of the most 




8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_6c 




8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_7 
Do you have access to a 
functional laptop for storing 
data, checking mail, and looking 




8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_8 
Do you have a functional 
motorbike which was provided 











Sometimes a health facility 
receives a priority case, but it 
does not get captured in the 
IDSR database. Can you think 
of some reasons why? 
 









In the past one month, have you 
run out of recently updated 




8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_11 
Do you have a place where you 




8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_12a 
Are there any formal POEs 
within in your district? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
E3_14 
E3_12b 
If you have a formal POE, how 
often do you meet with POE 




4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_12c 
Who is present at the POE 
meetings? 
1. Port health official 








If not 9, skip 
to E3_12d 
E3_12d 
Which other person is at these 
meetings?  
E3_13 
Do you provide routine 




8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_14 
Do you keep a record of which 
IDSR suspect cases were 




8. Don’t Know 
 
E3_15 
Do you keep a record of which 
cases have recently travelled 
from country to country? 
1. Yes 
2. No 






SECTION 4: Organizational Determinants 
E4_1 
Do you have a supervision tool to 
evaluate OIC and POE 
performance in IDSR activities? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E4_2 
On average, how often do you 
communicate with the health 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E4_3 
How often do you give feedback 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E4_4 
Which of the following sources of 
information do you check 
weekly? 
 
Select all that apply 
1. OIC or SFP tells me (oral 
report) 
2. HMIS ledgers 
3. IDSR Weekly Ledger 
4. IDSR Case Alert Forms 
5. CEBS forms 
6. Direct reports from community 










If not 9, skip 
to E4_5 
E4_4x 





E4_5a How often do you meet with the 
DHO to discuss IDSR 
performance and reporting of 






4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E4_5b 
Do you talk about CEBS or POE 
data at these meetings? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E4_6 
How often do you have routine 
(weekly or monthly) meetings 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E4_7a 
How often do you meet with the 




4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E4_7b 
How often do you meet with the 










8. Don’t Know 
E4_8 
How often does the CSO talk to 
you about the data 
completeness, quality, and 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 








8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
E4_10a 
E4_9b 
Can you give me an example of 
what was discussed at the 









8. Don’t Know 
 




Can you give me an example of 
what was discussed at the CEBS 
implementation team meeting? 
 
E4_11 
Have you ever worked with a 
gCHV to detect and respond to 
cases in a community? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
E4_12 
Have you ever worked with a 
gCHV to promote behavior 
change in a community? 
1. Yes 
2. No 




Is CEBS data used to inform 
community education and 
mobilization within communities 
in your district? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 




Can you give me an example of 
when CEBS data was used to 




Is CEBS data used to identify 




8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
E4_6 
E4_15 Based on your CEBS data, what 
communities are at the highest 
risk of disease in your district?  
E4_16 
Do you have graphs updated 
within the last month with the 










Who is responsible for verifying 
CEBS triggers meet the 
community case definition? 
 
E4_18 
Who is responsible for checking 
to make sure a suspect case 




Who is responsible for filling out 
IDSR Case Alert forms?  
E4_20 
Tell me three challenges of your 
job in relation to CEBS? 
 








E4_21 Do you have suggestions for how 
CEBS activities could be 
improved? 
 








PROMPT: For the last section, I will give you statements. You will tell me to what extent 
do you agree with the following scale? 























I feel discouraged when the data that I 
collect/record is not used for taking action 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_2 Collecting data is meaningful/useful for me 1 2 3 4 5 
E5_3 
I feel that the data I collect is important for my 
district 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_4 
I feel that collecting data is a burden, I have 
better things to do 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_5 
My work of collecting data is appreciated and 
valued by my supervisors 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_6 
People in the community trust the health facility 
to provide health services 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_7 
I feel people trust and talk to me about their 
health conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_8 
People sometimes face stigma from the 
community about health conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_9 
I feel that I get regular feedback about IDSR 
data quality from the county 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_1
0 
I feel that I get regular feedback about CEBS 
and POE data quality from the county 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_1
1 
I feel that supervision and mentorship of 
OIC/SFPs is a burden 





I feel that I have support in addressing potential 
outbreaks in my catchment area 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_1
3 
I feel that I have the necessary training or 
experience to check data quality 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_1
4 
I can use data for identifying service 
performance gaps and setting performance 
targets 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_1
5 
I can use data for providing feedback to OICs 
and POE staff 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_1
6 
I feel that my supervisors and policy-makers 
demand complete, timely, accurate, relevant 
and validated IDSR and CEBS data 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_1
7 
I feel that some OICs in my area do not 
understand why CEBS is important to their 
catchment area 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_1
8 
I feel that the CHV is a helpful resource when 
working in the community 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_1
9 
I feel comfortable in data cleaning, 
management, and analysis activities for 
surveillance information 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_2
0 
I feel that I need more training in data cleaning, 
management, and analysis activities for 
surveillance information 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_2
1 
I feel that I know how to create a line list when 
dealing with an outbreak 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_2
2 I feel that I know how to create spot maps 
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_2
3 
I feel that communities in my area understand 
why CEBS is important to them  
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_2
4 
I feel that I understand how CEBS data is 
captured and feeds into IDSR 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 







1. Use this tool to interview CSOs about CEBS and POE activities.  
2. Record answers in the boxes. 
Identification 
F0_1 Respondent ID 
  
  
F0_2 County Name 
  
  





F0_4 Interviewer Name   
F0_5 Time beginning of interview |_||_|:|_||_| 






2. Partly Completed 





F0_8 Interview Date 
___ ___ / ___ ___ / ___ ___ ___ ___ 


















PROMPT: Today we will be talking about Community Event Based 
Surveillance and Point of Entry activities, as a part of the IDSR strategy to 
improve disease surveillance in Liberia. As you may know, CEBS and POE 
screening is a way to use Community Health Workers and Assistants to 
refer potential cases of priority disease to the health facility. We have been 
implementing CEBS in your county, and want to understand how we can 
make the program sustainable and produce better data. This is an 
evaluation of the program, not a supervision or performance assessment. 
Your responses will be kept completely anonymous. 
F0_10 
Do you consent to the interview 
and wish to proceed? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
 
First we will start by asking some basic background information. 
SECTION 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
F1_1 What is your profession? 
1. Physician 
2. Physician’s Assistant 
4. Nurse 
5. Midwife  
9. Other 
 
If not 9, skip 
to F1_2 




What level of schooling have you 
completed? 
1. Medical School 
2. Certificate Program 
3. BSN/BA 
4. High School 
9. Other 
 
If not 9, skip 
to F1_3 











SECTION 2: BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS  
F2_1 
Have you been trained in 
frontline FETP in the past year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F2_2 Have you been trained in 
Community Event-Based 
Surveillance sometime in the 





8. Don’t Know 
 
F2_3 Can you think of three reasons 
why your CEBS work is 







F2_4 In CEBS we use community 
triggers, which are symptoms 
which may indicate a sickness 
in the community and a need to 
go to the health facility. Can you 
please list all the triggers you 
can remember? 
 
DO NOT READ ANSWERS. 
Check off the following as the 
respondent mentions them, 
and prompt for more.  
Check off as the respondent mentions them: 
Any person with weakness in the 
legs and arms or not able to walk 
(polio) 
 
Running stomach. Any person 
passing three or more watery pu-pu 
within one day (acute water 
diarrhea) 
 
Diarrhea with blood, Any person 
passing bloodying pu-pu or slimy 
pu-pu with stomach pain (acute 
bloody diarrhea) 
 
Any person who is bitten by a dog 
or other animal (rabies)  
Any person with hot skin and spot-
spot or red eyes (measles)  
Any person who has fever with two 
or more of headaches, vomiting, 
runny stomach, weak in the body, 
yellow eyes, or died after serious 
sickness with fever and bleeding 
(viral hemorrhagic fever) 
 
Any person with hot skin fever and 
stiff neck (meningitis)  
Big belly death, woman who dies 
with big belly or within 42 days after 
baby is born when belly move 
(maternal death) 
 
Jerking sickness. Baby who is 
normal at birth, then after two days 
is not able to suck starts jerking 
(neonatal tetanus) 
 
Young baby death. Baby who dies 





Unknown health problems grouped 
together, that is happening to many 
many people or animals in the 
community 
 
Any death in human or animals that 
you don't know why it happened  
F2_5 
Describe three activities you 
would conduct during a data 










SECTION 3: Technical Determinants 
F3_1 




8. Don’t Know 
 
F3_2 
Which of these networks can 
you use within your county?  
 













If not 9, skip 
to F3_3 
F3_2x 






Are you able to access internet 
within your county? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
F3_4 
F3_3b 




3. Internet at the district health 
office 
4. Internet at the county health 
office or county EOC 
9. Other (specify) 
 
If not 9, skip 
to F3_4 
F3_3x 
If another source of internet is 
available, specify  
F3_4 
Do you have a county office or 
room where you work? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
If 2, skip to 
F3_6a 
F3_5a 
Do you have the priority disease 
clinical case definitions posted 









Do you have the community 
trigger definitions posted on the 
wall of your county office?  
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
B3_5c 
Do you have daily electricity 
supply in your county office? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F3_6a 
Do you have a copy of the most 




8. Don’t Know 
 
F3_6b 




8. Don’t Know 
 
F3_7 
Do you have access to a 
functional laptop for storing 
data, checking mail, and looking 




8. Don’t Know 
 
F3_8 
Do you have a vehicle you can 
use for your IDSR work? 
1. Yes 
2. No 







Sometimes a health facility 
receives a priority case, but it 
does not get captured in the 
IDSR database. Can you think 
of some reasons why? 
 









In the past one month, have you 
run out of the recently updated 




8. Don’t Know 
 
F3_11 
Are there any formal POEs 
within in your county? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
If not 2, skip 
to E3_14 
F3_12a 
If you have a formal POE, how 
often do you meet with POE 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 




Who is present at the POE 
meetings? 
 
(select all that apply) 
1. Port health official 







If not 9, skip 
to E3_14 
E3_12c 
Which other persons are 






Do you provide routine 
supervision to screeners and 
PHOs at POEs? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F3_15 
Do you keep a record of which 




8. Don’t Know 
 
F3_16 
Do you keep a record of which 
cases have recently travelled 
from country to country? 
1. Yes 
2. No 






SECTION 4: Organizational Determinants 
F4_1 
Do you have a supervision tool to 
evaluate DSO and OIC 
performance in IDSR activities? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F4_2 
On average, how quickly do you 
find out about IDSR suspect 
cases from the district? 
1. Within a day 
2. Within a few days 
3. Within a week 
4. Within a month 
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F4_3 
How often do you give feedback 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F4_5a 
How often do you meet with the 
CHO to discuss IDSR 
performance and reporting of 






4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
If not 5 or 8, 
skip to F4_6 
F4_5b 
Do you talk about CEBS or POE 
data at these meetings? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F4_6 
How often do you have routine 
(weekly or monthly) meetings 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F4_7 
How often do you communicate 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F4_8 
How often does DPC give you 
feedback about the data 
completeness, quality, and 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
F4_9 




8. Don’t Know 
 





Can you give me an example of 
what is discussed at the CEBS 













How often do you talk to the 
CHDD about CEBS 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 




Is CEBS data used to inform 
community education and 
mobilization within communities 
in your district? 
1. Yes 
2. No 




Can you give me an example of 
when CEBS data was used to 





Is CEBS data used to identify 








Based on your CEBS data, what 
communities are at the highest 
risk of disease in your county? 
  
F4_14 
Do you have graphs updated 
within the last month with the 





8. Don’t Know 
 
F4_15 





Who is responsible for checking 
to make sure a suspect case 




Who is responsible for filling out 
IDSR Case Alert forms? 
  
F4_19 
Tell me three challenges of your 
job in relation to CEBS? 
 









Do you have suggestions for how 
CEBS activities could be 
improved? 
 











PROMPT: For the last section, I will give you statements. You will tell me to what extent do you agree with 
the following scale? 
















I feel discouraged when the data that I collect/record is not 
used for taking action 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_3 Collecting data is meaningful/useful for me 1 2 3 4 5 
F5_4 I feel that the data I collect is important for the county 1 2 3 4 5 
F5_5 
I feel that collecting data is a burden, I have better things to 
do 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_6 
My work of collecting data is appreciated and valued by my 
supervisors 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_7 
People in the community trust the health facility to provide 
health services 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_8 
I feel people trust and talk to me about their health 
conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_9 
People sometimes face stigma from the community about 
health conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_10 
I feel that I get regular feedback about IDSR data quality 
from the county 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_11 
I feel that supervision and mentorship of OIC/SFPs is a 
burden 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_12 
I feel that I have support in addressing potential outbreaks 
in my county 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_13 
I feel that I have the necessary training or experience to 
check data quality 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_14 
I can use data for identifying service performance gaps and 
setting performance targets 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_15 I can use data for providing feedback to staff 1 2 3 4 5 
F5_16 
I feel that my supervisors and policy-makers demand 
complete, timely, accurate, relevant and validated IDSR 
and CEBS data 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_17 
I feel that some DSOs in my area do not understand why 
CEBS is important 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_18 
I feel that CHVs are a helpful resource when working in the 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_19 
I feel comfortable in data cleaning, management, and 
analysis activities for surveillance information 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_20 
I feel that I need more training in data cleaning, 
management, and analysis activities for surveillance 
information 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_21 
I know how to create a line list when dealing with an 
outbreak 
1 2 3 4 5 
F5_22 I know how to create spot maps 1 2 3 4 5 
F5_23 
I feel that communities in my area do not understand why 
CEBS is important to them  
1 2 3 4 5 
E5_24 
I feel that I understand how CEBS data is captured and 
feeds into IDSR 







1. Use this tool to interview CSOs about CEBS and POE activities.  
2. Record answers in the boxes. 
Identification 
G0_1 Respondent ID 
  
  
G0_2 County Name 
  
  





G0_4 Interviewer Name   
G0_5 Time beginning of interview |_||_|:|_||_| 






2. Partly Completed 





G0_8 Interview Date 
___ ___ / ___ ___ / ___ ___ ___ ___ 


















PROMPT: Today we will be talking about Community Event Based 
Surveillance and Point of Entry activities, as a part of the IDSR strategy to 
improve disease surveillance in Liberia. As you may know, CEBS and POE 
screening is a way to use Community Health Workers and Assistants to 
refer potential cases of priority disease to the health facility. We have been 
implementing CEBS in your county, and want to understand how we can 
make the program sustainable and produce better data. This is an 
evaluation of the program, not a supervision or performance assessment. 
Your responses will be kept completely anonymous. 
G0_10 
Do you consent to the interview 
and wish to proceed? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
 
First we will start by asking some basic background information. 
SECTION 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
G1_1 What is your profession? 
1. Physician 
2. Physician’s Assistant 
4. Nurse 
5. Midwife  















G1_3 Which unit of the MOH do you work in? 
1. DPC 
2. CHSD (Community 
Health) 
3. HMER 
4. Health Promotion 




G1_3x If another unit, specify  
G1_4 
What level of schooling have you 
completed? 
1. Medical School 
2. Certificate Program 
3. BSN/BA 











SECTION 2: BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS (for DPC only) 
G2_1 
In CEBS we use 
community triggers, which 
are symptoms which may 
indicate a sickness in the 
community and a need to 
go to the health facility. 
Can you please list all the 
triggers you can 
remember? 
 
DO NOT READ 
ANSWERS. Check off the 
following as the 
respondent mentions 
them, and prompt for 
more.  
Check off as the respondent mentions 
them: 
Any person with weakness in the legs 
and arms or not able to walk (polio)  
Running stomach. Any person passing 
three or more watery pu-pu within one 
day (acute water diarrhea) 
 
Diarrhea with blood, Any person 
passing bloodying pu-pu or slimy pu-pu 
with stomach pain (acute bloody 
diarrhea) 
 
Any person who is bitten by a dog or 
other animal (rabies)  
Any person with hot skin and spot-spot 
or red eyes (measles)  
Any person who has fever with two or 
more of headaches, vomiting, runny 
stomach, weak in the body, yellow eyes, 
or died after serious sickness with fever 
and bleeding (viral hemorrhagic fever) 
 
Any person with hot skin fever and stiff 
neck (meningitis)  
Big belly death, woman who dies with 
big belly or within 42 days after baby is 
born when belly move (maternal death) 
 
Jerking sickness. Baby who is normal at 
birth, then after two days is not able to 
suck starts jerking (neonatal tetanus) 
 
Young baby death. Baby who dies at 
birth or within 28 days after birth 
(neonatal death) 
 
Unknown health problems grouped 
together, that is happening to many 
many people or animals in the 
community 
 
Any death in human or animals that you 
don't know why it happened  
G2_2 
Describe three activities 
you would conduct during 
a data quality audit of 
CEBS or IDSR data 
1) 
  




Sometimes a health 
facility receives a priority 
case, but it does not get 







database. Can you think of 
some reasons why? 
 









What steps would you 
take after finding a silent 
district for CEBS, or 
discrepancy between 













Who is responsible for 





Who is responsible for 






Who is responsible for 


























SECTION 3: OPERATIONAL CONTROL (for DPC only) 
G3_1 
Do you have a supervision tool for CEBS 
which is integrated into the overall IDSR 
and CHSD programs? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8. Don’t Know 
 
G3_2 
How often do you review the data 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
G3_3 
How often do you discuss data 
completeness, quality, and timeliness of 




4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
G3_4 
How often do you give feedback on 
performance of IDSR and CEBS activities 




4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
G3_5 
How often do you have routine meetings 




4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
G3_6 
How often do you have routine meetings 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
G3_7 
How often do you have routine meetings 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
G3_8 
How often do you review the data 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
G3_9 








In your opinion, what is the most important 
indicator of CEBS performance?  
G3_1
1 
Is CEBS data used to identify high risk 
communities within your county? 
1. Yes 
2. No  
245 
 
8. Don’t Know 
G3_1
2 
What is the biggest IDSR priority disease 
of concern in your county?  
G3_1
3 
Do you have graphs updated within the 
last month with the priority disease trends 
within the catchment area? 
1. Yes 
2. No 




Who is primarily responsible for the 





Who is primarily responsible for 
implementation and coordination of CEBS 
at the national level? 
 
 
SECTION 4: ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS 
G4_1
a 
Which of these meetings have 
you attended in the past 1 
month?: 
1. CEBS technical working group 
2. National Surveillance 
Technical Committee 
3. MNDSR Technical Committee 
4. CBIS Technical Work Group 
5. HMER Technical Working 
Group 











How often do you communicate 





4. Rarely  
5. Never 
8. Don’t Know 
 
G4_2 
Have you participated in 
Community Event-Based 
Surveillance training sometime in 





8. Don’t Know 
 
G4_3 
Can you think of three reasons 
why CEBS is important to the 








Based on your current position, 
which of the following roles do 
you play in CEBS implementation 
in Liberia? 
1. Technical support 
2. Operational support 
3. Supervision 
4. Monitoring and Evaluation 









If not 9, skip 
to G4_6 
G4_5x What other role do you play?  
G4_6 
Who do you talk to in order to 




What aspects of CEBS are 




What aspects of CEBS are 




What is your role in: 
 
Building relationships, 
communication, and coordination 
with other community key 
informants, resource persona, 
and existing formal and informal 
networks for information 




What is your role in: 
 
Community mapping and 





What is your role in: 
 
Community death recording with 
special emphasis on maternal 





What is your role in: 
 
Identify reporting priority 
diseases and event triggers as 
they occur in the community, 
including early case detection 





What is your role in: 
 
Adherence to IPC standard 
practices and community 





Have you ever used CEBS data 
to inform community education 




Tell me three challenges of your 
job in relation to CEBS? 
 










Do you have suggestions for how 














Describe three activities you 
would conduct during a data 













PROMPT: For the last section, I will give you statements. You will tell me to what extent do you agree with 
the following scale? 
















I feel that I get regular feedback about IDSR data quality 
from the county 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_2 
I feel that supervision and mentorship of OIC/SFPs is a 
burden 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_3 
I feel that I have support in addressing potential outbreaks 
in my catchment area 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_4 
I feel that I have the necessary training or experience to 
check data quality 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_5 
I can use data for identifying service performance gaps and 
setting performance targets 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_6 I can use data for providing feedback to staff 1 2 3 4 5 
G5_7 
I feel that my supervisors and policy-makers demand 
complete, timely, accurate, relevant and validated IDSR 
and CEBS data 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_8 I feel that CHTs do not understand why CEBS is important 1 2 3 4 5 
G5_9 
I feel that CHVs are a helpful resource when working in the 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_10 
I feel comfortable in data cleaning, management, and 
analysis activities for surveillance information 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_11 
I feel that I need more training in data cleaning, 
management, and analysis activities for surveillance 
information 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_12 I know how to create and use risk hotspot maps 1 2 3 4 5 
G5_13 
I feel that units at the MOH besides mine support 
implementation and value CEBS 
1 2 3 4 5 
G5_14 
I feel that CEBS implementation, supervision, and data use 
is well coordinated between units at the MOH 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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